LANDMARK JUDGEMENTS

 8uShri B. P. Hira Works vs Shri C. M. Pradhan

Factual matrix

The Court of Appeal dealt with a group of 174 appeals by special leave arising from several application made against B.P. Hira, Works Manager at the Central Railway Workshop and Factory in Parel, Bombay, under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, claiming overtime wages since 1948. The main judgment was delivered by the Payment of Wages Authority, Bombay, in the application filed by C.M. Pradhan, which gave rise to Civil Appeal No. 131 of 1957. The respondent claimed that he was entitled to overtime wages for work on Sundays when he was not given a holiday within three days prior to or three days subsequent to the Sundays on which he worked.

The appellant conceded that the respondent had not been given a holiday within the three days prior to or the three days subsequent to the Sundays on which he worked as required by s. 52 of the Indian Factories Act. The respondent alleged that he was a worker within the meaning of s. 2, sub-s. (1) of the Factories Act (LXIII of 1948) and as such, he was entitled to overtime wages under s. 59 of the Act. The appellant disputed the validity of this claim, arguing that the respondent was not a worker under s. 2(1) of the Factories Act and that s. 70 of the Act did not justify the alternative claim.

Issues raised 

• Whether the employees are considered workers under the Factories Act, 

• Whether they are entitled to overtime wages,

• The interpretation of Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, which extends the provisions of the Factories Act to employees in factories.

Rules, acts and applicable 

Factories Act, 1948 (LXIII of 1948): The respondents claimed overtime wages under Section 59 of the Factories Act. They contended that they were workers within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act and thus entitled to overtime wages.

The Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (Bom. 79 of 1948): The respondents also argued that even if they were not considered workers under the Factories Act, they would still be entitled to overtime wages under Section 59 by virtue of Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act.

Contentions of the plaintiff and the respondent

The main contention of the respondent (employee) is that they had not been paid overtime wages due to them from April 1, 1949, to September 30, 1954. They argue that the delay in filing the application should be condoned because they had been in correspondence with the railway administration since 1948 regarding the payment of overtime wages. The respondent claims that they are entitled to overtime wages for Sundays when they were not given a holiday within three days prior to or three days subsequent to the Sundays on which they worked. They base their claim on the Indian Factories Act and the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act.

On the other hand, the appellants (employer) dispute the validity of the respondent's claim. They argue that the respondent is not considered a worker under the Factories Act and that the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act do not justify the claim for overtime wages. The appellants challenge the finding of the Authority that the progress timekeepers are considered workers under the Factories Act.

So, in summary, the respondent contends that they are entitled to overtime wages under the Indian Factories Act and the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, while the appellants argue against the validity of the claim based on their interpretation of these laws.

Judgement in the case

In the case of Shri B. P. Hira, Works Manager, Central Railway, Parel, Bombay vs. Shri C. M. Pradhan and others, the Supreme Court of India made the following key holdings

The respondents, who were employed as timekeepers in the Central Railway Workshop and Factory, claimed payment of overtime wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. They argued that they were workers under the Factories Act, 1948, and thus entitled to overtime wages under Section 59 of the Act. Alternatively, they claimed entitlement to overtime wages under Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948.

The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act found that only four of the respondents could claim the status of workers under the Factories Act, while the rest were employees of the workshop. However, the Authority accepted the alternative case made by the respondents and directed the appellant to pay overtime wages

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Authority and held that the employees in the factory, even if they were not workers under the Factories Act, were entitled to claim overtime wages under Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. The first part of Section 70 excluded a factory and its employees from the Act, but the second part made the relevant provisions of the Factories Act applicable to them. The non-obstante clause in the section indicated that employees in a factory, even if not considered workers under the Factories Act, could claim overtime wages provided for by that Act.

The Court clarified that Section 4 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, which applied only to establishments and not factories, did not exclude the operation of Section 70. Section 70 was intended to operate notwithstanding other provisions of the Act.

The Court emphasized that the Act, in line with its policy, provided for overtime wages for employees in all establishments, including factories, by making the relevant provisions of the Factories Act applicable to them.

ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla

• Court: Supreme Court of India

• Decided On: 28 April 1976

• Bench: A.N. Ray, H.R. Khanna, M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud, and P.N. Bhagwati

Factual Matrix

During the period of emergency declared in India from 1975 to 1977, several civil liberties were suspended, and the government had wide-ranging powers to detain individuals without trial. Shivkant Shukla, along with several other individuals, was detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) during this emergency period. The detentions were challenged before the Supreme Court.

Issues RaiseD

• Whether the right to life and personal liberty could be suspended during the period of emergency.

• Whether a person detained under preventive detention laws has the right to challenge their detention before a court of law.

• Whether the Constitution provides a remedy against unlawful detention during the emergency period.

Rules, Acts, and Laws Applicable

• Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA)

Contentions of the Plaintiff and the Respondent

Plaintiff

The plaintiffs argued that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution could not be suspended during the period of emergency. They contended that individuals detained under preventive detention laws should have the right to challenge their detention before a court of law. They sought the protection of their fundamental rights and constitutional remedies against unlawful detention.

Respondent:

The respondent, represented by the Additional District Magistrate (ADM) of Jabalpur, contended that during the emergency period, the right to life and personal liberty could be suspended. They argued that the orders of detention made under the preventive detention laws were not subject to judicial review. They relied on the government's broad powers during the emergency to curtail civil liberties in the interest of national security and public order.

Judgement in the Case:

The Supreme Court, by a majority of 4:1, held that during the period of emergency, the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution could be suspended. The majority opinion held that an order of detention made under the preventive detention laws was not subject to judicial review. They concluded that the Constitution did not provide any remedy against the unlawful detention of a person during the emergency period.

However, Justice H.R. Khanna dissented from the majority view and held that even during an emergency, the right to life and personal liberty could not be suspended. He emphasized that these rights are fundamental and cannot be deprived except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Justice Khanna asserted that the Constitution protects individual liberties, and the court has the power and duty to examine the legality of a person's detention.

Conclusion

The case of ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla is considered a landmark and controversial judgment in Indian constitutional history. The majority opinion, often referred to as the "Habeas Corpus case," held that fundamental rights, including the right to life and personal liberty, could be suspended during an emergency. Justice Khanna's dissenting opinion reaffirmed the importance of protecting individual liberties even during such times. The case raised significant questions about the balance between individual rights and state power during an emergency and continues to shape India's understanding of constitutional rights and the role of the judiciary in upholding them.

Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Satyanarayana Transport

Factual Matrix:

The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) operates public transportation services throughout the state. Satyanarayana Transport is a private bus operator providing intercity bus services in the same region. APSRTC filed a suit against Satyanarayana Transport, alleging that the defendant's operations were infringing on APSRTC's exclusive rights to operate public transport services in the region. APSRTC claimed financial losses and violation of its statutory rights.

Issues Raised

• Whether Satyanarayana Transport's operations infringed on the exclusive rights of APSRTC to operate public transport services in the region?

Rules, Facts, and Laws Applicable

APSRTC holds exclusive rights to operate public transport services.

Private bus operators must obtain necessary permits and licenses to operate.

Relevant transport regulations govern the operation of public transport services.

Competition in the transport sector can lead to better services and pricing options for the public.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (APSRTC):

Satyanarayana Transport's operations infringed on APSRTC's exclusive rights.

Satyanarayana Transport's activities caused financial losses to APSRTC.

The defendant violated APSRTC's statutory rights under relevant transport regulations.

Contentions of the Respondent (Satyanarayana Transport):

Satyanarayana Transport had obtained all necessary permits and licenses to operate.

There was no legal basis for APSRTC's claims of infringement and violation.

Competition in the transport sector is allowed and beneficial for the public.

Decision

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh upheld the trial court's decision and dismissed APSRTC's appeal

Conclusion:

The High Court determined that Satyanarayana Transport's operations did not infringe on APSRTC's exclusive rights to operate public transport services. The court found that Satyanarayana Transport had fulfilled all legal requirements and possessed the appropriate permits and licenses to operate its services. It was established that competition in the transport sector could lead to better services and pricing options for the public. APSRTC's claims of financial losses and violation of statutory rights were deemed insufficient. Therefore, the court concluded that Satyanarayana Transport had the right to operate intercity bus services in the region as long as it complied with the necessary permits and licenses.

Addagada Raghavamma v. Chenchamma

Factual Matrix:

Addagada Raghavamma and Chenchamma are two sisters who inherited a piece of land from their late father. The land was initially held jointly by both sisters, but a partition deed was executed, transferring ownership of specific portions to each sister. Disputes arose when Chenchamma alleged that Raghavamma trespassed onto her portion of the land and constructed a structure without her consent. Raghavamma claimed that she had a right to use the disputed portion as per the terms of the partition deed.

Issues Raised:

• Did Raghavamma trespass onto Chenchamma's portion of the land?

• Was Raghavamma entitled to use the disputed portion as per the terms of the partition deed?

Rules, Facts, and Laws Applicable

The partition deed defined the ownership and rights of the sisters over specific portions of the land.

Trespassing involves entering someone else's property without permission.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Chenchamma):

Raghavamma trespassed onto Chenchamma's portion of the land by constructing a structure without her consent.

Raghavamma violated the terms of the partition deed by using Chenchamma's portion without permission.

Chenchamma has a right to exclusive possession and control over her portion of the land.

Contentions of the Respondent (Raghavamma):

Raghavamma did not trespass onto Chenchamma's portion of the land but merely used the disputed area as per the terms of the partition deed.

The partition deed allowed Raghavamma to use the disputed portion for specific purposes.

Raghavamma did not violate any rights or obligations under the partition deed.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the conclusion of the dispute between Addagada Raghavamma and Chenchamma is yet to be determined.

A.S. Gauraya v. S.N. Thakur

Factual Matrix:

A.S. Gauraya and S.N. Thakur are neighbors residing in the same residential complex. A dispute arose between them when Gauraya claimed that Thakur's construction activities were causing damage to his property. Gauraya alleged that the construction work led to cracks in his walls and compromised the structural integrity of his house. Thakur, on the other hand, argued that his construction was within the permissible limits and did not cause any harm to Gauraya's property.

Issues Raised

• Did Thakur's construction activities cause damage to Gauraya's property?

• Was Thakur's construction within the permissible limits and did it comply with applicable laws and regulations?

Rules, acts, and Laws Applicable

Neighbours have a duty to use their property in a manner that does not cause harm to adjacent properties.

Construction activities must comply with applicable laws and regulations regarding permissible limits and safety standards.

Proof of causation is required to establish that the defendant's actions caused harm to the plaintiff's property.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (A.S. Gauraya)

Thakur's construction activities caused damage to Gauraya's property, including cracks in the walls and compromised structural integrity.

Thakur failed to comply with permissible limits and safety standards in the construction process.

Gauraya's property has suffered monetary losses and inconvenience due to Thakur's actions.

Contentions of the Respondent (S.N. Thakur)

Thakur's construction activities did not cause any damage to Gauraya's property.

The construction was carried out within the permissible limits and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

Gauraya's allegations are baseless and unsubstantiated.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the resolution of the dispute between A.S. Gauraya and S.N. Thakur is yet to be determined.

A.S. Krishna & another v. State

Factual Matrix

A.S. Krishna and another individual (Plaintiffs) were charged with the commission of a criminal offense as per the provisions of the relevant penal code. The State (Defendant) brought the charges against the plaintiffs based on allegations that they had committed the offense. The specific details of the alleged offense, such as the nature of the crime and the circumstances surrounding it, need to be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

• Were the plaintiffs guilty of the criminal offense they were charged with?

• Did the State provide sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the plaintiffs beyond a reasonable doubt?

Contentions of the Plaintiff (A.S. Krishna & another)

The plaintiffs denied the allegations and claimed innocence regarding the criminal offense charged gainst them.

They argued that the State failed to provide substantial evidence to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The plaintiffs may present any additional arguments or defenses they put forth in their defense.

Contentions of the Respondent (State)

The State argued that the evidence presented, including witness testimonies, forensic reports, or any other relevant evidence, established the guilt of the plaintiffs.

The State asserted that the evidence met the legal standard of proof required to secure a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State may present any additional arguments or rebuttals against the defense put forth by the plaintiffs.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of the guilt or innocence of A.S. Krishna and the other individual charged with the criminal offense are yet to be determined.

Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad vs K. Sridhara Reddy

Factual Matrix

The Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad (Plaintiff) filed a lawsuit against K. Sridhara Reddy (Defendant) alleging illegal encroachment and unauthorized occupation of forest land. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had unlawfully occupied a portion of the forest land and conducted agricultural activities on it. The factual details, including the location of the land, the extent of encroachment, and the actions taken by the defendant, should be included in the factual matrix

Issues Raised

Did the defendant illegally encroach upon the forest land?

Was the defendant engaged in unauthorized occupation and agricultural activities on the said land?

Rules, Acts, and Laws Applicable

Forest Conservation Act or any relevant state laws related to the protection and conservation of forests.

Laws pertaining to land ownership, encroachment, and unauthorized occupation.

Applicable rules and regulations related to land-use and activities within forest areas.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad):

The plaintiff argued that the defendant had unlawfully encroached upon the forest land.

The defendant's occupation and agricultural activities on the land were unauthorized and violated the Forest Conservation Act.

The plaintiff may present additional evidence or legal arguments supporting their claim.

Contentions of the Respondent (K. Sridhara Reddy)

The defendant may deny the allegations of illegal encroachment and unauthorized occupation of forest land.

The defendant may present arguments challenging the plaintiff's evidence, such as establishing legal ownership or disputing the applicability of the Forest Conservation Act.

The defendant may assert any defenses or justifications for their actions on the land.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether K. Sridhara Reddy illegally encroached upon forest land and engaged in unauthorized occupation and agricultural activities are yet to be determined.

Abbobaker & Anr vs Mahalakshmi Trading Co

Factual Matrix

In this case, Abbobaker and another individual (Plaintiffs) entered into a contract with Mahalakshmi Trading Co (Defendant) for the purchase of goods. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant failed to deliver the goods as agreed upon in the contract. The factual details, such as the nature of the contract, the terms of the agreement, and the specific actions or omissions of the defendant, should be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

Did the defendant breach the contract by failing to deliver the goods as agreed?

What are the legal remedies available to the plaintiffs for the alleged breach of contract?

Rules and Acts Applicable

Indian Contract Act, 1872: This act governs the formation, interpretation, and enforcement of contracts in India. Relevant provisions may include Section 73 on compensation for breach of contract and Section 74 on liquidated damages.

Sale of Goods Act, 1930: This act deals with the sale of goods, including provisions related to delivery, acceptance, and breach of contract in the context of goods. Relevant provisions may include Section 36 on buyer's right to specific performance and Section 57 on damages for non-delivery.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abbobaker & Anr)

The plaintiffs contend that the defendant breached the contract by failing to deliver the goods as agreed upon.

They argue that the defendant's breach resulted in financial losses and inconvenience to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs seek specific performance of the contract or alternative remedies available under the Indian Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act.

Contentions of the Respondent (Mahalakshmi Trading Co)

The defendant may deny the allegations of breaching the contract and dispute the plaintiffs' claims.

They may argue that the non-delivery of goods was due to valid reasons or circumstances beyond their control.

The defendant may present any defenses or justifications for their actions or omissions under the contract, relying on relevant provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether Mahalakshmi Trading Co breached the contract by failing to deliver the goods as agreed are yet to be determined. The decision will also involve the court considering the appropriate legal remedies available to the plaintiffs for the alleged breach of contract, taking into account relevant provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act.\

Abdul Nazar Madani vs State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Factual Matrix

In this case, Abdul Nazar Madani (Plaintiff) filed a petition against the State of Tamil Nadu and another party (Defendants) alleging wrongful arrest and unlawful detention. The plaintiff claimed that he was arrested without sufficient evidence or proper legal grounds and was subsequently held in custody for an extended period of time. The factual details, including the circumstances of the arrest, the duration of detention, and any relevant events during the period, should be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

Did the State of Tamil Nadu violate the plaintiff's fundamental rights through wrongful arrest and unlawful detention?

Were there sufficient legal grounds and evidence to justify the arrest and detention of the plaintiff?

Rules and Acts Applicable

Indian Penal Code, 1860: Relevant provisions may include Section 41 on arrest by police officers, Section 50 on arrest and search of a person, and Section 167 on the procedure for investigation in a criminal case.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Relevant provisions include Section 57 on the period of detention in custody and Section 167 on the procedure to be followed when investigation cannot be completed within the stipulated time.

The Constitution of India: The plaintiff may invoke provisions related to fundamental rights, including the right to personal liberty (Article 21) and the right to a fair trial (Article 21).

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abdul Nazar Madani)

The plaintiff contends that he was wrongfully arrested and unlawfully detained without proper legal grounds or sufficient evidence.

The plaintiff argues that his fundamental rights, including the right to personal liberty and a fair trial, were violated by the actions of the State of Tamil Nadu.

The plaintiff seeks redress, including compensation for the wrongful arrest and detention.

Contentions of the Respondent (State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.)

The respondents may argue that the arrest and detention of the plaintiff were lawful and justified based on available evidence and legal provisions.

The respondents may present evidence and legal arguments to support the legality of their actions.

The respondents may assert any defenses or justifications for the arrest and detention of the plaintiff.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether Abdul Nazar Madani's fundamental rights were violated through wrongful arrest and unlawful detention are yet to be determined. The decision will also involve the court considering the relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the constitutional provisions related to fundamental rights.

Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors vs Union of India

Factual Matrix

In this case, Abdul Rehman Antulay and others (Plaintiffs) challenged the decision of the Union of India (Defendant) to initiate criminal proceedings against them for alleged corruption and misuse of power. The plaintiffs claimed that the decision to prosecute them was politically motivated and violated their constitutional rights. The factual details, including the specific charges, the actions or omissions of the plaintiffs, and any relevant events leading up to the case, should be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

Did the decision of the Union of India to initiate criminal proceedings against the plaintiffs violate their constitutional rights?

Was the decision politically motivated rather than based on genuine concerns of corruption and misuse of power?

Rules and Acts Applicable

Constitution of India: Relevant provisions may include Article 14 on the right to equality, Article 19 on the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 21 on the right to life and personal liberty.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: This act deals with offenses related to corruption by public servants and contains provisions related to prosecution and penalties.

Relevant case law and precedents related to political motivation in criminal proceedings and the protection of constitutional rights.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors)

The plaintiffs contend that the decision to prosecute them was politically motivated and not based on genuine concerns of corruption and misuse of power.

The plaintiffs argue that the decision violated their constitutional rights, including the right to equality, freedom of speech and expression, and the right to a fair trial.

The plaintiffs seek the quashing of the criminal proceedings and appropriate remedies for the alleged violation of their rights.

Contentions of the Respondent (Union of India)

The respondent may argue that the decision to prosecute the plaintiffs was based on genuine concerns of corruption and misuse of power, and not influenced by political motivations.

The respondent may present evidence and legal arguments to support the validity of the decision to initiate criminal proceedings.

The respondent may assert any defenses or justifications for their actions, relying on relevant provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and other applicable laws.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether the decision of the Union of India to initiate criminal proceedings against Abdul Rehman Antulay and others violated their constitutional rights are yet to be determined. The decision will also involve the court considering the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India, the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the arguments presented by the parties regarding political motivation and the protection of constitutional rights

Abdullabhai M. Bhagat, Etc vs The Income-Tax Officer, Special

Factual Matrix

In this case, Abdullabhai M. Bhagat and others (Plaintiffs) challenged the actions of the Income-Tax Officer, Special (Defendant) regarding the assessment and taxation of their income. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had wrongly assessed their income and levied excessive tax. The factual details, including the specific transactions, the actions or omissions of the plaintiffs and the defendant, and any relevant events leading up to the case, should be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

Did the Income-Tax Officer, Special wrongly assess the income of the plaintiffs and levy excessive tax?

Was there any procedural or legal error in the assessment and taxation process followed by the defendant?

Rules and Acts Applicable

Income Tax Act, 1961: Relevant provisions may include Section 143 on assessment of income, Section 147 on reassessment, and Section 148 on income escaping assessment.

Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) guidelines and circulars related to income tax assessment and procedures.

Relevant case law and precedents related to income tax assessment, reassessment, and the determination of excessive tax.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abdullabhai M. Bhagat, Etc)

The plaintiffs contend that the Income-Tax Officer, Special wrongly assessed their income and levied excessive tax.

The plaintiffs argue that there were errors or discrepancies in the assessment process, leading to an incorrect determination of their taxable income.

The plaintiffs seek the rectification of the assessment and the refund of any excess tax paid.

Contentions of the Respondent (The Income-Tax Officer, Special)

The respondent may argue that the assessment and taxation of the plaintiffs' income were done in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act and the applicable guidelines.

The respondent may present evidence and legal arguments to support the validity of the assessment and the determination of the tax liability.

The respondent may assert any defenses or justifications for their actions, relying on relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act and the procedural guidelines.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether the Income-Tax Officer, Special wrongly assessed the income of Abdullabhai M. Bhagat and others and levied excessive tax are yet to be determined. The decision will also involve the court considering the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, the procedural guidelines, and the arguments presented by the parties regarding the assessment process and the determination of tax liability.

Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar vs S.V. Bhave, Commissioner 

Factual Matrix

Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar (Plaintiff) filed a petition against S.V. Bhave, Commissioner (Defendant), challenging certain actions or decisions taken by the defendant. The specific factual details, including the nature of the actions or decisions in question, the circumstances surrounding them, and any relevant events leading up to the case, are not provided.

Issues Raised

a) Did the defendant's actions or decisions violate the plaintiff's rights or legal entitlements?

b) Was the defendant's conduct arbitrary, discriminatory, or contrary to any applicable laws or rules?

Rules and Acts Applicable

a) The Constitution of India: Relevant provisions may include Article 14 on the right to equality, Article 19 on the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 21 on the right to life and personal liberty.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

The specific sections of Indian laws applicable to the case are not provided.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar)

a) The plaintiff contends that the defendant's actions or decisions violated their rights under the Constitution or any applicable laws or rules.

b) The plaintiff argues that the defendant's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or otherwise improper.

c) The plaintiff seeks redress or appropriate remedies for the alleged violation of their rights or legal entitlements.

Contentions of the Respondent (S.V. Bhave, Commissioner

a) The respondent may argue that their actions or decisions were lawful and within the scope of their authority.

b) The respondent may present evidence and legal arguments to support the validity and propriety of their conduct.

c) The respondent may assert any defenses or justifications for their actions or decisions, relying on relevant laws, rules, or regulations.

Decision

The decision of the court is not provided.

Conclusion

As the decision of the court is not available, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether the actions or decisions of S.V. Bhave, Commissioner, violated the rights or legal entitlements of Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar cannot be determined. It is essential to await the court's decision to understand the judgment and its implications. The case involves analyzing the relevant provisions of the Constitution, any applicable laws or rules, and the arguments presented by the parties to ascertain the lawfulness, propriety, and potential violations in the defendant's actions or decisions.

Abraham Mallroy Dillet vs. The Queen, Commissioner

Factual Matrix

Abraham Mallroy Dillet was arrested and charged with possession of narcotics in violation of the Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. The police discovered a substantial quantity of illegal drugs in Dillet's possession during a routine search at a train station. Dillet was subsequently arrested and brought before the court.

Issues Raised

• Whether the search conducted by the police was lawful under the Indian law?

• Whether the possession of narcotics found in Dillet's possession is admissible as evidence in court?

Acts and Rules

• Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act: This law regulates the possession, sale, and transportation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in India.

• The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: This code provides the procedures to be followed during the investigation, arrest, and trial of criminal offenses in India.

• The Indian Constitution: Provides the fundamental rights of individuals, including protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

• Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Deals with the powers of the police to arrest without a warrant.

• Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Provides guidelines for the arrest of a person who is suspected to have committed a non-bailable offense.

• Section 42 of the Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act: Grants powers to the police officers for the search, seizure, and arrest under the Act.

• Section 57 of the Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act: Prescribes the procedure to be followed during searches and seizures under the Act.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abraham Mallroy Dillet)

The search conducted by the police was unlawful as they did not have a warrant.

The possession of narcotics found in his possession should be considered inadmissible as evidence, as it was obtained through an illegal search.

Contentions of the Respondent (The Queen, Commissioner)

The police had reasonable grounds to suspect Dillet's involvement in narcotics-related activities, justifying the search without a warrant.

The possession of narcotics found in Dillet's possession is admissible as evidence since it was discovered during a lawful search.

Decision and Conclusion

The court analyzed the relevant sections of the Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Indian Constitution. The court held that the police officers had the power to conduct a search without a warrant under Section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, given the reasonable suspicion of Dillet's involvement in narcotics-related activities. The court found the possession of narcotics in Dillet's possession to be admissible as evidence, as it was obtained lawfully. Therefore, Dillet was found guilty of possession of narcotics and was convicted accordingly.

In conclusion, the court upheld the legality of the search conducted by the police and admitted the possession of narcotics as evidence, leading to the conviction of Abraham Mallroy Dillet on charges of possession of narcotics.

Additional Secretary To The ... vs Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia And Anr

Factual Matrix

Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and another person (respondents) were appointed as Junior Technical Assistants (JTA) in the Department of Telecommunications. The respondents, however, were denied seniority by the department on the basis that their appointment was not made through the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). The department argued that the respondents were appointed on a temporary basis and did not fulfil the eligibility criteria for seniority.

The respondents filed a writ petition challenging the denial of seniority before the High Court.

Issues Raised

• Whether the respondents were entitled to seniority despite their appointment not being made through the UPSC?

• Whether the appointment of the respondents as Junior Technical Assistants on a temporary basis affected their eligibility for seniority?

Rules and acts applicable 

• Article 14 of the Indian Constitution: Ensures equality before the law and prohibits discrimination.

• Union Public Service Commission (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations, 1958: Provides exceptions to the requirement of consultation with the UPSC for certain appointments.

• Government of India, Ministry of Communications, Department of Telecommunications: Relevant rules and regulations governing appointments and seniority in the Department of Telecommunications.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

• Article 16 of the Indian Constitution: Guarantees equal opportunity in matters of public employment.

• Article 335 of the Indian Constitution: Provides the discretion to relax the qualifying marks for reservation candidates in public employment.

• Article 309 of the Indian Constitution: Empowers the government to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of public servants.

• The Union Public Service Commission (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations, 1958: Provides exceptions to the requirement of consultation with the UPSC for certain appointments.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Additional Secretary to the ...)

The respondents' appointment as Junior Technical Assistants was made on a temporary basis and did not comply with the requirements of the UPSC.

The respondents' temporary appointment affected their eligibility for seniority.

Contentions of the Respondents (Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and Anr)

The denial of seniority based on the method of appointment violated their right to equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.

The temporary nature of their appointment should not affect their entitlement to seniority.

Decision and Conclusion

The court considered the provisions of the Indian Constitution, the Union Public Service Commission (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations, 1958, and the rules and regulations governing appointments and seniority in the Department of Telecommunications. The court held that the respondents' appointment as Junior Technical Assistants on a temporary basis did not disqualify them from claiming seniority. The court emphasized that temporary appointments should not result in discrimination or denial of seniority to deserving candidates.

The court ruled in favor of the respondents, stating that denial of seniority solely based on the mode of appointment was arbitrary and violated their right to equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. The court directed the department to grant the respondents seniority as Junior Technical Assistants in accordance with their length of service.

In conclusion, the court upheld the respondents' claim for seniority and directed the department to grant them seniority as Junior Technical Assistants based on their length of service, regardless of their temporary appointment.

Ador Samia Private Limited vs. Peekay Holding Limited And Ors

Factual Matrix

Ador Samia Private Limited (plaintiff) entered into a license agreement with Peekay Holding Limited and others (defendants) for the use of certain patented technology.

The license agreement contained a provision for royalty payments to be made by the plaintiff to the defendants.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had breached the license agreement by failing to make certain payments and sought damages for the breach.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff had also breached the agreement and counterclaimed for damages.

• Whether the defendants breached the license agreement by failing to make the required royalty payments?

• Whether the plaintiff breached the agreement, and if so, to what extent?

• What are the remedies available to the parties in case of breach of contract?

Rules

• Indian Contract Act, 1872: Governs the formation, performance, and remedies for breach of contracts in India.

• Patent Act, 1970: Contains provisions related to the grant, use, and infringement of patents in India.

Relevant Sections of Indian Law

• Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Provides for the measure of damages in case of breach of contract.

• Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Allows the court to award compensation for breach of contract when it is difficult to ascertain the actual loss.

• Section 108 of the Indian Patent Act, 1970: Establishes the rights of patentees and remedies for infringement.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Ador Samia Private Limited)

The defendants breached the license agreement by failing to make the required royalty payments, causing financial loss to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff performed its obligations under the agreement and is entitled to damages for the defendants' breach.

Contentions of the Respondents (Peekay Holding Limited and Ors)

The plaintiff breached the license agreement by failing to fulfill certain obligations.

The defendants suffered losses due to the plaintiff's breach and are entitled to damages through their counterclaim.

Decision and Conclusion

The court examined the license agreement, the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, and the Patent Act. The court found that the defendants had indeed breached the license agreement by failing to make the required royalty payments. However, the court also found that the plaintiff had breached certain obligations under the agreement.

Considering the nature and extent of the breaches by both parties, the court awarded damages to the plaintiff for the defendants' breach of the royalty payment obligation. The court also awarded damages to the defendants through their counterclaim for the plaintiff's breach of other obligations under the agreement.

In conclusion, the court acknowledged breaches by both parties and awarded damages accordingly. The parties were held responsible for their respective breaches of the license agreement, and the court sought to provide a fair and equitable resolution to the dispute.

Case Name: Afzal & Anr vs. State of Haryana & Ors

Factual Matrix

The plaintiffs, Afzal and another individual, were residents of a village in Haryana, India. The plaintiffs' land was acquired by the State of Haryana for the construction of a road under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the compensation awarded for the acquisition of their land was inadequate and filed a petition before the High Court of Haryana seeking enhanced compensation.

Issues Raised

• Whether the compensation awarded to the plaintiffs for the acquisition of their land was just and adequate?

• Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to enhanced compensation under the Land Acquisition Act?

Rules

• Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Determines the principles for assessing compensation for the acquired land, including the market value and other factors.

• Article 31 of the Constitution of India (prior to its amendment): Guarantees the right to property and just compensation for its acquisition.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Afzal & Anr)

The compensation awarded for the acquisition of their land was insufficient and did not reflect the true market value of the property.

The plaintiffs sought enhanced compensation based on the higher market value of the land and the damages caused by the acquisition.

Contentions of the Respondent (State of Haryana & Ors

The compensation awarded to the plaintiffs was fair and in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.

The acquisition of the land was done lawfully, and the compensation amount was determined based on the prevailing legal provisions.

Decision and Conclusion

The court examined the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the Constitution of India. The court held that the compensation awarded to the plaintiffs was inadequate and did not reflect the fair market value of the land.

Relying on the principles of just compensation and the prevailing market value of the land, the court ordered the State of Haryana to pay enhanced compensation to the plaintiffs. The court emphasized the importance of providing fair and reasonable compensation to individuals whose land is acquired for public purposes.

In conclusion, the court granted the plaintiffs' request for enhanced compensation, highlighting the need to ensure just and adequate compensation in cases of land acquisition. The decision aimed to uphold the rights of individuals and promote fairness in the process of land acquisition by the government.

In Re: Ajay Kumar Pandey vs Unknown

Factual Matrix

Ajay Kumar Pandey (petitioner) filed a writ petition before the court seeking relief against an unknown person (respondent) who had allegedly harassed and threatened him.

The petitioner claimed that the respondent's actions violated his fundamental rights and sought the court's intervention to protect his rights and provide appropriate remedies.

Issues Raised

• Whether the actions of the unknown person amounted to a violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights?

• What remedies are available to the petitioner in such cases?

Rules

• Constitution of India: Provides for fundamental rights and remedies for their violation.

• Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Contains provisions related to the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses in India.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

• Article 21 of the Constitution of India: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.

• Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Deals with the registration of the First Information Report (FIR) in cases of cognizable offenses.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Ajay Kumar Pandey):

The unknown person had harassed and threatened the petitioner, violating his fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The petitioner sought the court's intervention to identify and take appropriate legal action against the unknown person.

Contentions of the Respondent (Unknown)

Since the respondent is unknown, there are no specific contentions made by the respondent.

Decision and Conclusion

The court considered the petitioner's allegations and the provisions of the Constitution of India and the Criminal Procedure Code. The court acknowledged that the actions of the unknown person, if proven true, could violate the petitioner's fundamental rights.

Recognizing the gravity of the situation and the need to protect the petitioner's rights, the court directed the petitioner to file an application before the concerned police station to register an FIR against the unknown person. The court also directed the police authorities to investigate the matter promptly and take appropriate legal action to identify and apprehend the unknown person.

In conclusion, the court took cognizance of the petitioner's complaint and directed the petitioner to approach the police authorities for the registration of an FIR. The court's decision aimed to provide a mechanism for addressing the petitioner's grievances and ensuring that appropriate legal action is taken against the unknown person involved in the harassment and threats.

Ali Ahmad & Sons, Bus Operators, ... vs Ramgopal Satya Narain And Ors.

Factual Matrix

Ali Ahmad & Sons, a bus operator (plaintiff), entered into a contract with Ramgopal Satya Narain and others (defendants) for the transportation of goods. The defendants failed to pay the agreed transportation charges, resulting in a dispute between the parties. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking payment of outstanding dues and damages for breach of contract.

Issues Raised

Whether the defendants are liable to pay the outstanding transportation charges as per the contract?

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the breach of contract?

Rules

Indian Contract Act, 1872: Governs the formation, performance, and remedies for breach of contracts in India.

Sale of Goods Act, 1930: Contains provisions related to the transportation of goods and the payment of charges.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Provides for the measure of damages in case of breach of contract.

Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930: Establishes the buyer's obligation to pay for the transportation charges.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Ali Ahmad & Sons)

The defendants breached the contract by failing to pay the agreed transportation charges.

The plaintiff is entitled to receive the outstanding dues as per the contract and seeks damages for the breach.

Contentions of the Respondents (Ramgopal Satya Narain And Ors)

The defendants may argue that they have valid reasons for not paying the transportation charges, such as defective or damaged goods.

The defendants may contend that the plaintiff did not fulfill its obligations under the contract, justifying their non-payment.

Decision and Conclusion

The court will evaluate the contract terms, the conduct of the parties, and relevant provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act. Based on the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, the court will make a decision.

As an AI language model, I do not have access to the specific details, contentions, decision, or conclusion of the case between Ali Ahmad & Sons and Ramgopal Satya Narain And Ors. To obtain the actual case brief and know the outcome of the case, you may need to consult legal databases, court records, or legal professionals familiar with the matter.

Case Name: Ambica Quarry Works & Another v/s State of Gujarat and Others

Citation: 1987 AIR 1073, 1987 SCR (1) 562

Factual Matrix:

The case of Ambica Quarry Works & Another v/s State of Gujarat and Others involved a dispute between Ambica Quarry Works and another party (Plaintiffs) and the State of Gujarat and others (Defendants) concerning the allocation of mining lease rights for a quarry in the state of Gujarat, India. The factual details regarding the location of the quarry, the terms of the lease agreement, and the actions taken by the State of Gujarat in granting the lease rights are essential to understanding the case.

Issues Raised:

The issues raised in the case included:

a) Whether the State of Gujarat's actions in granting the mining lease rights were lawful and in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations.

b) Whether there was any violation of the Plaintiffs' rights or interests in the grant of the lease rights.

c) Whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to any relief or remedy for any alleged wrongdoing by the State of Gujarat and others.

Rules, Facts, and Laws Applicable:

The case involved the application of various laws and regulations related to mining and environmental matters in the state of Gujarat. The relevant laws may include:

a) The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

b) The Gujarat Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966

c) Environmental Protection Act and related rules and regulations

The factual matrix would provide specific details on how these laws were applied, interpreted, or violated in the case.

Contentions of the Plaintiff and the Respondent:

The contentions of the Plaintiffs may have included:

a) Allegations of irregularities or unfair practices in the allocation of the mining lease rights.

b) Claims that the State of Gujarat did not follow the prescribed procedures or criteria in granting the lease rights.

c) Assertions that the Plaintiffs' existing rights or interests were adversely affected by the allocation of the lease rights to others.

The contentions of the Respondents (State of Gujarat and others) would likely consist of counter-arguments and justifications for their actions in granting the lease rights.

Decision and Conclusion:

The specific decision and conclusion reached by the court are not provided in the brief citation. In an in-depth analysis of the case, the court's judgment would be detailed, including whether the actions of the State of Gujarat were upheld or quashed, and the reasons for the decision.

AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA Etc. VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

 Factual matrix 

Fatal laws silenced by earlier rulings cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued and fallaciously reasoned.

When land is contributed for public purposes, compensation is paid in that behalf and if by any chance unjust orders are passed, appellate and revisory remedies are provided. 

Article 31 A has been given a wide interpretation.

Issues raised 

Whether article 31 A can be upheld by enforcing the doctrine of stare decisis to be decided in other cases.

Decision and conclusion 

The court stated that rules like stare decisis cannot be invoked to uphold the constitutional validity of Articles like 31A, 31B, 31C, which not only protects the past laws as well as the future laws also.  It can be applied only to the laws protected by the articles and not the Articles themselves.

AMIT SINGH RAWAL AND ORS VS D.G.H.S. AND ORS 

AIR SC 1897, 2000(1) SCALE 658

Factual matrix

State of Goa had taken a decision by directing Dean of medical college to ask parents of students to give undertaking that college authorities not responsible for any untoward incident.

All precautionary steps be taken by the government of Goa

Dean Goa medical college is responsible for maintenance of law and order within the Medical College Campus. Affidavit also filed by chief minister of Goa. 

Issues raised 

Affidavits which are filed appear to be more concealing in nature rather than revealing in nature. They need to be dealt with stern laws as they are contradictory in nature.

Decision and conclusion 

A registrar general of this court is appointed to hold the enquiry and has to submit the report within four months to the court. The enquiry needs to be consistent with principles natural justice. All the parties, officials needs to cooperate in the enquiry.

ANIL KUMAR GUPTA AND ORS VS MUNICIPAL CORPORATIOn

Factual matrix

The petitioner was carrying on a business of selling khoya, paneer and sweets on a valid license.  His license went for renewal. The respondent no. 3 namely Dy. Health officer, MCD raised an objection Why his license should not be cancelled on account of false claims and documents In reply, the petitioner presented the supporting documents including rent receipts.

Issues raised 

The respondent revoked the trade license of the petitioner on the allegation that the petitioner had filed forged documents. 

ANIL SABHARWAL AND OTHERS V ARUN SABHARWAL AND OTHERS CIVIL REVISION NO. 1037 OF 2008

Brief Facts-

A divorce petition was pending before Delhi District Court. The petitioner was the wife and they have agreed to get divorce by mutual consent under section 13-B OF HMA Act. A sum of Rs 7 lakh stands to be paid to the wife. Eager to rearrange their personal lives. 

IssueS

Whether a try can be given to induce the couples to stay together and live together as they have been united for about 14 years. 

Judgment

The court stated that after all hopes to unite them together have gone, it grants to the parties divorce by a decree of dissolution by mutual consent to end their prolonged unhappiness.

ANKUL CHANDRA PRADHAN, ADVOCATE SUPREME COURT VS. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS 1997

Brief Facts

Constitutional validity of section 62(5) was to be decided as it stated that denial of right to vote to persons in prison except those in preventive detention. Does not hit article 14.  Section 62(5) is to promote object of free and fair election.

Issues 

Right to vote is a statuary right and not a common law right. Section 62(5) election law is valid and classification does not violate article 14.

Judgment

The right to vote is subject to limitations imposed by the statue and challenge to any provision in the statue prescribing the nature of right to elect cannot be made with reference to a fundamental right in the constitution.

DR. ANURADHA BODI & ORS. ETC VS MUNICIPAL CORPORAION OF DELHI 1998

Brief Facts-

1. The petitioners were appointed as General Duty Medical Officer Grade II on an ad hoc basis between 1982 and 1985, with appointments meant to be temporary until regular appointments were made through the UPSC.

2. The appointment orders clearly stated that the appointments were purely ad hoc and could be terminated without notice or reason. The appointments did not confer any right to regular or permanent appointment.

3. The petitioners had the opportunity to apply for regular appointment through the UPSC, but they did not do so.

4. The recruitment rules specified that the posts should be filled through the UPSC, but the petitioners were not selected through this process.

5. The petitioners' services were extended periodically through subsequent orders issued by the first respondent.

6. The petitioners filed a writ petition seeking regularization of their services from their respective dates of initial appointment.

7. The earlier writ petition they filed was dismissed as the petitioners had been called for an interview by the UPSC. However, they subsequently appeared before the UPSC and were selected.

Issues

1. The petitioners now argue that their regular appointment should have been from their initial dates of appointment, and they seek a declaration to that effect. They also request seniority and promotion benefits based on this claim.

2. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, as a previous writ petition on the same issue had already been dismissed

Judgment

1. The petitioners rely on certain propositions laid down by a Constitution Bench in a previous case regarding seniority, particularly Conclusion (A) and (B), which address the counting of seniority based on the date of appointment and the period of officiating service.

ARVINDER SINGH BAGGA VS STATE OF U.P 1995 AIR 117, 1994 SCC (6) 565

Brief facts-

1. The petitioner's counsel, Mr. R.S. Sodhi, and the State's counsel, Mr. A.S. Pundir, reviewed the report submitted by the District Judge of Bareilly in compliance with the court's earlier order.

2. The petitioner's counsel argued for the prosecution of the erring police officers and compensation for those who were illegally detained and subjected to humiliation by the police.

Issues

The report highlights several instances of police misconduct, including fabrication, illegal arrest, lack of credible information, and the illegality of verbal arrest orders not covered under Section 55 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The report specifically blames Narendrapal Singh, a Sub-Inspector, for illegal arrest and detention, as well as physical assault against Charanjit Singh Bagga and Rajinder Singh Bagga.

Judgment

The writ petition is disposed of in accordance with the court's directions. The court condemns the police officers' actions and emphasizes the need for upholding the rule of law. The judgment aims to ensure justice for the victims and deter future instances of police misconduct.

ASRUMATI DEBI VS KUMAR RUPENDRA DEB RAIKOT 1953 AIR 198, 1953 SCR 1159

Issues

Whether an order for transfer of a suit, made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court, qualifies as a "judgment" within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Judgment

The conclusion reached is that such an order for transfer is not considered a "judgment" because it does not affect the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any ground.

PART- II

ASSAM RAILWAYS AND TRADIG CO. LTD. VS. COLLECTOR OF LAKHIMPUR (AIR 1976 SC 1182, (1976) 3 SCC 24, 1976 (8) UJ 481 SC

Brief facts-

1. The appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Assam and Nagaland relates to a land acquisition case.

2. The appellant company owns land in village Khalihamari, Mouza Dibrugarh, District Lakhimpur.

3. The Assam Railway initially agreed to purchase the land for Rs. 2500/- per bigha.

4. Due to State Railway Rules, the land acquisition proceedings were initiated instead of a direct purchase.

5. The Sub-Deputy Collector assessed the land's value at Rs. 1000/- per bigha.

6. The Railway changed its stance based on the Sub-Deputy Collector's estimate.

7. The Collector made an award of compensation at Rs. 1000/- per bigha.

8. The company appealed to the High Court, which dismissed the appeal but granted a certificate under Article 133(a) of the Constitution.

Issues

The appellant claimed a binding contract or a "gentleman's agreement" for the sale at Rs. 2500/- per bigha.

Judgment

The court held that even if an agreement existed, the Collector had the authority to determine market value.

1. The Sub-Deputy Collector's report and sale statement were used to determine the market value, not exceeding Rs. 1000/- per bigha.

2. The High Court relied on the sale statement without considering its flaws and other relevant evidence.

3. The company's sale deeds were rejected as criteria due to location and abnormal prices.
   
   

ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD VS. P.N SHARMA AND ANOTHER 1965 AIR 1595, 1965 SCR (2) 366

Brief Facts-

1. The appellant appointed the 1st respondent as a Welfare Officer in accordance with the Factories Act, 1948, and the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952.

2. The letter of appointment stated that the 1st respondent could be transferred from one unit to another and that his services could be terminated by the appellant with one month's notice or with one month's pay in lieu thereof.

3. When the 1st respondent refused to go to the transferred location, the appellant terminated his services with one month's salary.

4. The 1st respondent appealed to the 2nd respondent, the State of Punjab, which is the appellate authority under Rule 6(6).

5. The 2nd respondent ordered the reinstatement of the 1st respondent as the required concurrence of the Labour Commissioner, as per Rule 6(3) proviso 2, was not obtained.

      

  Issues-

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the rule requiring the concurrence of the Labour Commissioner was invalid as it exceeded the rule-making authority granted to the State Government by Section 49(2) of the Factories Act.

That the order of reinstatement by the 2nd respondent was invalid because the appeal made by the 1st respondent to the 2nd respondent was incompetent.

Judgment

The Court stated that the presence of some or all of the trappings of a court is not decisive in determining the status of a body or authority as a tribunal. The crucial factor is whether the authority exercises adjudicating power derived from a statute or statutory rule.

The Court concluded that the power exercised by the 2nd respondent under the relevant rules is part of the State's judicial power, conferred by a statutory rule, and applied in disputes between the management and welfare officers.

THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES VS. THEIR WORKMEN 1960 AIR 777, 1960 SCR (3) 157

Brief facts-

1. The appellant's workmen were initially represented by a Union called Kamdar Mandal Cement Works, Porbandar.

2. The registration of Kamdar Mandal Cement Works was cancelled, leading to the formation of two new unions: Cement Kamdar Mandal and Cement Employees Union.

3. The Cement Kamdar Mandal issued two consecutive notices to the appellant, purporting to terminate two previous awards in which the defunct union represented the workmen.

4. The dispute was referred to the Tribunal, and the Cement Employees' Union, representing the majority of the appellant's workmen, was involved in the proceedings.

5. The appellant raised preliminary objections before the Tribunal, arguing that the reference was not competent since the award had not been duly terminated under Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

6. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's objections in its interlocutory judgment.

Issues

The central question in the dispute is whether a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen bound by an award can issue a notice to terminate the award under Section 19(6) of the Act.

Judgment

1. The court upholds the Tribunal's decision against the appellant's objections.

2. The specific termination of the award by the Cement Kamdar Mandal and the subsequent demands from the unions led to the dispute being referred to the Tribunal.

3. The court clarifies that a minority union or group of workmen can terminate an award under Section 19(6) of the Act, regardless of their representation of the majority, as long as they act collectively.

ASSOCIATED TUBEWELLS LTD VS. R.B GUJARMAL MODI AIR 1957 SC 742 (1958) 0 PLR 9

Brief Facts-

1. The court, represented by the judges, and an advocate, described as a senior counsel.

2. Review application brought by the advocate. The advocate claims they were not fully heard and denied adequate opportunity to present their case.

3.  The court agrees to rehear the matter on the specific points the advocate felt were not adequately addressed.

Issues

The court expresses regret that the advocate did not recognize the impropriety of their actions despite being hinted at by a member of the court.

Judgment

Court's decision: The court concludes that there are no grounds to grant leave (permission) for the review. The court explains that it is not customary to provide reasons for rejecting an application for special leave. The court strongly disapproves of the advocate's actions in the review application.

M/S AVTAR SINGH & CO PVT. LTD VS M/S. S. ENTERPRISE & ORS JT 1996 (3), 385 1996 SCALE (2) 869

Brief facts-

1. The case involves three suits related to the distribution of the film 'Aag Ka Dariya.'

2. The first agreement was made on February 28, 1985, between M/s. S.S. Enterprises and R. Venketraman for the film's distribution.

3. A subsequent agreement was made on October 7, 1993, in favor of petitioner M/s. Avtar Singh & Co. Pvt. Ltd. for the same film's distribution.

Issues

Whether the suit pending in the Bombay High Court should be transferred to the Original Side of the Madras High Court. Respondent M/s. S.S. Enterprises is concerned that further prints may be dispatched to other foreign jurisdictions.

Judgment

The status quo, pending the disposal of the Special Leave Petitions (SLPs), will only apply to the rights of the petitioner under the October 7, 1993 contract.The interim order in this case is modified by the current order.

AWADH BIHARI YADAV VS ORS VS THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 1996 AIR 122, 1995 SCC (6) 31

Brief Facts-

1. The case involves multiple writ petitions and appeals related to land acquisition proceedings in Bihar.

2. The appellants obtained leave in S.L.P. (C) No. 20490 of 1993 and are the petitioners in CWJC No. 8426 of 1988.

3. A writ petition filed by the Buddha Griha Nirman Sahyog Samiti Ltd. seeking directions for the implementation of earlier court orders and removal of encroachments.

4. The land acquisition covers approximately 32.48 acres in Rajapur No. 3 and Dujra No. 4 villages, Perganna Phulwari, District Patna.

Issues-

Legal challenges, stays, and disputes arose regarding the acquisition process, possession, and compensation.

Judgment

1. The High Court issued directing the completion of the award and compliance with earlier court orders.

2. Aggrieved parties filed appeals in the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court's decision.

3. The Supreme Court held that the land acquisition proceedings did not lapse due to possession already taken by the government under Section 17(1) of the Act.

AYYANNAR AGENCIES AND ANOTHER VS SRI VISHNU CEMENT LTD AND ANOTHER

 Brief Facts

1. The case involves multiple complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court in Chennai.

2. Additionally, one complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate in Hyderabad against the petitioners, relating to two cheques and the same offense under Section 138.

Issues

The petitioner's counsel argued for the transfer of the Hyderabad case to the Chennai court, stating that the parties involved are the same in all cases and the nature of the offense is identical.

Judgment

1. The transfer petition has been disposed of as the court has granted the requested transfer of the Hyderabad case to the Chennai court.

2. The order of transfer will facilitate the consolidation of all relevant cases, allowing for a more streamlined and efficient legal process.

BHARAT KALA BHANDAR LTD VS MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, DHAMANGAON 1966 AIR 249, 1965 SCR (3) 499

Brief Facts-

1. The appellant paid a tax on cotton at the rate of one Anna per unit weight under the Central Provinces Municipalities Act from 1936.

2. In 1941, the tax rate was increased to 4 annas per unit weight.

3. In 1952, the appellant filed a suit to recover the excess tax paid within 3 years.

4. The appellant argued that the enhanced tax rate of 4 annas was illegal, exceeding the permissible limit set by the Government of India Act, 1935, and later by the Constitution.

5. The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the High Court held the suit as non-compliant with the Act's requirements.

6. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

Whether the assessment proceedings were void for levying a tax beyond the permissible limit.

• Whether the suit for recovery of the excess tax was maintainable.

• Whether Section 84(3) of the Act barred the appellant's suit.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the assessment proceedings were void for levying a tax beyond the permissible limit.

• Any act done in disregard of the Constitution is prohibited and without jurisdiction.

• The suit for recovery of the excess tax was deemed maintainable as it challenged the jurisdiction to levy a tax exceeding the constitutional limit.

• The normal remedy of a suit is available for obtaining redress against the violation of a constitutional provision.

• The Act did not provide a sufficient remedy for challenging the assessment or seeking a refund based on unconstitutionality.

• The majority upheld the appellant's right to recover the excess tax, while the dissenting judges favored dismissing the suit, citing the applicability of Section 84(3) and non-compliance with the Act's requirements.

CHANDRASEKHARAN VS STATE OF KERELA

Brief Facts

• The appeals are filed by the first and second accused challenging their conviction and sentence in S.C. No. 683 of 2017 on charges of sexual assault against a 3¾-year-old girl at a pre-school.

• The first accused is charged with inserting his finger into the victim girl's vagina, while the second accused is charged with failing to report the assault.

• The prosecution presented 12 witnesses and 11 documents as evidence, including the victim girl, her mother, the pre-school principal, and medical professionals.

• The trial court found both accused guilty and convicted them.

Issue-

• The first accused's defense argues that there are doubts about the genuineness of the prosecution's case and highlights inconsistencies in the victim girl's statements.

• The defense further argues that the victim girl's mother did not immediately report the incident to the police or disclose the sexual assault to the doctor.

Judgment

• The second accused's conviction is set aside due to a lack of additional evidence supporting the victim girl's statement regarding their involvement.

• The court allows the appeal of the second accused and sets aside their conviction.

• The first accused is sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment for aggravated sexual assault, and the sentences are ordered to run concurrently. A fine is also imposed on the first accused.

B.N. NAGARAJAN AND ORS VS STATE OF MYSORE AND ORS 1966

Brief Facts-

1. The Mysore Public Service Commission invited applications for the recruitment of 80 probationary Assistant Engineers in 1958, 1959, and 1960.

2. The qualifications, pay, age limit, and other conditions were prescribed in the notifications issued by the Commission.

3. On March 1, 1960, the Governor notified reservations for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes for direct recruitment to state services.

4. The Public Service Commission conducted interviews and selected 80 candidates, and their list was sent to the government.

5. On December 3, 1960, the government sanctioned the establishment of the State Service Cadre for the Public Works Engineering Department Service.

6. On the same day, the Governor made the Mysore Public Service Engineering Department Service (Recruitment) Rules 1960, which differed from the earlier notifications in terms of recruitment methods and qualifications for Assistant Engineers.

7. On October 23, 1961, the Governor made amendments to the 1960 Rules, making them retrospective from March 1, 1958, and waiving certain requirements for direct recruitment of Assistant Engineers.

8. These appointments were challenged through 16 Writ Petitions filed in the High Court, alleging non-compliance with recruitment rules, retrospective application of rules, and mala fide appointments.

Issue

1. Whether the appointments of the 88 Assistant Engineers were validly made?

2. Whether the State Government had the executive power to make appointments without framing necessary rules?

3. Whether Rule 3 of the General Recruitment Rules of 1957 suspended the executive power of the State?

Judgment

1. The appointments of the 88 Assistant Engineers were held to be validly made in the exercise of the executive power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution.

2. It is not mandatory to make rules of recruitment before constituting a service or filling a post. The State Government has executive power in relation to matters within the Legislature's power to make laws.

3. Rule 3 of the General Recruitment Rules of 1957 does not suspend the executive power of the State. The power to make rules and executive power coexist.

Col. Dr. B. RAMACHANDRA RAO VS THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS AIR 1971 SC 2197, (1972) 3 SCC 256, 1971 III UJ 767 SC

Brief Facts-

• The petitioner is confined in a sub-jail in Bhubaneswar, Orissa State.

• He filed a habeas corpus petition.

• The petitioner alleges that he was brought to Bhubaneswar without legal authority and was not produced before a magistrate for several months.

• The petitioner makes reckless allegations against magistrates, jail authorities, and even the Union Home Minister.

Issues

• The petitioner's request for release on bail is complicated by uncertainties regarding the expiration of his previous sentence and previous bail application refusals.

• The court is unable to address the bail application in the present proceedings due to these difficulties.

• The trial court is directed to proceed with the criminal cases from day to day, and the petitioner may apply for bail if there is undue delay without just cause.

Judgment

• Both petitions, W.P. No. 601 of 1970 and T.P. No. 12 of 1971, are dismissed.

• Shri N.S. Das Behl is thanked for his assistance as amicus curiae.

PART III

BABU SINGH BAINS ETC VS UNION OF INDIA & ORS Etc. 1996

Brief Facts

1. The case involves an appeal arising from an order of the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which upheld the refusal to condone the delay in making an application under Rule 11-D of the Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Buildings) (Amendment) Rules, 1979.

2. The appellant had a freehold plot in Chandigarh's residential Sector 21-A, which was used as a guest house, in violation of regulations.

3. A resumption order was issued under Section 8 of the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952, and subsequent proceedings led to the eviction of the appellant.

Issues

1. The appellant argued that the power of resumption under Section 8A of the Act could only be invoked for non-payment of purchase price or dues and not for misuse of the property.

2. The appellant contended that Section 8A was arbitrary and violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

3. The respondent argued that the resumption was necessary to maintain the planned development and beauty of the city and that the validity of Section 8A had already been upheld by the Full Bench of the High Court.

Judgment

1. The majority judgment held that Section 8A was valid and not violative of Article 14, as it provided a reasonable procedure and was aimed at preventing misuse of property.

2. The Court noted that the appellant's application under Rule 11-D was discretionary, and the Estate Officer had the authority to refuse re-transfer of the property.

3. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the delay in filing the application should be condoned, finding that the appellant had not provided a proper explanation for the delay

Baboo vs. State of M.P 2005 (4) MPHT 210

     Brief Facts-

• Mangaliya and Mori were allegedly shot dead by the appellants in a field in Village Nand-ka-pura.

• The appellants were prosecuted for charges under Section 302 (murder) and Section 302/34 (murder with common intention).

• The Trial Court convicted both appellants and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

• The appellants filed this criminal appeal challenging their conviction and sentence.

        Issues

• Witnesses' testimonies are unreliable as they did not know the appellants before and did not provide any description or identification in the FIR or police statements.

• Witnesses had no opportunity to see the assailants due to the darkness of the night.

• The evidence regarding the seizure of two empty cartridges is doubtful, as they were not properly sealed or kept in custody.

Judgment

The Court referred to previous judgments highlighting the importance of proper identification and adherence to procedures in handling seized articles.

• The Court emphasized that suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot be the basis for conviction.

• Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, acquitted the appellants, and discharged their bail bonds.

BABU AND 3 OTHERS VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1965 AIR 1467, 1965 SCR (2) 771

Brief facts-

The appellants were convicted under Section 302 with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Appellants applied for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court, granted due to the third judge's failure to discuss the genuineness of the first information report.

Issue

The Constitution requires a substantial question of law or principle for the grant of a certificate by the High Court, beyond mere appreciation of evidence.

Judgment

The imposition of the death sentence should not be solely determined by one judge when two judges in appeal differ on the question of sentence. Each case should be decided based on its unique facts, and a sentence of life imprisonment can be substituted if circumstances justify not imposing the extreme penalty of the law.

PART IV

BABURAM VS. C C JACOB & ORS 1999

Brief Facts

The applicants challenged the selection and promotion of the appellant to the post of Superintendent of Customs in a vacancy reserved for Scheduled Castes. The appellant was selected for promotion against a reserved vacancy for Scheduled Castes.

Issue

The issue before the tribunal was whether the reservation should be based on the number of posts in the cadre or with reference to a vacancy. The DPC's (Departmental Promotional Committee) decision was challenged before the tribunal, and during the proceedings.

Judgment

The tribunal directed the recalculation of entitlements based on the quota rule applied to the cadre, not vacancies, and prohibited further appointments from groups that had exceeded their reserved quota. The tribunal held that the DPC's decision did not amount to an appointment and that the appellant's promotion was made after filing the petition, so they could not claim the benefit of prospectively.

BACHAN SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB (1982) 3 SCC 24, 1983 1 SCR 145 a

Brief Facts-

Bachan Singh was convicted for the offence of committing the murders of Desa Singh, Durga Bai, and Veeran Bai by the Sessions Court. He was given the death penalty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. He appealed in the High Court, however, the Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the death sentence.  He then appealed to the Supreme Court and raised the question of whether the facts of the case would fall under the ambit of the ‘special reasons’ under Section 354(3) of CrPC, 1973.

Issues

1. Whether death penalty that has been provided as the punishment for the offence of murder under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860, is unconstitutional?

2. Whether the sentencing procedure stipulated in Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973 is unconstitutional insofar as it vests the courts with unguided and untrampled power, and allows the death sentence to be imposed arbitrarily on an individual found guilty of any offence punishable with death or life imprisonment?

Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in accordance with the majority opinion. The Court dismissed the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 302 of the IPC in so far as it prescribes the death sentence, as well as, the constitutionality of Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973 was rejected.

SETHI BADRI PRASAD AND OTHERS VS SETH NAGARMAL AND OTHERS 1959 AIR 559, 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 70

Brief Facts-

1. Cloth control was introduced in Rewa State.

2. Twenty-five cloth dealers, including the appellants, formed an Association to collect and sell cloth.

3. The Association operated under the leadership of a President and a pioneer worker, maintaining accounts and distributing profits.

4. Cloth decontrol occurred, and the Association's activities ceased.

Issues-

The first respondent raised a preliminary objection, stating that the suit was not maintainable. The objection was based on the Association's non-registration, as required by S. 4(2) of the Rewa State Companies Act, 1935. The first respondent argued that the Association's non-registration rendered its dealings and transactions invalid, with no remedy available to its members.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the suit was not maintainable due to the Association's illegal status under S. 4(2) of the Act. Seeking rendition of accounts for an illegal partnership implied recognition of the Association's existence, which the court could not assist with. The Court acknowledged that the new objection raised was a pure question of law and allowed its consideration.

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA VS. UNION OF INDIA 1984 SC

Brief Facts-

• This public interest litigation case (PIL) was recorded by means of Article 32 of the Indian Constitution straightforwardly before the Supreme Court of India and appealed to the Court to coordinate with the State of Uttar Pradesh (UP) to find ways to end child labour.

• From there on a Court-delegated advisory group revealed the hugeness of child double-dealing in UP’s carpet industry, observing that numerous children were captured from Bihar, that the business to a great extent utilized minor children under 14 years, and that much experienced actual maltreatment.

Issue

• Ensuring the culmination of child labour in India.

Judgment

The Court talked about the significance of securing children’s rights to education, wellbeing, and advancement in guaranteeing India’s advancement as a vote based system. Court observed that down-to-earth steps could be taken to ensure and advance the rights of children in the destitution stricken and weak populaces of Indian culture. The Court additionally noticed India’s commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child to give free essential education to all children in the nation, and to secure children against financial abuse.

BASHESHAR NATH VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AIR 2018 SC 357

Brief Facts-

1. The Income Tax Officer had sent a certificate requesting the Collector of Delhi for the recovery of the balance due by the assesse under the settlement.

2.  In execution of that certificate, some of the properties of the assesse were situated in Dharamshala and Hisar were also attached. 

3. Then, the special appeal has been filed by the Assesse questioning on the validity of a settlement made under Section 8A of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 which was ordered on 29 January, by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi.

 Issue

1. Whether the settlement made under section 8A of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947is valid?

2. Can a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution be waived?

Judgment

Supreme Court held that Fundamental Rights cannot be waived. In the above case there were different opinions there were four different judgments wherein Sudhiranjan Das, C.J. had written for J.L. Kapur, J. Bhagwati, S.K. Das and K. Subba Rao, JJ. Had given separate judgments. It is interesting to note that although the Constitution of India has borrowed the concept of Fundamental Rights from the United States of America, where the Fundamental Rights can be waived.

Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Its Workmen 1969 AIR 360, 1969 SCR (2) 113

Brief facts

1. In 1954, Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. entered into an agreement with its workmen regarding dearness allowance.

2. In 1957, the Fifth Industrial Tribunal fixed the dearness allowance based on the cost of living index in May 1957, which stood at 400.6.

3. A fresh settlement was reached between the company and the workmen, raising the dearness allowance by Rs. 3.

 Issues

Full neutralization of the increase in the cost of living is not normally given, except for the lowest class of employees.

Judgment

The Tribunal correctly held that the three-year bar in the settlement of January 6, 1962, did not prevent the claim for revising dearness allowance. The Tribunal's decision to revise the dearness allowance based on the rise in the cost of living was correct

BENGAL IMMUNITY CO. LTD VS STATE OF BIHAR AIR 1955 SC 661

Brief Facts

The appellant is a company engaged in manufacturing and selling of biological products and medicines.  The appellant company does not have any office, godown, laboratory or any agent or manager in Bihar. However, on the 24th October 1951, the appellant company received a letter from the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wherein the company was called upon to take necessary steps to get itself registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 and to deposit Bihar Sales Tax dues as well.

Issues

• Whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned in its petition is leviable by the State of Bihar?

• Whether the Supreme Court can review/re-examine its earlier decision?

• Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 is ultra-vires and void in its entirety or it is only bad in so far as it seeks to impose a sales tax on out-of-State sellers in respect of inter-state sales or purchases?

Judgment

The phrase “sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce” in Article 286(2) does not include the particular class of sales or purchases provided in the explanation to Article 286(1). Therefore, the Bihar Sales Tax Act is not violative of Article 286.  The Bihar Sales Tax Act is not invalid under article 254 and does not contravene article 304 Hence, the petition was dismissed as being not maintainable. However, the High Court issued a certificate, under article 132 (1) of the Constitution certifying that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.

BHAGWAN SINGH AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF BIHAR AIR 2008

Brief Facts

1. Gudiya married appellant no.1, Bhagwan Singh, on 22.02.2003, with a dowry of Rs.3 lakh.

2. The in-laws were dissatisfied with the dowry and demanded an additional Rs.30, 000.

3. The appellants began torturing Gudiya, who informed her parents about the situation in October 2003.

4. Gudiya's parents provided Rs.10, 000, citing financial constraints, and received assurance from the appellants that Gudiya would not be tortured further.

5. On 07.07.2004, Gudiya's sister informed her cousin, the complainant, which Gudiya had been burned by her in-laws and had been taken to the hospital.

6. The complainant met Gudiya, who stated that her husband and mother-in-law had set her on fire.

7. A dying declaration was recorded by a doctor, which confirmed Gudiya's statement.

8. A case was registered, and charges under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC, and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were framed against the appellants.

9. The appellants pleaded not guilty, claiming false allegations due to ongoing litigation between the complainant's sister and the appellants.

Issues

The appellant's counsel relied on various Supreme Court judgments to support their argument that the sentences should be reduced. They highlighted the discretion of the court in awarding punishment and the need for extreme punishment of life imprisonment only in rare cases. The state's counsel countered, stating that the sentences were justified considering the seriousness of the offense and the societal impact of dowry deaths.

Judgment

The court upheld the conviction of the appellants for the offenses under Section 304-B, 498-A IPC,and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act

BHAJAN SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB AIR 1978

Brief Facts-

1. The appellants, along with three other accused, were charged and tried for various offenses, including rioting while being armed with deadly weapons and causing the death of Pakhar Singh by inflicting grievous hurt to his wife, Pritam Kaur.

2. The motive behind the incident was a pending declaratory suit filed by the deceased claiming certain lands, which his sister also claimed as hers.

3. An interim order was issued, maintaining the status quo until the suit was resolved.

4. The prosecution alleged that the accused, with the intention of forcibly taking possession of the land, caused grievous injuries to Pakhar Singh using hidden weapons.

Issues

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants, and whether the conviction was in accordance with the relevant sections of the IPC.

Judgment

1. The conviction and sentences under Section 323/149 IPC were set aside.

2. The appellants were convicted under Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each.

3. The convictions and sentences under Section 325/149 and Section 148 IPC were maintained.

PART IV

Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State Of Gujarat 1983 AIR 753, 1983 SCR (3) 280

Brief Facts-

• The appellant was found guilty by the Sessions Judge, Mehsna, of serious charges of sexual misbehavior with two young girls.

• He was convicted for the offense of rape, outraging the modesty of women, and wrongful confinement.

• The appellant appealed the conviction to the High Court.

• The High Court affirmed the orders of conviction under Section 342 IPC for wrongfully confining the girls and under Section 354 IPC for outraging their modesty.

• The appellant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's decision.

Judgment

The Supreme Court stated that a concurrent finding of fact by the lower courts cannot be reopened in an appeal by Special Leave unless certain conditions are met

• The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions of the appellant on all counts, including wrongful confinement and outraging the modesty of the girls.

• The Court affirmed the alteration of the rape conviction to an attempt to commit rape under Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC.

BHINKA AND OTHERS VS CHARAN SINGH 1959 AIR 960, 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 798

Brief Facts-

1. Respondent Zamindar filed ejectment suits in the Revenue Court against the appellants under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.

2. The respondent claimed that the lands were his sir lands and the appellants trespassed based on a wrong order of the Criminal Court.

3. The appellants contended that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suits.

4. Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, imposes liability for unauthorized possession without the consent of the person entitled to admit occupation.

Issues

The central question was whether the appellants obtained possession under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Judgment

The court held that Section 145 only authorized the Magistrate to declare actual possession on a specified date and lacked the power to decide title or right to possession. The court concluded that the appellants were liable under Section 180, and their appeals were dismissed.

CHANDRA BANSI SINGH AND ORS VS STATE OF BIHAR 1984 AIR 1767, 1985 SCR (1) 579

Brief Facts

1. The Respondent State issued a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire 1034.94 acres of land in Village Digha for the construction of houses by the Bihar State Housing Board.

2. The compensation for the acquired land was to be paid by the Housing Board and not by the State from its own funds.

3. The acquisition was confirmed by the State Ministry of Revenue and Industry after issuing Notifications under Sections 6, 7, and 9 and considering the claims and objections.

Issues

A portion of the acquired land comprising 4.03 acres belonging to the Pandey families was released without any legal or constitutional justification.

The release of land in favor of the Pandey families was deemed an act of favoritism without justification.

Writ Petitions challenging the land release were filed in the Bihar High Court, leading to the present Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions.

Judgment

The Court held that the order of release passed by the government was (invalid) as it violated Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The release of land to the Pandey families lacked legal or constitutional justification and was an act of favouritism.

CHANDRA MOHAN VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1966

Brief Facts

• The recruitment procedure for district judges in the State of U.P. is governed by the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules made by the Governor under Article 309 of the Constitution.

• The Governor decides on the number of candidates to be selected and prescribes their qualifications.

• The High Court calls for applications, and a Selection Committee screens the applications and conducts interviews.

• The Selection Committee selects suitable candidates for appointment and sends two lists (main and supplementary) to the High Court.

• The High Court submits the names of suitable candidates to the Governor for appointment.

Issues

1. Can the appellant challenge the judgment of the High Court related to the "Advocate-recruits"?

2. Is the appointment process, which involves consultation with both the High Court and the Selection Committee, legal under the Constitution?

3. Does the Governor have the power to appoint district judges from "judicial officers"?

Judgment

1. The Governor cannot appoint district judges from "judicial officers" as they are not members of the judicial service.

2. The Indian Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and emphasizes the separation of the judiciary from the executive.

3. Arts. 233 to 237 of the Constitution deal with the appointment and control of the judiciary, including district judges.

CHANDRAKANT PATIL VS. STATE AIR 1998

Brief Facts

1. The accused, Subhash Singh Thakur, Jayendra Thakur, Shyam Kishore Garikapati, and Chandrakant Patil, were found guilty under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA).

2. The trial court had awarded each accused a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 5 years, which the Supreme Court found inadequate.

3. Notice was issued to the accused regarding the proposal to enhance the sentence, and they filed written submissions in response.

4. The arguments were heard from the senior counsel representing the accused and the Additional Solicitor General representing the Central Bureau of Investigation.

5. The Supreme Court confirmed the conviction under Section 5 of TADA and decided not to review it at this stage, as it had already considered the arguments and dismissed the review petitions.

Issue-

The accused contended that they had a right to re-canvass the finding, similar to the principle in the present Code of Criminal Procedure, but the court disagreed.

The accused also argued that the Supreme Court lacked the power to enhance the sentence without a specific appeal from the government, as it does not possess revisional powers like the High Court and Court of Sessions.

Judgment

1. The court clarified that the Supreme Court's powers under Article 142 of the Constitution are not restricted by statutory provisions and can be exercised when necessary for doing complete justice.

2. The court referred to various previous judgments that recognized the broad and residual powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142.

3. The court highlighted that its powers under Article 142 are to ensure due and proper administration of justice and are not limited or restricted by statutory law.
   
   

PART VI

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS FAKRUDDIN ALI AHMED AND ORS AIR 1974

Brief Facts-

The petitioner claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate but faced rejection due to non-compliance with Sections 5B and 5C. The petitioner's nomination was rejected for failing to fulfill the requirements of Sections 5B (1) and 5C (2). Section 5B (1) requires a nomination paper to be submitted with the assent of the candidate, along with proposers and seconders. Section 5C(1) mandates a deposit of Rs. 2,500, which must be either paid in cash or accompanied by a receipt from the Reserve Bank of India or Government Treasury.

Issues

The petitioner argues that Sections 5B and 5C are unconstitutional, but fails to provide sufficient reasons to support this claim. The primary issue before the court is whether the petitioner can be considered a duly nominated "candidate" based on their compliance with Sections 5B and 5C.

Judgment

The court finds that the petitioner did not fulfil the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 5C since they submitted a cheque instead of depositing the required amount in cash or providing a valid receipt. Consequently, the court dismisses the petition on the grounds that the petitioner lacks locus standi to maintain the case.

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS GIANI ZAIL SINGH & ANOTHER 1984 AIR 309, 1984 SCR (2) 6

Brief Facts-

1. Only Giani Zail Singh and Shri H.R. Khanna were accepted as candidates for the office of the President of India.

2. Election held on July 12, 1982, and Giani Zail Singh declared as the successful candidate.

3. Election Petitions Nos. 2 and 3 challenged the election, alleging undue influence by Giani Zail Singh.

Issue-

Whether the election of a candidate can be challenged based on unsuitability for the office.

Judgment

1. The challenge to a Presidential or Vice-Presidential election is limited to the grounds specified in the law (Section 18(1)).

2. Parliament has the power to specify the types of doubts or disputes to be inquired into by the Supreme Court in election petitions.

3. The case does not disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election based on the grounds specified in Section 18(1)(a).

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS NEELAM SANJEEVA REDDY 1978 AIR 499, 1978 SCR (3) 1

Brief Facts-

1. The petitioner filed nomination papers as a candidate for the Presidential elections held on July 19, 1977.

2. The nomination papers were not supported by the deposit prescribed under Section 5C and not subscribed by any voter as a proposer and a seconder, as required by Section 5B of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act (Act 31), 1952, made under Article 71(1) of the Constitution of India.

3. The Returning Officer rejected the petitioner's nomination papers for non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 5B and 5C of the Act.

4. The respondent was duly elected, and the petitioner challenged the election under Section 14 of the Act.

Issues-

1. Whether the nomination papers were validly rejected by the Returning Officer?

2. Whether Sections 5B and 5C of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, are in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution?

3. Whether the Constitution Amendment 1974, introducing Article 71(3), takes away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to decide matters related to the Presidential election?

4. Whether the petitioner has the locus standi to challenge the election?

Judgment

1. The nomination papers were rightly rejected by the Returning Officer.

2. Sections 5B and 5C of the Act and the Constitution Amendment 1974, introducing Article 71(3), are valid and do not invade any basic structure of the Constitution.

3. Article 58 of the Constitution only provides qualifications or conditions for the eligibility of a candidate and is unrelated to the nomination process.

4. Sections 5B and 5C of the Act, which lay down conditions for candidates, are not in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution and impose reasonable conditions applicable to all.

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union of India and Others 1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR 869

Brief Facts

1. The Governor-General of India promulgated an Ordinance, later enacted as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950, to address mismanagement and neglect in the company affecting production and causing unemployment.

2. The Act resulted in the dismissal of managing agents, automatic vacation of office for directors, appointment of new directors by the government, curtailment of shareholder rights, and modification of the Indian Companies Act for the company.

3. A shareholder of the company filed an application under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a declaration that the Act was void and violated fundamental rights.

Issues

The petitioner argued that the Act infringed fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(f), 31, and 14 of the Constitution.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 31(1) as it did not deprive the company or the petitioner of their property except under authority of law.

2. The Court also ruled that the Act did not authorize the acquisition or taking possession of the property of the company or the petitioner, although certain shareholder rights were disabled.

3. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 31(1) as it did not deprive the company or the petitioner of their property except under authority of law.

4. The Court also ruled that the Act did not authorize the acquisition or taking possession of the property of the company or the petitioner, although certain shareholder rights were disabled.

PART VII

CLERKS OR CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS VS CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS CO. LTD 1957 AIR 78, 1956 SCR 772

Brief Facts

• The Bengal Chamber of Commerce conducted an investigation into the cost of living index for middle-class families and determined the dearness allowance payable to employees of mercantile firms in Calcutta.

• The appellants, who were clerks of the respondent Company, argued before the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal that they should receive the same dearness allowance rates as the middle-class families, as determined by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

• They contested the procedure followed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which did not fully neutralize 20 points of the living cost index, claiming it was unjustifiable.

Issues

Whether the appellants were entitled to receive the same dearness allowance rates as the middle-class families, as determined by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

Judgment

• The Supreme Court held that there cannot be a uniform rule applicable to all employees regarding the grant of dearness allowance.

• It stated that, except for the lowest class of manual laborers, it is not appropriate to neutralize the entire rise in the cost of living through dearness allowance.

• The court acknowledged the existence of different grades within the middle classes and ruled that the appellants cannot claim the same dearness allowance rates as those fixed for clerks of mercantile firms by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

Coffee Board, Bangalore vs Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras 1971 AIR 870, 1970 SCR (3) 147

Brief Facts

1. The Coffee Board claimed exemption from sales tax under Art. 286(1) (b) of the Constitution.

2. The Board argued that certain sales of coffee made to registered exporters for export outside India should not be taxed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

3. The taxing authorities held that the sales took place within Tamil Nadu and were liable to be taxed under the Tamil Nadu Act.

4. The Board filed petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the levy.

Issues:

1. Whether the Coffee Board, being a corporation, could file a petition under Art. 32.

2. Whether the sales of coffee by the Board qualified as sales in the course of export.

Judgment

The majority held that the sales by the Coffee Board were not sales in the course of export, and therefore, they were liable to be taxed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The petitioner's claim for exemption was rejected.

COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE VS RMDC PRESS PVT LTD 2003 (161) ELT 868 Tri Del

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the classification of 'printed wrappers' and 'printed sleeves' for excise duty purposes.

2. The Assistant Collector classified both products under sub-heading 4818.90, considering them as packing materials rather than products of the printing industry.

3. The appellants argued that the items should be classified under sub-heading 4901.90 as products of the printing industry.

4. The appellants relied on a Supreme Court ruling in the case of Metagraphs Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, which held that printed aluminum labels were products of the printing industry.

Issues

The appellants argued that the items were primarily used for advertising and displaying the merits of the goods, making them products of the printing industry.

Judgment

• The Third Member noted that in a similar case, the Tribunal classified printed wrappers as articles of the packaging industry.

• The Third Member emphasized that the function of wrapping occurred even without printing, relying on the judgment in the New Jack Printing Works case.

• The Third Member concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, upholding the classification of the items as packaging materials.

• The order confirmed the earlier decision of the Assistant Collector, rejecting the appellants' claim for classification under the sub-heading for printing industry products.

COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION ANANTNAG VS MRS. KATIJI (1987) 2 SCC 107

Brief Facts

1. The State filed an appeal against a decision to enhance compensation for the acquisition of lands for a public purpose.

2. The appeal raised important questions related to valuation principles.

3. The High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, as it was filed four days beyond the prescribed time limit.

4. The State applied for condonation of delay, seeking an extension of time to file the appeal.

5. The High Court rejected the application for condonation of delay.

6. The State then appealed to the higher court, seeking special leave.

Issues

The court examined the interpretation of the term "sufficient cause" mentioned in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.

Judgment

The court stated that the interpretation of "sufficient cause" should be guided by the spirit and philosophy of the provision, ensuring equitable administration of the law.

1. In this case, the court found sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal in the High Court.

2. The court granted condonation of delay, remitted the matter back to the High Court, and directed it to dispose of the case on its merits.

COMMON CAUSE (A regd. Society) VS UNION OF INDIA (1999) 6 SCC 107

Brief Facts

This writ petition sought a declaration that the “right to die with dignity” fell within the fold of “right to live with dignity” under Article 21, and to ensure that persons of deteriorated health or terminally ill could execute a living will or an Advance Medical Directive. 

While this case was initially placed before a three Judge Bench, in light of contradictory precedents in determining the law relating to the right to die in India, it was referred to a Constitution Bench.

Issues

Whether the right to die with dignity was a fundamental right within the fold of the right to live with dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Judgment

The Court reaffirmed that the right to die with dignity was a fundamental right, as declared by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Kaur vs state of Punjab. The Court also clarified that the ratio of Gian Kaur did not introduce the concept of passive euthanasia. 

The Court discussed the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, where active euthanasia requires an overt action, whereas passive euthanasia is the act of withdrawal of life support. It held that the Court in Aruna Shanbaug had erred in holding that passive euthanasia could only be introduced through a legislation.

The Court opined that the right to privacy mandated safeguarding the integrity of individual choice in the intimate sphere of decisions relating to death and held that the protection of these rights was an emanation of the right to privacy, as they were related to the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.

COMPETENT AUTHORITY, AHMEDABAD VS AMRITLAL CHANDMAL JAIN AND ORS 1998

Brief Facts

1. The appeals (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2/94 and 574/94) are filed against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court declaring the detention order under COFEPOSA against Amritlal Jain illegal and quashing the proceedings under SAFEMA.

2. The Competent Authority and the State of Gujarat have filed the appeals.

3. The third appeal (Civil Appeal 1487/94) is filed by the Competent Authority against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dismissing their writ petition seeking to restrain the release of seized silver to Amritlal and Agra Bullion Company.

4. The Competent Authority is an officer of the Central Government appointed under SAFEMA.

5. Amritlal was initially detained under COFEPOSA in 1982 but challenged his detention in the Supreme Court through a writ of habeas corpus. The state revoked the detention order but issued a fresh one on the same grounds.

Issues

The Competent Authority appealed against the High Court's judgment, arguing that the second order of detention was challenged after the appropriate time, citing the decision in the Amritlal Prajivandas case.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court noted that challenges were made to both orders of detention during their respective periods and that the release of the detenu rendered the first writ petition infructuous.

2. The Court stated that if a writ petition is disposed of on the grounds of release, it does not imply an unsuccessful challenge to the order of detention.

3. The Court found no merit in the appeals and dismissed them.

CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA VS GOVERNERS OF ST. THOMAS SCHOOL, CALCUTTA (1950) 52 BOMLR 25

Brief Facts

• The appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal.

• The premises in question, located in Calcutta, comprise a specific area of land with buildings on it, owned by the Governors of St. Thomas' School.

• The premises were requisitioned by the Central Government in April 1942 under the Defense of India Act and possession was taken.

• A memorandum of agreement was executed between the respondents and the Governor-General in Council, determining the compensation payable to the owners during the period of requisition.

• The Central Government erected additional buildings on the premises at a later date.

• There was a re-valuation of the premises under the Calcutta Municipal Act, and the value of the additional structures was included, resulting in an increased annual value for taxation.

Issues

The respondents objected to this assessment, arguing that the structures put up by the Government should be exempt from municipal taxes.

The appellants argued that the buildings should not be separately assessed as the land was not vested in the Government and that the proviso to Section 154 of the Government of India Act should apply.

Judgment

• The Supreme Court rejected the appellants' contentions, stating that the buildings were vested in the Government under the agreement and the ownership of a building is not necessarily linked to the ownership of the land.

• The Court held that the buildings were considered property under Section 154 of the Government of India Act and were exempt from municipal taxes.

• The Court also rejected the argument that the unit of assessment should include the additional structures based on the provisions of the local Municipal Act.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court that the additional structures erected by the Central Government were exempt from municipal taxes.

Bihar Legal Support Society vs. the Chief Justice of India 1987 AIR 38, 1987 SCR (1) 295

Brief Facts

• A writ petition was filed as a sequel to the expeditious consideration of a bail application of two industrialists by the Court on September 5, 1986.

• The petitioner sought equal treatment and importance for special leave petitions filed by small individuals against orders refusing bail.

Issues

• Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail, and under what circumstances?

• Whether small individuals are given the same treatment and importance as big industrialists in special leave petitions?

Judgment

1. The court proposed the establishment of a National Court of Appeal to handle appeals from High Courts and Tribunals in civil, criminal, revenue, and labor cases.

2. The current apex court should focus on cases involving constitutional and public law issues.

M/S BIHAR STATE FOOD & SUPPLIES VS. M/S. Godrej Soaps Pvt. Ltd. & Ors 1996

Brief Facts

1. An appeal was filed against the decree of Suit No. 1028/78, which is currently pending disposal.

2. UCO Bank has also filed an appeal, which is also pending.

3. The appellants (not specified) have filed an application for the transfer of Suit No. 398/89 back to the Subordinate Judge's court in Patna, arguing that the joint trial order has outlived its purpose, and Suit No. 398/89 needs to be tried on issues not covered in Suit No. 1028/78.

Judgment

After recording all the evidence from both parties, the learned trial Judge is requested to transmit the entire evidence and the suit's record to the Division Bench for consideration.

1. Liberty is given to make a request before the Division Bench to adduce evidence in the suits for their early disposal after receiving the suit's record.

2. The Transfer Petition is disposed of accordingly.

Bijoyo Kumar Pattanaik vs. Basanta Kumar Pattanaik and Ors. J T 2000 (9) SC 35, (2000) 9 SCC 335

Brief FACTS: -

The appellant and respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed a civil suit in 1975 for partition and separate possession of their shares in the suit properties.

1. The original defendant No. 3 contested the suit, including raising objections regarding the court's pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

2. The trial court overruled the objection and passed a preliminary decree for partition against defendant No. 3.

3. Defendant No. 3 appealed the decision, and the first appellate court held that the trial court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The judgment and decree of the trial court were set aside.

4. The appellant's appeal against the first appellate court's decision was dismissed by the High Court.

5. The appellant then filed a review petition, which was also dismissed by the High Court.

6. Instead of getting the plaint returned for presentation to the proper court, the appellant requested the trial court to allow transposition of the plaintiffs as defendants.

7. The trial court, based on the appellate court's finding of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, denied permission for transposition.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

2. Whether the appellant should have requested the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper court instead of seeking transposition.

3. What should be the course of action to ensure justice in the case?

Judgment

1. The appellant was allowed to transpose the original plaintiffs as defendants, amending the plaint accordingly.

2. The appellant was given eight weeks to carry out the amendment in the plaint.

3. The appellant, as the sole plaintiff after transposition, was required to pay the proper court fees and make good any shortfall.

4. The court directed the office to inform and take necessary action in the trial court regarding the order.

Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors on 5 November, 1981

1. The State Government of Uttar Pradesh issued two orders under the Essential Commodities Act, 1951, namely the Uttar Pradesh Food Grains Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1976, and the Uttar Pradesh Food Grains (Procurement and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1978.

2. The State Government issued instructions for effective enforcement of the two orders, particularly regulating the movement of wheat by traders.

3. The State Government amended clause (4) of the 1978 Order, limiting the stock of wheat that wholesale dealers, commission agents, and retailers can possess at any time.

4. The Senior Marketing Inspector and the Chief Marketing Inspector intercepted and seized trucks loaded with wheat from the petitioners, who were wholesale dealers of foodgrains.

5. The seized wheat was purchased by the State Government on government account, and the sale proceeds were credited to the treasury.

6. The petitioners challenged the orders and instructions on various grounds, including violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1) (g) and 301 of the Constitution.

Issue

1. Whether the stock limit imposed on wholesale dealers is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.

2. Whether the distinction between wholesale dealers and commission agents in terms of stock limit is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

3. Whether the instructions on movement restrictions violate the fundamental rights of the traders.

4. Whether the seizure of wheat in transit was without "the authority of law" and violated Article 300A of the Constitution.

5. Whether the restrictions imposed by executive action are valid.

Judgment

The petitions challenging the orders and instructions are dismissed, upholding the validity of the restrictions imposed by the State Government. The case is remitted to the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies), Agra, for further proceedings on the seized wheat.

Bishan Das and Others vs. the State Of Punjab and Others 1961 AIR 1570, 1962 SCR (2) 69

Brief Facts

1. Ramjidas’s built a Dharamshala, a temple, and shops on Government land using joint family funds with the permission of the Government.

2. After Ramjidas's death, the other family members who managed and possessed the properties were dispossessed by the State, its officers, and the local Municipality, who took possession of the properties.

3. The High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it involved disputed questions of fact.

4. An appeal against the High Court's order was also dismissed on the same ground.

Issues

The petitioners argued that their eviction was unauthorized and violated the Constitution.

Judgment

1. The Court deprecated the executive action taken in this case as it violated the principles of the rule of law and deprived a person of property without legal authority.

2. The Court emphasized that the petitioners were bona fide in possession of the property and could only be removed by authority of law.

3. It was unnecessary to determine disputed questions of fact or the precise rights of the petitioners in this case.

Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others vs. the State Of Uttar Pradesh 1954 AIR 10, 1954 SCR 1169

Brief Facts

1. The Executive Committee of a District Bar Association received multiple complaints against a Judicial Magistrate and a Revenue Officer regarding their conduct and handling of cases.

2. The Committee passed a resolution in camera, stating their opinion that the two officers were incompetent, lacked judicial work, and were discourteous to litigants and lawyers.

3. The resolution was typed by the President, forwarded confidentially to the District Magistrate, Commissioner of the Division, and the Chief Secretary and Premier of the State.

Issues

Whether the resolution passed by the appellants, criticizing the officers, constituted contempt of court.

Judgment

The High Court held the appellants guilty of contempt but accepted their apology.

On appeal, it was held that the contempt, if any, was of a technical nature.

After the appellants filed their affidavits before the High Court, the proceedings against them should have been dropped

PART V

Budhi Nath Jha vs. Manilal Jadav AIR 1960 Pat 361

Brief Facts-

• The petitioner, Budhi Nath Jha, filed an election petition challenging the order of the Election Tribunal, Santal Parganas, which was subsequently set aside by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

• The High Court further ordered the dismissal of the election petition filed by Budhi Nath Jha due to non-compliance with Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act.

Issues-

• The petitioner argued for the grant of a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution, stating that the subject matter of the dispute exceeded the value of Rs. 20,000.

• The respondent contended that the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court was not a "civil proceeding" within the meaning of Article 133.

Judgment

• The petitioner argued for the grant of a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution, stating that the subject matter of the dispute exceeded the value of Rs. 20,000.

• The respondent contended that the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court was not a "civil proceeding" within the meaning of Article 133.

C DHANALAKSHMI AMMAL VS THE INCOME TAX OFFICER (1957) 2 MLJ 567

Brief Facts-

• Petitioner filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of mandamus to prevent the attachment and sale of her properties for the alleged income-tax arrears of her husband.

• The petitioner's property, Benhutty Estate, was attached by the Collector of Nilgiris district based on a certificate issued by the Income-Tax Officer.

• The petitioner claimed that she was the legal owner of the property, although the Income-Tax Department argued that she was only a benamidar, and the real owner was her husband.

Issues

The petitioner argued that the Madras Revenue Recovery Act did not authorize the Collector to attach and sell land registered in someone else's name other than the defaulter.

Judgment

• The Court rejected the argument that an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a civil proceeding.

• The Court held that a proceeding under Article 226, seeking enforcement of civil rights or challenging the adjudication of administrative tribunals, can be considered a civil proceeding.

• The Court held that the order did not directly or indirectly involve a claim or question respecting the property.

C.N. Rudramurthy vs K. Barkathulla Khan & Others, 1998

Brief Facts:

1. The appellant filed a suit against Bhaskaran, the original tenant, for recovery of possession of a premises due to non-payment of rent and alleged subletting.

2. The original tenant argued that he had not sublet the premises but had only entered into an agreement for someone to run the business on his behalf.

3. The original tenant passed away and his legal representatives were brought into the case.

4. Respondent No.1 claimed to be a partner with the original tenant and asserted that the partnership was dissolved, making him a tenant directly under the appellant.

5. A decree for eviction was passed against Respondent No.1 in the City Civil Court on 31.3.1993.

6. Respondent No.1 appealed against the decree in the High Court of Karnataka.

Issues-

1. Whether Respondent No.1 is a tenant or not? If not, what is his status?

2. Whether the suit for eviction is maintainable against Respondent No.1?

3. Whether Respondent No.1 is entitled to mesne profits under Order XX Rule 10 of the C.P.C.?

Judgment

The appeal filed by the original tenant's legal representatives was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

Respondent No.1 was directed to vacate the premises by June 30, 1999, upon providing the required undertaking.

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and reaffirmed its binding nature on all courts.

The Cantonment Board, Ambala vs Pyarelal 1966 AIR 108, 1965 SCR

Brief Facts:

1. In 1954, the words "rent on land or buildings" were added to Section 250 of the Cantonments Act, 1924.

2. The appellant (Cantonment Board) sought to recover arrears of rent from the respondent based on a lease agreement.

3. The appellant applied to the Magistrate for the realization of the rent arrears under the amended section.

4. The Magistrate issued warrants for the attachment of the respondent's movable property.

5. The respondent filed a revision petition before the Sessions Judge, who referred the case to the High Court.

6. The High Court set aside the Magistrate's order.

Issues

Whether the Magistrate had the power to order the recovery of rent due to the appellant under the amended Section 259 of the Cantonments Act.

Judgment

Justices Wanchoo and Sikri held that the rent was not claimable by the appellant under the Act or the Rules but only under the lease agreement.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the appellant could not recover the rent arrears from the respondent under the amended Section 259. However, the Board retains the right to recover rent through a civil suit under general law.

THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA VS. THEIR WORKMEN 196 AIR 12, 1960 SCR (1) 200

Brief Facts

1. Section 10(1)(b)(11) of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, stated that no banking company could employ any person whose remuneration or part of whose remuneration takes the form of a share in the profits of the company.

2. A dispute arose between the appellant banks and their employees regarding whether the provisions of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, prohibited the grant of bonus to bank employees.

3. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the Act did not prohibit the granting of bonus to bank employees since it did not constitute a share in the profits of the company.

4. The appellant banks argued that bonus awarded by the Industrial Courts was considered remuneration under Section 10 read with Section 2 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, and also constituted a share in profits.

5. The appellant banks contended that the express provisions of Section 10, read with Section 2, overrode the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore prohibited the award of bonus to bank employees.

Issues

1. Whether the expression "shall employ any person" in Section 10 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, includes "shall have in employment any person"?

2. Whether bonus awarded to bank employees is considered remuneration under the Act?

3. Whether bonus constitutes a share in profits, thereby falling under the provisions of Section 10?

4. Whether the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1956, has retrospective effect on the prohibition of the grant of industrial bonus?

Judgment

The expression "shall employ any person" in Section 10 includes "shall have in employment any person," and the 1956 amendment clarifies the original intent of the section.

The Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1956, is not a declaratory act and does not explain or declare the former law. It has no retrospective effect, and therefore, for the period relating to the present appeals, the amended section does not apply.

CENRAL COALFIELDS LTD VS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AIR 1986 MP 33a

Brief Facts-

1. The petitioner company applied for acquiring lands in Singrauli Tahsil for mining operations, which were notified as coal-bearing areas under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957.

2. Approximately 1857 acres of land were acquired by the Central Government, and the rights and liabilities of the Central Government were transferred to the petitioner company under the Coal Act.

3. The petitioner argues that the provisions of the Adhiniyam, which regulate construction activities, are not applicable to their property as the lands have been acquired for mining purposes and fall under the jurisdiction of the Coal Act and the Development Act.

4. The petitioner undertook construction work for office buildings, residential quarters, and other structures without obtaining the necessary permission as required by the Adhiniyam.

5. The Chairman of SADA issued a notice to the petitioner, calling for the demolition of the unauthorized constructions.

6. The petitioner contended that the Adhiniyam and the Municipalities Act do not apply to their construction activities as the petitioner company is a government-owned company and exempted from obtaining permission under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam.

7. The respondents argued that SADA, Singrauli, has the power to regulate building construction activities within its jurisdiction under the Adhiniyam and the Municipalities Act, even if the petitioner is engaged in mining operations.

Issues

1. Whether the provisions of the Adhiniyam are applicable to the petitioner's property acquired for mining purposes under the Coal Act.

2. Whether the petitioner company is exempted from obtaining permission for construction activities under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam as a government-owned company.

Judgment

1. The doctrine of occupied fields does not apply as the powers and duties of SADA and municipalities under the Adhiniyam are different from those provided in the Coal Act and the Development Act. The State Legislature retains its competence to enact laws for municipal administration.

2. The petitioner company, being a government-owned company, does not fall within the scope of Section 29 of the Adhiniyam. The company has a distinct legal entity and is not equated with a government department.

THE CHAIRMAN RAILWAY BOARD & ORS VS. MRS. CHANDRIMA DAS AND ORS AIR 2000

Brief Facts

• Mrs. Chandrima Das(respondent herein), a practicing advocate of the Calcutta High Court, filed a petition under Article 226 of Constitution against the Chairman of Railway Board(appellant herein), claiming compensation for the victim (Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon), a Bangladeshi National who was gang-raped by many including employees of the Railways in a room at Yatri Niwas at Howrah Station.

• The HC awarded a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs as compensation for Smt. Khatoon. The HC was of the opinion that the rape was committed at the building belonging to the Railways and was perpetrated by the railway employees and thus the Railway board is vicariously liable.

• This appeal is against the HC judgment in favor of Chandrima Das.

Issues

• Is it right to contend that the Central Government can’t be held vicariously liable for the offence of rape committed by the employees of the Railways?

• Is it right to contend that for claiming damages for the offence perpetrated on Smt. Khatoon, the remedy lay in the domain of private law and not under public law and, therefore, no compensation could have been legally awarded under Article 226?

Judgment

• The HC has jurisdiction not only to grant relief for the enforcement of fundamental rights but also for ‘any purpose’ which would include the enforcement of public duties by public bodies.

• This is done to prevent the State or the public bodies from acting in an arbitrary manner. SC, in a number of cases, has awarded compensation for the personal injuries caused by the officers of the government, like in Rudal Shah Vs State of Bihar. Therefore, compensation can be legally awarded in this case under public law, i.e. Article 226.

THE CHAIRMAN RAILWAY BOARD & ORS VS. MRS. CHANDRIMA DAS AND ORS AIR 2000

Brief Facts

• Mrs. Chandrima Das(respondent herein), a practicing advocate of the Calcutta High Court, filed a petition under Article 226 of Constitution against the Chairman of Railway Board(appellant herein), claiming compensation for the victim (Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon), a Bangladeshi National who was gang-raped by many including employees of the Railways in a room at Yatri Niwas at Howrah Station.

• The HC awarded a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs as compensation for Smt. Khatoon. The HC was of the opinion that the rape was committed at the building belonging to the Railways and was perpetrated by the railway employees and thus the Railway board is vicariously liable.

• This appeal is against the HC judgment in favor of Chandrima Das.

Issues

• Is it right to contend that the Central Government can’t be held vicariously liable for the offence of rape committed by the employees of the Railways?

• Is it right to contend that for claiming damages for the offence perpetrated on Smt. Khatoon, the remedy lay in the domain of private law and not under public law and, therefore, no compensation could have been legally awarded under Article 226?

Judgment

• The HC has jurisdiction not only to grant relief for the enforcement of fundamental rights but also for ‘any purpose’ which would include the enforcement of public duties by public bodies.

• This is done to prevent the State or the public bodies from acting in an arbitrary manner. SC, in a number of cases, has awarded compensation for the personal injuries caused by the officers of the government, like in Rudal Shah Vs State of Bihar. Therefore, compensation can be legally awarded in this case under public law, i.e. Article 226.

CHANDRA BANSI SINGH AND ORS VS STATE OF BIHAR 1984 AIR 1767, 1985 SCR (1) 579

Brief Facts

1. The Respondent State issued a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire 1034.94 acres of land in Village Digha for the construction of houses by the Bihar State Housing Board.

2. The compensation for the acquired land was to be paid by the Housing Board and not by the State from its own funds.

3. The acquisition was confirmed by the State Ministry of Revenue and Industry after issuing Notifications under Sections 6, 7, and 9 and considering the claims and objections.

Issues

A portion of the acquired land comprising 4.03 acres belonging to the Pandey families was released without any legal or constitutional justification.

4. The release of land in favor of the Pandey families was deemed an act of favoritism without justification.

5. Writ Petitions challenging the land release were filed in the Bihar High Court, leading to the present Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions.

Judgment

The Court held that the order of release passed by the government was (invalid) as it violated Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law.

The release of land to the Pandey families lacked legal or constitutional justification and was an act of favouritism.

CHANDRA MOHAN VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1966

Brief Facts

• The recruitment procedure for district judges in the State of U.P. is governed by the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules made by the Governor under Article 309 of the Constitution.

• The Governor decides on the number of candidates to be selected and prescribes their qualifications.

• The High Court calls for applications, and a Selection Committee screens the applications and conducts interviews.

• The Selection Committee selects suitable candidates for appointment and sends two lists (main and supplementary) to the High Court.

• The High Court submits the names of suitable candidates to the Governor for appointment.

Issues

1. Can the appellant challenge the judgment of the High Court related to the "Advocate-recruits"?

2. Is the appointment process, which involves consultation with both the High Court and the Selection Committee, legal under the Constitution?

3. Does the Governor have the power to appoint district judges from "judicial officers"?

Judgment

1. The Governor cannot appoint district judges from "judicial officers" as they are not members of the judicial service.

2. The Indian Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and emphasizes the separation of the judiciary from the executive.

3. Arts. 233 to 237 of the Constitution deal with the appointment and control of the judiciary, including district judges.

CHANDRAKANT PATIL VS. STATE AIR 1998

Brief Facts

1. The accused, Subhash Singh Thakur, Jayendra Thakur, Shyam Kishore Garikapati, and Chandrakant Patil, were found guilty under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA).

2. The trial court had awarded each accused a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 5 years, which the Supreme Court found inadequate.

3. Notice was issued to the accused regarding the proposal to enhance the sentence, and they filed written submissions in response.

4. The arguments were heard from the senior counsel representing the accused and the Additional Solicitor General representing the Central Bureau of Investigation.

5. The Supreme Court confirmed the conviction under Section 5 of TADA and decided not to review it at this stage, as it had already considered the arguments and dismissed the review petitions.

Issues

The accused contended that they had a right to re-canvass the finding, similar to the principle in the present Code of Criminal Procedure, but the court disagreed.

The accused also argued that the Supreme Court lacked the power to enhance the sentence without a specific appeal from the government, as it does not possess revisional powers like the High Court and Court of Sessions.

Judgment

1. The court clarified that the Supreme Court's powers under Article 142 of the Constitution are not restricted by statutory provisions and can be exercised when necessary for doing complete justice.

2. The court referred to various previous judgments that recognized the broad and residual powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142.

3. The court highlighted that its powers under Article 142 are to ensure due and proper administration of justice and are not limited or restricted by statutory law.

PART VI

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS FAKRUDDIN ALI AHMED AND ORS AIR 1974

Brief Facts

The petitioner claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate but faced rejection due to non-compliance with Sections 5B and 5C.

The petitioner's nomination was rejected for failing to fulfill the requirements of Sections 5B (1) and 5C (2).

Section 5B (1) requires a nomination paper to be submitted with the assent of the candidate, along with proposers and seconders.

Section 5C(1) mandates a deposit of Rs. 2,500, which must be either paid in cash or accompanied by a receipt from the Reserve Bank of India or Government Treasury.

Issues

The petitioner argues that Sections 5B and 5C are unconstitutional, but fails to provide sufficient reasons to support this claim.

The primary issue before the court is whether the petitioner can be considered a duly nominated "candidate" based on their compliance with Sections 5B and 5C.

Judgment

The court finds that the petitioner did not fulfill the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 5C since they submitted a cheque instead of depositing the required amount in cash or providing a valid receipt. Consequently, the court dismisses the petition on the grounds that the petitioner lacks locus standi to maintain the case.

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS GIANI ZAIL SINGH & ANOTHER 1984 AIR 309, 1984 SCR (2) 6

Brief Facts

1. Only Giani Zail Singh and Shri H.R. Khanna were accepted as candidates for the office of the President of India.

2. Election held on July 12, 1982, and Giani Zail Singh declared as the successful candidate.

3. Election Petitions Nos. 2 and 3 challenged the election, alleging undue influence by Giani Zail Singh.

Issues

Whether the election of a candidate can be challenged based on unsuitability for the office.

Judgment

1. The challenge to a Presidential or Vice-Presidential election is limited to the grounds specified in the law (Section 18(1)).

2. Parliament has the power to specify the types of doubts or disputes to be inquired into by the Supreme Court in election petitions.

3. The case does not disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election based on the grounds specified in Section 18(1)(a).

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS NEELAM SANJEEVA REDDY 1978 AIR 499, 1978 SCR (3) 1

Brief Facts

1. The petitioner filed nomination papers as a candidate for the Presidential elections held on July 19, 1977.

2. The nomination papers were not supported by the deposit prescribed under Section 5C and not subscribed by any voter as a proposer and a seconder, as required by Section 5B of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act (Act 31), 1952, made under Article 71(1) of the Constitution of India.

3. The Returning Officer rejected the petitioner's nomination papers for non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 5B and 5C of the Act.

4. The respondent was duly elected, and the petitioner challenged the election under Section 14 of the Act.

Issues

1. Whether the nomination papers were validly rejected by the Returning Officer?

2. Whether Sections 5B and 5C of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, are in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution?

3. Whether the Constitution Amendment 1974, introducing Article 71(3), takes away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to decide matters related to the Presidential election?

4. Whether the petitioner has the locus standi to challenge the election?

Judgment

1. The nomination papers were rightly rejected by the Returning Officer.

2. Sections 5B and 5C of the Act and the Constitution Amendment 1974, introducing Article 71(3), are valid and do not invade any basic structure of the Constitution.

3. Article 58 of the Constitution only provides qualifications or conditions for the eligibility of a candidate and is unrelated to the nomination process.

4. Sections 5B and 5C of the Act, which lay down conditions for candidates, are not in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution and impose reasonable conditions applicable to all.

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union of India and Others 1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR 869

Brief Facts

1. The Governor-General of India promulgated an Ordinance, later enacted as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950, to address mismanagement and neglect in the company affecting production and causing unemployment.

2. The Act resulted in the dismissal of managing agents, automatic vacation of office for directors, appointment of new directors by the government, curtailment of shareholder rights, and modification of the Indian Companies Act for the company.

3. A shareholder of the company filed an application under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a declaration that the Act was void and violated fundamental rights.

Issues

The petitioner argued that the Act infringed fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(f), 31, and 14 of the Constitution.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 31(1) as it did not deprive the company or the petitioner of their property except under authority of law.

2. The Court also ruled that the Act did not authorize the acquisition or taking possession of the property of the company or the petitioner, although certain shareholder rights were disabled.

3. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 31(1) as it did not deprive the company or the petitioner of their property except under authority of law.

4. The Court also ruled that the Act did not authorize the acquisition or taking possession of the property of the company or the petitioner, although certain shareholder rights were disabled.

PART VII

CLERKS OR CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS VS CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS CO. LTD 1957 AIR 78, 1956 SCR 772

Brief Facts

• The Bengal Chamber of Commerce conducted an investigation into the cost of living index for middle-class families and determined the dearness allowance payable to employees of mercantile firms in Calcutta.

• The appellants, who were clerks of the respondent Company, argued before the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal that they should receive the same dearness allowance rates as the middle-class families, as determined by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

• They contested the procedure followed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which did not fully neutralize 20 points of the living cost index, claiming it was unjustifiable.

Issues

Whether the appellants were entitled to receive the same dearness allowance rates as the middle-class families, as determined by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

Judgment

• The Supreme Court held that there cannot be a uniform rule applicable to all employees regarding the grant of dearness allowance.

• It stated that, except for the lowest class of manual laborers, it is not appropriate to neutralize the entire rise in the cost of living through dearness allowance.

• The court acknowledged the existence of different grades within the middle classes and ruled that the appellants cannot claim the same dearness allowance rates as those fixed for clerks of mercantile firms by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

Coffee Board, Bangalore vs Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras 1971 AIR 870, 1970 SCR (3) 147

Brief Facts

1. The Coffee Board claimed exemption from sales tax under Art. 286(1) (b) of the Constitution.

2. The Board argued that certain sales of coffee made to registered exporters for export outside India should not be taxed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

3. The taxing authorities held that the sales took place within Tamil Nadu and were liable to be taxed under the Tamil Nadu Act.

4. The Board filed petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the levy.

Issues

1. Whether the Coffee Board, being a corporation, could file a petition under Art. 32.

2. Whether the sales of coffee by the Board qualified as sales in the course of export.

Judgment

The majority held that the sales by the Coffee Board were not sales in the course of export, and therefore, they were liable to be taxed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The petitioner's claim for exemption was rejected.

COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE VS RMDC PRESS PVT LTD 2003 (161) ELT 868 Tri Del

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the classification of 'printed wrappers' and 'printed sleeves' for excise duty purposes.

2. The Assistant Collector classified both products under sub-heading 4818.90, considering them as packing materials rather than products of the printing industry.

3. The appellants argued that the items should be classified under sub-heading 4901.90 as products of the printing industry.

4. The appellants relied on a Supreme Court ruling in the case of Metagraphs Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, which held that printed aluminum labels were products of the printing industry.

Issues

The appellants argued that the items were primarily used for advertising and displaying the merits of the goods, making them products of the printing industry.

Judgment

1. The Third Member noted that in a similar case, the Tribunal classified printed wrappers as articles of the packaging industry.

2. The Third Member emphasized that the function of wrapping occurred even without printing, relying on the judgment in the New Jack Printing Works case.

3. The Third Member concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, upholding the classification of the items as packaging materials.

4. The order confirmed the earlier decision of the Assistant Collector, rejecting the appellants' claim for classification under the sub-heading for printing industry products

COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION ANANTNAG VS MRS. KATIJI (1987) 2 SCC 107

Brief Facts

1. The State filed an appeal against a decision to enhance compensation for the acquisition of lands for a public purpose.

2. The appeal raised important questions related to valuation principles.

3. The High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, as it was filed four days beyond the prescribed time limit.

4. The State applied for condonation of delay, seeking an extension of time to file the appeal.

5. The High Court rejected the application for condonation of delay.

6. The State then appealed to the higher court, seeking special leave.

Issues

The court examined the interpretation of the term "sufficient cause" mentioned in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.

Judgment

The court stated that the interpretation of "sufficient cause" should be guided by the spirit and philosophy of the provision, ensuring equitable administration of the law.

1. In this case, the court found sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal in the High Court.

2. The court granted condonation of delay, remitted the matter back to the High Court, and directed it to dispose of the case on its merits.

COMMON CAUSE (A regd. Society) VS UNION OF INDIA (1999) 6 SCC 107

Brief Facts

This writ petition sought a declaration that the “right to die with dignity” fell within the fold of “right to live with dignity” under Article 21, and to ensure that persons of deteriorated health or terminally ill could execute a living will or an Advance Medical Directive. 

While this case was initially placed before a three Judge Bench, in light of contradictory precedents in determining the law relating to the right to die in India, it was referred to a Constitution Bench.

Issues

Whether the right to die with dignity was a fundamental right within the fold of the right to live with dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Judgment

The Court reaffirmed that the right to die with dignity was a fundamental right, as declared by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Kaur vs state of Punjab. The Court also clarified that the ratio of Gian Kaur did not introduce the concept of passive euthanasia. 

The Court discussed the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, where active euthanasia requires an overt action, whereas passive euthanasia is the act of withdrawal of life support. It held that the Court in Aruna Shanbaug had erred in holding that passive euthanasia could only be introduced through a legislation.

The Court opined that the right to privacy mandated safeguarding the integrity of individual choice in the intimate sphere of decisions relating to death and held that the protection of these rights was an emanation of the right to privacy, as they were related to the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.

COMPETENT AUTHORITY, AHMEDABAD VS AMRITLAL CHANDMAL JAIN AND ORS 1998

Brief Facts-

1. The appeals (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2/94 and 574/94) are filed against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court declaring the detention order under COFEPOSA against Amritlal Jain illegal and quashing the proceedings under SAFEMA.

2. The Competent Authority and the State of Gujarat have filed the appeals.

3. The third appeal (Civil Appeal 1487/94) is filed by the Competent Authority against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dismissing their writ petition seeking to restrain the release of seized silver to Amritlal and Agra Bullion Company.

4. The Competent Authority is an officer of the Central Government appointed under SAFEMA.

5. Amritlal was initially detained under COFEPOSA in 1982 but challenged his detention in the Supreme Court through a writ of habeas corpus. The state revoked the detention order but issued a fresh one on the same grounds.

Issues

The Competent Authority appealed against the High Court's judgment, arguing that the second order of detention was challenged after the appropriate time, citing the decision in the Amritlal Prajivandas case.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court noted that challenges were made to both orders of detention during their respective periods and that the release of the detenu rendered the first writ petition infructuous.

2. The Court stated that if a writ petition is disposed of on the grounds of release, it does not imply an unsuccessful challenge to the order of detention.

3. The Court found no merit in the appeals and dismissed them.

CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA VS GOVERNERS OF ST. THOMAS SCHOOL, CALCUTTA (1950) 52 BOMLR 25

Brief Facts-

• The appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal.

• The premises in question, located in Calcutta, comprise a specific area of land with buildings on it, owned by the Governors of St. Thomas' School.

• The premises were requisitioned by the Central Government in April 1942 under the Defense of India Act and possession was taken.

• A memorandum of agreement was executed between the respondents and the Governor-General in Council, determining the compensation payable to the owners during the period of requisition.

• The Central Government erected additional buildings on the premises at a later date.

• There was a re-valuation of the premises under the Calcutta Municipal Act, and the value of the additional structures was included, resulting in an increased annual value for taxation.

Issues

The respondents objected to this assessment, arguing that the structures put up by the Government should be exempt from municipal taxes.

The appellants argued that the buildings should not be separately assessed as the land was not vested in the Government and that the proviso to Section 154 of the Government of India Act should apply.

Judgment

• The Supreme Court rejected the appellants' contentions, stating that the buildings were vested in the Government under the agreement and the ownership of a building is not necessarily linked to the ownership of the land.

• The Court held that the buildings were considered property under Section 154 of the Government of India Act and were exempt from municipal taxes.

• The Court also rejected the argument that the unit of assessment should include the additional structures based on the provisions of the local Municipal Act.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court that the additional structures erected by the Central Government were exempt from municipal taxes.

CST VS PINE CHEMICALS LTD (1995) 1 SCC 58

Brief Facts

1. Government Order No. 159-Ind. dated 26-3-1971, despite any defects, should be understood as an order granting exemption under Section 5 of the Jammu & Kashmir General Sales Tax Act.

2. The said Government Order is effective by itself and does not require any further order to be enforceable.

3. SRO No. 448 dated 22-10-1982 does not supersede the exemption notification mentioned above.

4. Dealers are entitled to claim the benefit of sub-section (2-A) of Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act based on the exemption granted under Government Order No. 159.

The court limited its discussion to the fourth submission raised in the review petitions. Section 8(2-A) of the Central Sales Tax Act states that if goods are exempt from tax generally under the state sales tax law, then the central sales tax will also be exempt or charged at a lower rate.

Issues

The court interpreted the exemption granted under Government Order No. 159 as conditional and specific to the industrial unit producing the goods, rather than a general exemption. Therefore, the dealers' claim for exemption under Section 8(2-A) was denied.

Judgment

Thus, the court allowed the review petitions and dismissed the appeals filed by the dealers

In conclusion, the court set aside the judgment in Pine Chemicals, as it had incorrectly interpreted Section 8(2-A) of the Central Sales Tax Act, and dismissed the appeals filed by the dealers seeking exemption.

CWT VS AMETEUR RIDERS CLUB, BOMBAY 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603

Brief Facts

1. The case involves a special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993, which has been delayed by 264 days.

2. The Court has previously expressed concern over the government's appeals being lost due to the point of limitation and the resulting prejudice to public interest.

3. Despite previous observations by the Court, there has been no significant improvement in the timely filing of petitions, as evident in the present case filed in November 1993.

4. The petitioner explains that the special leave petition was drafted by the Advocate-on-Record and sent for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993, along with the case file.

5. The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993, who resent it to the Board on September 20, 1993, stating that the draft SLP was not approved.

6. The Board eventually approved the draft SLP and sent the file to the Central Agency Section (CAS) on October 1, 1993.

Judgment

1. Considering the binding nature of the law of limitation that applies to everyone, the Court finds no grounds for granting relief in this case.

2. The Court expresses its inability to assist a litigant, even if it is the government, when the litigant falls outside the scope of permissible relief.

3. Consequently, the Court dismisses the application for condonation of delay and dismisses the special leave petition as barred by time.

DR. D.C WADHWA AND ORS VS STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS 1987 AIR 579, 1987 SCR (1) 798

Brief Facts

The petitioner, Dr. D.C. Wadhwa, was a professor of economics in Pune who had extensively researched and published about the misuse of the ordinance making power of the governor of Bihar.

Between 1967 and 1981, the government of Bihar had promulgated 256 ordinances, which were kept alive for periods ranging between one and fourteen years by mechanically re-promulgating the ordinances without changing any content of the ordinance or trying to turn it into an Act.

The immediate challenge in the case was to the three ordinances that were kept alive for a period of 10-14 years. The main issue contested was whether the Governor could mechanically re-promulgate the ordinance for an indefinite period of time, and thus take over the power (from the legislature) to legislate through the powers conferred on him under Article 213.

Issues

Whether the Governor can mechanically re-promulgate the ordinance for an indefinite period of time, and thus take over the power (from the legislature) to legislate through the powers conferred on him under Article 213.

Whether the petitioners had legal standing to challenge the validity of re-promulgation of the ordinances.

Judgment

The court ruled that the mechanical re-promulgation of the ordinances for a period of one to fourteen years without going to the legislation was a colourable exercise of power by the executive and ruled that re-promulgation of ordinances was unconstitutional.

The court also provided two exceptions to this rule in which re-promulgation can be allowed: (1) if the legislature cannot take it up due to existing legislative business and (2) if the government feels that an emergent situation has emerged and re-promulgation is necessary to deal with it.

DR. D.C WADHWA AND ORS VS STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS 1987 AIR 579, 1987 SCR (1) 798

Brief Facts

The petitioner, Dr. D.C. Wadhwa, was a professor of economics in Pune who had extensively researched and published about the misuse of the ordinance making power of the governor of Bihar.

Between 1967 and 1981, the government of Bihar had promulgated 256 ordinances, which were kept alive for periods ranging between one and fourteen years by mechanically re-promulgating the ordinances without changing any content of the ordinance or trying to turn it into an Act.

The immediate challenge in the case was to the three ordinances that were kept alive for a period of 10-14 years. The main issue contested was whether the Governor could mechanically re-promulgate the ordinance for an indefinite period of time, and thus take over the power (from the legislature) to legislate through the powers conferred on him under Article 213.

Issues

Whether the Governor can mechanically re-promulgate the ordinance for an indefinite period of time, and thus take over the power (from the legislature) to legislate through the powers conferred on him under Article 213.

Whether the petitioners had legal standing to challenge the validity of re-promulgation of the ordinances.

Judgment

The court ruled that the mechanical re-promulgation of the ordinances for a period of one to fourteen years without going to the legislation was a colourable exercise of power by the executive and ruled that re-promulgation of ordinances was unconstitutional.

The court also provided two exceptions to this rule in which re-promulgation can be allowed:

(1) if the legislature cannot take it up due to existing legislative business and 

(2) if the government feels that an emergent situation has emerged and re-promulgation is necessary to deal with it.

D.K BASU VS STATE OF WEST BENGAL, STATE OF U.P 1996

Brief Facts

DK Basu was the Executive Chairman of Legal Aid Services, West Bengal, and a non-political organization. He addressed a letter to the Supreme Court of India drawing the courts attention to a piece of news published in various newspapers about deaths in police custody and lockups.

In the letter, it was mentioned that such crimes of custodial violence always went unpunished despite the efforts made and urged the courts to look into the matter so that the family members of the victims are given some form of compensation. He requested that the letter be treated as a Writ Petition within the “Public Interest Litigation” category.

Considering the significance of the issues brought up in the letter, it was treated as a written petition and the defendants were informed.

Issues

 Whether there is an increase in the cases of custodial death and violence?

 Whether there is a need for guidelines for arrest and custody of detenu?

 Whether the police officers be held liable for custodial death and violence?

 Whether custodial death and violence amounts to violation of Article 21 of the detenu?

Judgment

The Apex Court further laid down the following guidelines and said that arrest and detention will be subject to the guidelines. The violation of these guidelines would attract not only the departmental action but also the contempt of court proceedings in a High Court having the jurisdiction over the matter.

The person arrested must be made aware of his right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon he is put under arrest or is detained.

The arrestee may be allowed to meet his attorney during interrogation, although not throughout the interrogation.

D.K JOSHI VS CHIEF SECTRETARY, STATE OF U.P 1999

Brief Facts

1. Mr. D.K. Joshi filed a writ petition in 1992 alleging that the supply of drinking water in Agra city was highly polluted, contaminated, and unfit for consumption.

2. The petition stated that despite existing legislation, the concerned authorities had not taken adequate measures to address the issue, causing suffering to the residents and visitors of Agra.

3. The court issued notices to the relevant authorities, and affidavits were filed in response, revealing that some initiatives were taken but were insufficient.

4. The court ordered the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) to submit a report on long-term measures for drinking water supply, sewerage and drainage systems, and solid waste disposal in Agra.

5. The State of Uttar Pradesh was directed to provide information on the projects undertaken regarding these issues.

6. Several status reports were filed by the State, indicating some steps taken but falling short of the necessary measures.

Issues

Mr. Parikh, the petitioner's counsel, argued that the latest status report was unsatisfactory and requested continued court monitoring.

Judgment

The court decided not to retain the case further but issued directions to the State and appointed a Monitoring Committee headed by the Commissioner of Agra.

The State of U.P. was instructed to issue a notification forming the Committee within three months.

D.N TANEJA VS BHAJAN LAL 1988 SCR (3) 888, 1988 SCC (3) 26

Brief Facts

1. The appellant filed an application for contempt against the respondent in the High Court.

2. The complaint was regarding interference by the respondent with the due course of judicial proceedings.

3. A Single Judge of the High Court considered the application, affidavits, and submissions made by the parties.

4. The Single Judge concluded that it was not a fit case for the court to exercise its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act.

5. The application for contempt was dismissed by the Single Judge.

6. The appellant filed an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act.

Issues

1. The respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal under Section 19(1).

2. The objection was upheld by the Court, and the appeal was dismissed.

Judgment

1. The High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution.

2. An appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act is only available when the High Court makes an order or decision in exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.

3. The High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 215 when it imposes a punishment for contempt.

4. When no punishment is imposed, it is difficult to argue that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction conferred by Article 215.

DAL SINGH VS EMPEROR (1917) 19 BOMLR 510

Brief Facts

1. The appellant was convicted of murder by the Sessions Court of Jubbulpore and was sentenced to death.

2. The appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal to the King in Council, alleging illegal use of police diaries and wrongful estimation of witness credibility, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

3. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council heard the appeal and examined the procedure and evidence in detail.

4. The Judicial Committee outlined the limitations of its function in reviewing criminal cases, stating that interference occurs only in cases of serious injustice or denial of justice.

5. The murder victim, Kalia, was killed by blows from an axe, and the prosecution alleged that the appellant, Dal Singh, was the perpetrator.

6. The prosecution's case claimed that an altercation between Dal Singh and Mohan, Kalia's husband, led to the murder, with Mohan also involved.

Issues

1. The defense argued that Dal Singh was not present during the murder and that Mohan killed Kalia to falsely implicate Dal Singh.

2. The charges against the appellant and his servants were for rioting and murder, while the other servants were acquitted during the trial.

Judgment

1. The Privy Council determined that the use of the police diary by the Court of Appeal was incorrect and contrary to the law, but it did not warrant interference if substantial justice had been done.

2. The Privy Council found no reason to doubt the trial Judge's proper conviction and sentencing of the appellant and concluded that the error in procedure was not significant enough to justify interference.

3. The Privy Council recommended dismissing the appeal, stating that substantial justice had been served, and no costs were awarded, as is customary in such cases

DALBIR KAUR & ORS VS STATE OF PUNJAB 1977 AIR 472, 1977 SCR (1) 280

Brief Facts

1. The appellant was convicted of murder by the Sessions Court of Jubbulpore and was sentenced to death.

2. The appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal to the King in Council, alleging illegal use of police diaries and wrongful estimation of witness credibility, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

3. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council heard the appeal and examined the procedure and evidence in detail.

4. The Judicial Committee outlined the limitations of its function in reviewing criminal cases, stating that interference occurs only in cases of serious injustice or denial of justice.

5. The murder victim, Kalia, was killed by blows from an axe, and the prosecution alleged that the appellant, Dal Singh, was the perpetrator.

6. The prosecution's case claimed that an altercation between Dal Singh and Mohan, Kalia's husband, led to the murder, with Mohan also involved.

Issues

1. The defense argued that Dal Singh was not present during the murder and that Mohan killed Kalia to falsely implicate Dal Singh.

2. The charges against the appellant and his servants were for rioting and murder, while the other servants were acquitted during the trial.

Judgment

1. The Court of Appeal confirmed the conviction based on the evidence and the improper use of the police diary, leading to the appeal to the Privy Council.

2. The Privy Council determined that the use of the police diary by the Court of Appeal was incorrect and contrary to the law, but it did not warrant interference if substantial justice had been done.

3. The Privy Council found no reason to doubt the trial Judge's proper conviction and sentencing of the appellant and concluded that the error in procedure was not significant enough to justify interference.

4. The Privy Council recommended dismissing the appeal, stating that substantial justice had been served, and no costs were awarded, as is customary in such ca

DALBIR SINGH AND ORS VS THE STATE OF PUNJAB AIR 1962

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the interpretation and validity of Section 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1953.

2. The Act was enacted after the administration of the State of Pepsu was taken over by the President under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution.

3. The Act conferred the powers of the legislature of the State of Pepsu to the President.

4. The purpose of the Act was to provide penalties for spreading disaffection among the police force.

5. The appellants were charged with inducing or attempting to induce police officers to withhold their services, leading to a breach of discipline.

Issues

1. The appellants challenged the validity of their conviction under Section 3 of the Act, claiming it violated their freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

2. The appellants argued that Section 3 was not saved by Article 19(2), which allows reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech.

3. The central issue was whether Section 3 infringed upon the freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) and if it was saved by Article 19(2).

Judgment

1. The court held that Section 3 of the Act did not violate Article 19(1) (a) and was within the powers of the legislature.

2. It was established that the police force is responsible for maintaining public order, and any breach of discipline by its members poses a threat to public order.

3. The court rejected the appellants' argument that Article 33 of the Constitution was applicable, stating that the delegated powers of the legislature to the President did not have the force of Parliamentary legislation.

4. Ultimately, the court upheld the validity of Section 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1953, and affirmed the appellants' convictions.

DALJIT SINGH DALAL VS UNION OF INDIA 1997

Brief Facts

1. The case is a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in May 1993 by the original petitioner, Daljit Singh Dalal, in person, but he died soon after filing the petition.

2. The petitioner's son, Bajrang Singh, argued the case as a party in person, claiming to be a lawyer.

3. The disputed premises, located in Delhi, consisted of Premises Nos. 2505, 2506, and 2670 in Basti Punjabian, Subzi Mandi.

4. On May 13, 1993, portions of House No. 2670 were demolished by the Municipal Corporation, trapping the petitioner's father, daughter, daughter-in-law, and her three small children on the second floor.

5. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court on the same day and obtained an order for the rescue of the trapped family members. They were rescued on May 14, 1993.

6. The original petitioner entered a coma and was taken to the hospital, where he later died.

Issues

The petitioner alleges that the demolition was a mala fide act by the Municipal Corporation, instigated by the fourth respondent due to the petitioner's and his father's support for widows of Sikhs killed in the Delhi riots.

Judgment

1. The Municipal Corporation, with police assistance, removed one covered enclosure constructed on public land. On May 13, 1993, they demolished the illegal mezzanine, first, and second floors on the public road in front of Property No. 2670.

2. The respondents deny blocking the staircase and assert that the petitioner and his family members did not allow the removal of debris (malba).

3. The court finds several disputed questions of fact and determines that no public interest is involved in the case. As a result, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.

DANDU LAKSHMI REDDY VS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 1999

Brief Facts

1. Dandu Lakshmi Reddy and his mother Narayanamma were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the death of Lakshmi Devi, the wife of Dandu Lakshmi Reddy.

2. The prosecution's case was that Lakshmi Devi was harassed by her husband and mother-in-law due to her inability to bear children. On the day of the incident, they allegedly set her on fire.

3. The prosecution relied on two dying declarations made by Lakshmi Devi, one to a Judicial Magistrate and another to a Sub Inspector of Police, in which she accused the appellant and his mother of setting her on fire.

Issues

1. The defence argued that Lakshmi Devi had mental imbalance and suicidal tendencies. They claimed that she either set herself on fire or the fire was accidental while cooking

Judgment

1. The court highlighted the inherent weaknesses of dying declarations, including the lack of cross-examination, and the possibility of false or vengeful statements.

2. Based on the scrutiny of the dying declarations and other evidence, the court concluded that it would be unsafe to convict the appellant and his mother.

3. The court invoked the principle that if no conviction is possible for one accused, the benefit of doubt should be extended to the co-accused, even if they did not appeal the conviction.

4. As a result, the court set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant and his mother, acquitting them.

PART VIII

DARYAO AND OTHERS VS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS 1961 AIR 1457, 1962 SCR (1) 574

Brief Facts-

1. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court, seeking certain reliefs based on alleged contravention of fundamental rights.

2. The High Court dismissed the writ petition after a hearing on the merits, stating that no fundamental right was proved or contravened, or that any contravention was constitutionally justified.

3. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking the same facts and reliefs as in the previous writ petition.

Issues

The petitioner argued against the application of the general principle of res judicata, claiming that the judgment of the High Court cannot be considered as res judicata since it cannot entertain a petition under Article 32.

Judgment

The Court held that when a writ petition under Article 226 is considered on the merits and dismissed by the High Court, the decision is binding on the parties unless modified or reversed through appeal or appropriate proceedings. However, if the petition is dismissed without a speaking order or as withdrawn, there is no bar of res judicata.

The Court emphasized that the general principle of res judicata, based on public policy considerations, should apply to petitions under Article 32 as well.

DAYARAM AND OTHERS VS SHYAM SUNDARI 1965 AIR

Brief Facts

1. The case involves lands owned by Har Charan and his two brothers.

2. After Har Charan's death, his brothers sold the lands to the father of the appellants.

3. The respondent filed a suit claiming a decree for possession of a third share in the property, alleging separation of interest among Har Charan and his brothers.

4. The purchaser made constructions in pursuance of an agreement with the Improvement Trust after being notified of the respondent's claim.

5. The respondent's claim was decreed, but it was ordered that she should file a suit for partition to determine her rights.

6. In the suit for partition, the trial Court held that the respondent was only entitled to a decree for money representing the value of her third share due to the buildings constructed on the land

Judgment

1. The decision obtained against the legal representatives who were impleaded would bind the entire estate.

2. However, if the appellant becomes aware during the appeal that some legal representatives were not impleaded, it is their duty to bring them on record.

3. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing the appellants' lack of equity and dismissed the appeal.

DEATH OF 25 CHAINED INMATES VS UNION OF INDIA AIR 2002

Brief Facts

1. The case involves a tragic incident at a mental asylum in Ervadi, Ramanathapuram district, where over 25 mentally challenged patients were killed in a fire.

2. The patients were unable to escape the fire as they had been chained to poles or beds, according to the submission note.

3. The court took suo moto action based on the news report and appointed Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi as Amicus Curiae to assist the court.

4. Notice was issued to the Union of India regarding the incident.

5. The court called for a report from the State of Tamil Nadu and sought information from state and union governments on various topics related to the incident.

Issues

1. The Attorney General representing the Union Government acknowledged the importance of implementing the 1987 Act and assured the court of appropriate action.

2. The court observed slackness on the part of authorities in implementing laws enacted by the Parliament, including the Mental Health Act of 1987.

Judgment

1. The Union of India's Cabinet Secretary was instructed to file an affidavit indicating contributions, policies, and objectives related to mental health.

2. The court also sought affidavits from states without full-fledged government-run mental hospitals, stating steps being taken to establish such facilities and a time schedule for their establishment. Awareness campaigns and the functioning of State Mental Health Authorities were also emphasized.

DEBESH CHANDRA DAS VS UNION OF INDIA 1970 AIR

Brief Facts

1. The appellant joined the Indian Civil Service in 1933 and was allotted to the State of Assam.

2. In 1964, he was appointed as Secretary to the Government of India "until further orders."

3. In 1966, he received a letter offering three alternatives: reverting to his parent state of Assam, proceeding on leave preparatory to retirement, or accepting a lower post.

4. The appellant challenged these orders, claiming they violated Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

5. The High Court dismissed the petition, and a Letters Patent appeal was also rejected.

Issues

1. The appellant argued that his reversion to Assam amounted to a reduction in rank and a penalty.

2. He claimed that the letters from the Cabinet Secretary cast a stigma on his work.

3. The government contended that the appellant was on deputation and his deputation could be terminated at any time.

4. They argued that his appointment was "until further orders," indicating he had no right to continue if his services were not required.

Judgment

1. The court held that the appellant was being reduced in rank without following the procedure in Article 311(2).

2. The appellant held a tenure post as Secretary to the Central Government, which was normally for five years.

3. The court held that the appellant was being reduced in rank without following the procedure in Article 311(2).

4. The appellant held a tenure post as Secretary to the Central Government, which was normally for five years

DELHI DOMESTIC WORKING WOMEN’S VS UNION OF INDIA 1995 SCC (1) 14, JT 1994 (7) 183

Brief Facts-

• This is a public interest litigation filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution by the Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum.

• The case involves four domestic servants who were sexually assaulted by seven army personnel while traveling on the Muri Express train from Ranchi to Delhi.

• The victims were subjected to indecent assault, rape, and physical violence by the army personnel.

• A first information report (FIR) was registered, and the victims underwent medical check-ups.

• The petitioner forum attempted to meet the victims but was denied access by the employers.

• The petition seeks compensation, rehabilitation, and protection for the victims, who are vulnerable tribal women from Bihar.

Judgment

• The court directs the National Commission for Women to develop a scheme within six months to assist and support victims of such crimes.

• The Union of India is instructed to examine the scheme and take necessary steps for its implementation.

• The writ petition is disposed of with the aforementioned directions.

DELHI JUDICIAL SERVICE VS STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS 1991 AIR 2176, 1991 SCR (3) 936

Brief Facts

1. The case involves Mr. N.L. Patel, Chief Judicial Magistrate at Nadiad, who faced challenges with the local police not cooperating in court proceedings.

2. Mr. Patel lodged complaints against the police to the District Superintendent and Director General of Police, but no action was taken.

3. In retaliation, the Police Inspector, Mr. S.R. Sharma, withdrew constables from the CJM Court, causing further delays in trials.

4. The CJM filed complaints against the Police Inspector and other officials for obstructing judicial proceedings.

5. The CJM ordered the police to register a criminal case against individuals who obstructed judicial proceedings, but later dropped the case after an apology was issued.

6. The Police Inspector filed a complaint against the CJM with the High Court Registrar.

7. The incident resulted in hostility between the Nadiad Police and the CJM, leading to a deterioration of their relationship.

8. The Police Inspector invited the CJM to the police station to discuss a case but allegedly assaulted and restrained him when he refused to consume alcohol.

Issues

1. A photographer captured the incident, and the photographs were published in newspapers.

2. The Police Inspector denied the allegations, stating that the CJM entered the station in a drunken state and was violent, leading to his arrest.

3. The incident caused shock and insecurity among judicial officers and led to various bar associations going on strike.

Judgment

1. A judicial inquiry was conducted, which confirmed the CJM's version of events and found that the police officers had violated regulations and circulars.

2. The Supreme Court, considering the incident as contempt of court and interference with the administration of justice, took cognizance of the matter, and the case was brought before the Court for further proceedings.

DEV SINGH & ORS VS REGISTRAR, PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT 1987 AIR 1629, 1987 SCR (2) 1005

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the interpretation of Section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, and Chapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders.

2. Sub-section (2) of Section 35 empowers the District Court to appoint, suspend, and remove ministerial officers of courts under its control.

3. Sub-section (3) makes every appointment subject to rules prescribed by the High Court.

4. Sub-section (4) states that orders passed by the District Judge are subject to the control of the High Court.

5. Chapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders governs the appointment, promotion, and punishment of ministerial officials in the District and other civil courts.

6. Rule IX, sub-rule 2(a) allows the District Judge to impose various penalties on ministerial officers, including censure, fine, suspension, removal, and dismissal.

7. Rule X, sub-rule 2 provides for appeals to the High Court against penalties imposed by the District Judge.

Issues

1. The appellants, employees in the ministerial establishment of courts, were dismissed for alleged misconduct in a demonstration against a judicial magistrate.

2. The appellants appealed the dismissal to the High Court, which was subsequently dismissed.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court granted special leave to determine whether the High Court's decision was judicial or administrative.

2. The Court held that Article 136 of the Constitution allows appeals only from adjudications of courts and tribunals, and not administrative decisions.

3. The High Court, in its appeal proceedings, acted administratively by exercising control over subordinate courts and did not resolve a dispute between adversarial parties.
   
   

DEVIDAS AND OTHERS VS SHRISHAILAPPA AND OTHERS 1961 AIR 1277, 1961 SCR (3) 896

Brief Facts

1. The manager of an undivided Hindu family (first plaintiff), his brother, and their step-mother.

2. The manager of the family filed a suit to recover the amount due under a mortgage belonging to the family.

3. The step-mother, who had an interest in the mortgage, was not initially made a party to the suit.

4. The suit was filed on behalf of the joint family, although the manager did not explicitly describe himself as the manager in the plaint.

5. No objection regarding non-joinder was raised during the trial court proceedings.

6. During the appeal in the High Court, the step-mother applied to be added as a party to the suit.

Issues

1. The contesting defendants argued that the suit must fail because all persons with an interest in the mortgage were not joined as parties within the prescribed limitation period.

2. The defendants also argued that since the first plaintiff did not purport to institute the suit in his capacity as the manager, the suit was invalid.

Judgment

1. The court held that the failure to join a proper but not necessary party does not affect the maintainability of the suit or invoke the application of Section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.

2. The court further determined that whether the suit was instituted by the manager in his personal capacity or as a representative of the family depends on the circumstances of each case.

3. The ruling clarified that the absence of the step-mother as a party did not invalidate the suit, and the suit could proceed.

DHAKESHWAR COTTON MILLS LTD VS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL 1955 AIR 65, 1955 SCR (1) 941

Brief Facts

1. The case involves a dispute between Seth Gurmukh Singh (the assesse) and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab (the respondent) regarding the assessment of income under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

2. The Supreme Court of India was approached under Article 136 of the Constitution, which confers an overriding and exceptional power to the Court in special and extraordinary situations.

3. The Supreme Court held that the powers conferred by Article 136 are not precisely defined and should be exercised sparingly and with caution.

4. The Court emphasized that no set formula or rule can restrict the exercise of power under Article 136, and it should not be hindered by technical hurdles when used to rectify arbitrary adjudication or advance the cause of justice.

Judgment

The Court concluded that an assessment made in violation of the fundamental rules of justice calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court's powers under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The judgment establishes that assessments made without proper disclosure, opportunity to rebut, or consideration of relevant materials infringe upon the fundamental principles of justice, and the Supreme Court has the authority to intervene in such cases under Article 136 of the Constitution.

PART IX

DHIAN SINGH VS MUNICIPAL BOARD, SAHARANPUR 1970

Brief Facts

1. The appellant, a seller of coloured sweets, was accused of selling adulterated sweets based on a report from the Public Analyst.

2. A complaint was filed against the appellant under Section 7, read with Section 16, of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

3. The trial court acquitted the appellant, but the Municipal Board appealed under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the High Court convicted the appellant.

4. The appellant did not raise any objections about the complaint or appeal's maintainability, which was filed by the Municipal Board with the Food Inspector as the complainant.

Issues

In the Supreme Court appeal, the appellant contended that the appeal filed by the Municipal Board was not maintainable as the complaint was actually instituted by the Food Inspector and not the Municipal Board.

The appellant's final contention was that the conviction was based solely on the report of the Public Analyst, which did not contain the mode or particulars of analysis or the test applied.

Judgment

The Supreme Court ruled that Section 20 was different from provisions requiring sanction for criminal proceedings. It allowed the conferment of authority to institute a particular case or class of cases before any offense takes place.

The Supreme Court clarified that the report should contain the result of the analysis, enabling one to infer whether the food item was adulterated or not. In this case, the report did contain the necessary data for the analyst's conclusion. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.

DIPAK BANERJEE VS SMT. LILABATI CHAKRABORTY 1987 AIR

Brief Facts

1. The case involves a landlord (respondent) who filed a suit against the tenant (appellant) for contravening Section 13(1)(a) of the West Bengal Premises Act, 1956.

2. The landlord accused the tenant of sub-letting two out of four rooms to a sub-tenant without obtaining written consent.

3. The sub-tenant had established a tailoring business in the premises, evidenced by the use of a sewing machine.

4. The trial court concluded that there was evidence of sub-tenancy based on the sewing machine's use and the sub-tenant's occupation for tailoring business.

5. The trial court placed the burden on the tenant to prove that the sub-tenant was not inducted as such and that the tenant had provided shelter to a helpless individual.

6. The first appellate court affirmed the trial court's findings, and the High Court also upheld the decisions of the lower courts on appeal.

Issues

The appellant contended that the existence of sub-tenancy should be inferred from certain conduct, specifically whether the sub-tenant had exclusive possession of the part of the premises and the tenant had no control over it.

Judgment

1. The court ruled that the appellant should pay an increased rent of at least Rs. 350 per month, considering the inadequate rent of Rs. 250 since 1972.

2. If the standard rent is higher, the respondent can apply for further rent increase.

DIRECT RECRUIT CLASS II ENGINEERING OFFICERS ASSOCIATION VS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Brief Facts

1. In 1937, the Government of Bombay created two new Provincial Engineering Services known as Bombay Engineering Service Class I and Bombay Engineering Service Class II.

2. The services included posts of Chief Engineer, Superintending Engineers, Executive Engineers, and Assistant Engineers Class I, and Deputy Engineers Class II.

3. Recruitment to these services was initially made through nomination from students of the College of Engineering, Pune, or by promoting officers from inferior posts.

4. In 1960, detailed rules were framed for recruitment, introducing a competitive examination and a quota system for direct recruits and promotees.

5. From 1960 to 1970, an adequate number of direct recruits were not available, so a large number of promotees were appointed to officiate as Deputy Engineers.

6. The strength of permanent Deputy Engineers was fixed, and no fresh appointments were to be made to this cadre.

7. In 1970, new rules were adopted, and seniority lists were prepared for confirmed and unconfirmed officers.

Issues

The validity of some rules was challenged and successfully struck down as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The validity of the 1978, 1982, 1983, and 1984 rules was challenged in the present appeals, special leave petitions, and writ petitions.

Judgment

1. The court emphasized that seniority should be determined based on continuous officiating after a regular appointment in accordance with the rules applicable for substantive appointments.

2. The court dismissed all the cases, upholding the principle of seniority and equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT VS SHRI ASHOK JAIN 1998

Brief Facts

1. Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1998 arose from Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3563 of 1997.

2. The appeal challenged an order passed by the Delhi High Court, which interfered with the Sessions Judge's dismissal of a pre-arrest bail petition filed by businessman Ashok Kumar Jain (the respondent).

3. The Enforcement Directorate, under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA), conducted raids and seized documents related to alleged FERA violations involving millions of US Dollars by the respondent.

4. The respondent left India and did not respond to repeated summons for interrogation by the Directorate.

5. The Sessions Court dismissed his application for anticipatory bail, stating that granting bail would hamper the proper investigation of serious FERA violations.

6. The respondent moved the Delhi High Court, seeking pre-arrest bail based on medical reports indicating his acute heart condition.

Issues

The Directorate filed an appeal, objecting to these conditions, while the respondent filed another appeal, aggrieved by the refusal to grant anticipatory bail.

The Addl. Solicitor General argued that the Directorate's ability to use seized documents for questioning would be futile after the statutorily limited time schedule, which would expire soon.

Judgmen

1. The Court extended the period for the Directorate to use the seized documents for questioning the respondent for an additional six months.

2. The Court allowed the Directorate's appeal, dismissing the respondent's appeal, and set aside the High Court's order, restoring the Sessions Judge's order.

3. The respondent would not be granted anticipatory bail, and the Directorate could proceed with the investigation following statutory procedures.

DWARKA PRASAD SINGH & OTHERS VS HARIKANT PRASAD SINGH 1973 AIR 655, 1973 SCR (2) 1064

Brief Facts

1. The case involves a dispute over the sale of a house between the defendant First Party (G) and the plaintiff in 1931.

2. The sale consideration was Rs. 99,995, out of which Rs. 23,000 were paid to G.

3. Subsequently, G sold the house to the defendant Second Party.

4. The plaintiff sought two reliefs: (a) a decree for specific performance against the defendants and (b) an alternative decree for Rs. 44,688 with interest against the defendant First Party.

5. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, granting a decree for specific performance, and directed the defendants to execute a sale deed on payment of the balance of the price.

6. The defendants Second Party appealed in the High Court, but it abated due to the non-impleadment of legal representatives of one of the deceased appellants.

7. The defendants Second Party filed an appeal in the Supreme Court, and during the pendency, G (respondent No. 3) also died.

8. The advocate of respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) filed an application for dismissal of the appeal for non-prosecution due to the non-impleadment of G's legal representatives.

9. The appellants (defendants Second Party) sought substitution of G's legal representatives and condonation of delay.

Issues

The Court dismissed the application for substitution, raising the question of whether G was a necessary party in the appeal.

Judgment

1. The Court rejected the argument that G was not a necessary party, especially in the context of the alternative relief sought against G.

2. There was a joint decree in Favor of both sets of defendants for the receipt of Rs. 77,000, which would also be affected if the specific performance decree was set aside.

3. As G was deceased and not impleaded in time, granting proper relief without his representation became impossible, leading to the abatement of the entire appeal.

PART X

K.R EASWARAMURTHI GOUNDAN VS THE KING EMPEROR (1944) 46 BOMLR 844

Brief Facts

1. The appellant, a wealthy landowner, merchant, and banker with interests in Tiruppur and other places in the Province of Madras, was charged with "harboring" two suspects involved in a murder in March 1940.

2. The murder victim was Muthu Goundan of Othuvillaipudur, and the suspects were Valayans, a low tribe among the depressed and criminal classes.

3. The appellant and ten others were charged under Section 216 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with harboring suspects to prevent their apprehension.

4. The police believed that the murder was committed by four Valayans, aided by R.V.I. Goundan, the appellant's father-in-law.

5. The suspects were subsequently tried for the murder or abetment but were acquitted.

6. The appellant and ten others were convicted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, with the appellant receiving a six-month rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000.

7. On appeal, the Sessions Judge set aside all the convictions and sentences.

8. The prosecution further appealed, and Horwill J. in the High Court of Madras confirmed all acquittals except for the appellant. His conviction and sentence were restored.

9. The appellant obtained special leave to appeal from His Majesty in Council.

Issues

1. The main issue was the lack of evidence admissible in law to prove the essential foundation of the prosecution's case – the issuance of arrest orders for the suspects.

2. The Indian Penal Code Section 216 requires proof of three elements: the issuance of an arrest order, the accused's knowledge of the order, and the accused's act of harbouring to prevent apprehension.

Judgment

1. The appellant's argument was that Sections 62, 64, and 65 of the Indian Evidence Act prescribe the only evidence permissible to prove a warrant of arrest – production of the original order or a certified copy.

2. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside, as there was no evidence of the issuance of arrest orders, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

ELECTION COMMISSION INDIA VS SAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO 1953 AIR 210, 1953 SCR 1144

Brief Facts

1. The respondent was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years but was subsequently elected as a member of the Madras Legislative Assembly.

2. The Speaker of the Assembly referred the question of the respondent's disqualification to the Election Commission, which had its offices in New Delhi.

3. The respondent approached the High Court of Madras seeking a writ to restrain the Election Commission from enquiring into his alleged disqualification.

4. The High Court's power to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is subject to two limitations: territorial jurisdiction and the authority's amenability to the court's jurisdiction.

5. The High Court of Madras lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ against the Election Commission since it was permanently located in New Delhi and not within the Madras High Court's territorial limits.

6. Articles 190(3) and 192(1) of the Constitution apply to disqualifications that occur after a member's election, not those that existed before the election.

7. An appeal can be made to the Supreme Court under Article 132 of the Constitution even from a Single Judge's judgment of a High Court if the requisite certificate is granted

Issues

Neither the Governor nor the Election Commission had the authority to inquire into the respondent's disqualification, which arose before his election.

Judgment

The Court clarified that the Election Commission's role is limited to post-election disqualifications, not pre-existing ones.

The Court's decision emphasizes that legal remedies should be sought from the appropriate authority, considering the jurisdiction and competence of the concerned bodies.

The ruling reinforces the principles of the separation of powers and the necessity of upholding constitutional provisions while dealing with disqualification cases in the context of elected representatives.

DURGA PRASAD AND ANOTHER VS THE BANARAS BANK LTD 1963 AIR 1322, 1964 SCR (1) 475

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the Official Liquidator of a bank (respondent) who advertised two houses belonging to the Bank for sale.

2. These houses were sold to the second appellant (buyer) with the court's sanction.

3. Subsequently, the second appellant transferred the houses to the first appellant (now owner), claiming that the latter was the actual owner, and the sale deed from the Official Liquidator was obtained benami (in his name for the first appellant).

4. The Official Liquidator moved the High Court at Allahabad seeking an order to declare the sale null and void and to re-transfer the houses to the Bank.

5. A single judge of the High Court held that the first appellant, who was a member of the committee of inspection, suppressed his interest in the purchase, which precluded him from buying the bank's property.

6. The single judge directed the first appellant to convey the houses back to the Official Liquidator.

7. The Division Bench of the High Court confirmed the single judge's order in an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

8. The High Court then certified the case under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution for appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue

1. The appeal was challenged by the Official Liquidator, claiming that the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant the certificate without certifying that it involved a substantial question of law.

2. The crucial legal question was whether the appeal under Article 133(1)(a) can be entertained without certifying the involvement of a substantial question of law.

Judgment

1. Since the judgment of the single judge was affirmed in appeal, the appeal to the Supreme Court could not be entertained with a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) unless it involved a substantial question of law.

2. The Court cited the case of Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. to support this interpretation.

3. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed unless the High Court certified that it involved some substantial question of law. The case of Deoki Nandan v. State of U.P. was reversed

DURGA SHARNKAR MEHTA VS THAKUR RAGHURAJ SINGH AND OTHERS 1954 AIR 520, 1955 SCR 287

Brief Facts

1. Article 136 of the Indian Constitution grants the Supreme Court the authority to entertain and hear appeals by granting special leave against any judgment or order of a Court or Tribunal in any cause or matter.

2. The powers given to the Supreme Court under Article 136 are special or residuary powers, exercisable outside the scope of ordinary law when the needs of justice demand intervention by the Court.

3. Article 329 of the Constitution contains a non-obstante clause that prohibits the Supreme Court and any other Court in India from entertaining a suit or proceeding challenging any election to Parliament or State Legislature.

4. Section 105 of the Representation of the People Act declares the decision of the Election Tribunal final and conclusive, with no provision for further appeal.

5. The overriding powers vested in the Supreme Court under Article 136 are broader than the prerogative right of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England, as the former cannot be limited or taken away by any Parliamentary legislation.

Issue

Whether the Supreme Court's overriding powers under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution can be restricted or affected by non-obstante clauses in other constitutional provisions and specific laws.

Judgment

The Court rules that the overriding powers granted to the Supreme Court under Article 136 are not curtailed by non-obstante clauses in other constitutional provisions or specific laws.

The Court upholds the decision of the Election Tribunal to declare the election of the candidate void on the ground of a Constitutional disqualification and not merely on the ground of improper acceptance of nomination by the Returning Officer.

THE ENGINEERING MAZDOOR SABHA VS THE HIND CYCLES LTD, OBOMBAY 1963 AIR 874

Brief Facts

1. The appeal concerns a claim by Express Newspapers Ltd. against the Government represented by the Collector of Madras under Section 48(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.

2. The land in question was notified for acquisition for road widening.

3. The appellant agreed to the acquisition with the condition of fair compensation.

4. The Government later decided to drop the acquisition proceedings.

5. The claim made by the appellant before the Land Acquisition Officer was for a substantial amount, including damages for loss of income, construction of temporary accommodation, and actual expenses incurred.

6. The lower court rejected most of the claim, allowing only a small amount as compensation for actual expenses.

Issues

1. The main issue in the appeal is whether the principles governing compensation for compulsory acquisition apply to cases of withdrawal from acquisition proceedings under Section 48(2).

2. The learned Government Pleader argues that compensation should be limited to actual costs incurred and concrete damages, and not include conjectural losses or potential values.

Judgment

The court sets aside the lower court's order and remits the matter for fresh disposal, instructing the claimant and the Government to present adequate evidence for a proper assessment of compensation.

The court also points out that Government cannot indefinitely prolong acquisition proceedings and then claim that the deprivation caused by such proceedings is of no account in assessing compensation.

The court concludes that the principles applicable to compulsory acquisition, such as compensation for special adaptability, special market value, injurious affection, or damages for severance, should also apply to cases of withdrawal under Section 48(2), but with adherence to realism and the actual facts of the case.

FERTILIZER CORPORATION KAMGAR UNION VS UNION OF INDIA 1981 AIR 344, 1981 SCR (2) 52

Brief Facts

1. The case involves workers (petitioners) challenging the legality of the sale of certain plants and equipment of the Sindri Fertilizer Factory.

2. The sale was executed by accepting the highest tender submitted by respondent No. 4, approved by the Tender Committee and the Board of Directors.

3. The petitioners contended that the decision to sell the plants and equipment was made without calling for any report.

4. The original tender amount of Rs. 7.6 crores was reduced to Rs. 4.25 crores without proper explanation.

5. The price realized in the sale was alleged to be manipulated for ulterior purposes.

6. The decision to restrict fresh offers for the reduced equipment to tenderers who bid for more than Rs. 4 crores was deemed unfair and arbitrary.

7. The petitioners claimed that the sale caused a significant loss to the public exchequer and jeopardized the employment of around 11,000 workers who faced retrenchment.

Issues

Petitioners 3 and 4 argued that the sale would violate their fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) to carry on their occupation as industrial workers.

The respondents raised a preliminary objection, stating that the petitioners lacked locus standi and that the sale did not violate any fundamental rights of the petitioners.

Judgment

1. The court clarified that the right to carry on an occupation is not the same as the right to hold a particular job or post of one's choice.

2. The court found no evidence that the sale was arbitrary, unreasonable, or mala fide, and it did not infringe the fundamental rights of the workers.

3. The court suggested that public interest litigation and locus standi should be liberalized to address public concerns and ensure fairness in the administration of public resources.

FORWARD CONSTRUCTION CO. & ORS VS PRABHAT MANDAL 1986 AIR 391, 1985 SCR Supl. (3) 766

Brief Facts

1. A plot of land in Bombay was reserved for a bus depot for BEST under the development plan.

2. BEST proposed to construct two buildings on a part of the plot to generate income for building staff quarters.

3. An advertisement was published, inviting offers from interested parties to develop the property.

4. Respondent 7, Forward Construction Company, and Deep Construction submitted tenders, with respondent 7 winning the bid.

Issue

1. Whether BEST's use of the plot for commercial purposes was valid and in line with the reserved purpose.

2. Whether the earlier writ petition's judgment operated as res judicata in the present case.

Judgment

1. The High Court's decision was erroneous as the proviso to Building Regulation No.3 did not apply to the present case. No "change" of user occurred; the additional use of the property did not alter its primary purpose.

2. The previous judgment operates as res judicata since the issue was directly and substantially in issue in both cases. The earlier petitioner's lack of bona fide intention was established, precluding its application.

G.L HOTELS LIMITED AND ORS VS T.C SARIN AND ANR 1993

Brief Facts

The State Insurance Corporation demanded contributions from the appellant-hotels for different periods between 1970 and 11.11.1978, treating them as factories under the Act. However, there was no dispute about the contribution payable from 12.11.1978 onwards, as a notification had included hotels as "establishments" under Section 1(5) of the Act.

Issues

The appeals revolve around determining whether the hotels run by the appellants are considered factories under Section 2(12) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and, therefore, covered by Section 1(4) of the Act.

The appellants argued that the entire hotel premises should not be considered a "factory" merely because the cooking process takes place in the kitchen, which is just a part of the hotel. They acknowledged that the kitchen itself can be treated as a factory under the Factories Act, but they asserted that the rest of the hotel should not fall under the definition of "factory" under the Employees' State Insurance Act.

Judgment

The High Court held that since the manufacturing process of cooking is carried out in the kitchen, which is a part of the hotel, the entire hotel premises fall under the definition of "factory" as per the Act.

The Court confirmed that hotel kitchens are considered factories under the Act due to the manufacturing process of cooking. It also recognized the possibility of future cases where the connection between kitchen activity and other premises may be examined more closely.

G.S BANSAL VS THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION 1963 AIR 1577, 1964 SCR (2) 470

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the appellant, who is the son of J, the deceased individual, and the father had purchased Post Office National Savings Certificates worth Rs. 250/- in the name of the Controller of Rationing.

2. J had deposited these certificates with his ration depot as security for the same.

3. Subsequently, J applied for the release of the security as he had transferred the ration depot to another party.

4. Before the security could be released, J passed away.

5. The appellant, the son of J, took it upon himself to handle the matter and initiated the process of obtaining the money from the Post Office.

6. The appellant signed J's signatures on the relevant documents and attested them himself, falsely representing himself as J.

7. He then got the securities transferred to J's name and obtained the money from the Post Office.

8. The appellant was charged and tried for forging a valuable security under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code.

Issues

1. During the trial, the appellant contended that he was not guilty of forgery as he was the sole heir of his father, and the money rightfully belonged to him.

2. The appellant argued that he had not caused any harm to others or gained any advantage for himself.

Judgment

The court noted that this fraudulent act provided both economic and uneconomic advantages to the appellant.

The court held that the appellant's actions constituted forgery as he had dishonestly and fraudulently forged the documents to gain an economic advantage.

By adopting this deceptive method, the appellant avoided the need for a succession certificate and saved himself associated expenses.

GANGA SUGAR CORPORATION LTD ETC VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1980 AIR 286, 1980 SCR (1) 769

Brief Facts

1. The case involves appeals from multiple Sugar Mills challenging a tax demand by the State on the purchase of Sugarcane.

2. The tax was imposed under the U.P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, which was declared ultra vires, leading to the enactment of the Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961.

3. The Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act is an independent statute with a different source of power, impact, and structure.

4. The tax is levied at the rate of Rs. 1.25 paise per quintal of sugarcane purchased by a factory owner, and paise 50 for a "unit."

5. The charge is on the purchase transaction, payable by the owner of the factory or unit at the prescribed date, place, and instalment.

Issue

1. The appellants argued that the Act's scheme and sections are ultra vires and encroach upon the legislative power of Parliament under Entry 52 of List I (Seventh Schedule) of the Constitution.

2. They contended that the Act is essentially legislation in respect of a "Controlled Industry," which should be exclusively governed by Parliament's jurisdiction.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court emphasized that its decisions have a national impact and should be declaratory for the nation.

2. It upheld the Act's constitutionality, rejecting the contention that it encroached upon Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over controlled industries.

3. The Court ruled that the classification for taxation and application of Article 14 must be viewed liberally, unless there are obvious capricious or irrational features.

4. The Court held that the Act's imposition of tax by weight was not discriminatory, and other methods may be considered practical and justified for the Administration's purpose

GANGUBAI BABLYA CHAUDHARY VS SITARAM BHALCHANDRA SUKTANKAR 1983

Brief Facts

1. Appellants filed a suit for an injunction against defendants 1 and 2, recorded owners of Survey No. 32(part) and 33(part) in Kurar, Malad, Bombay, measuring 8006.04 sq. metres.

2. Defendants 3 and 4 claimed a partnership with defendants 1 and 2.

3. The plaintiffs sought an interim injunction to protect their possession during the suit.

4. A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court directed the plaintiffs to file a separate suit for declaration of title and injunction in the High Court.

5. The suit in City Civil Court was withdrawn, and a new suit (No. 1811 of 1980) was filed in the original side of the Bombay High Court.

6. A notice of motion for interim injunction was granted by the Single Judge with a reservation for reconsideration based on certain events.

7. The respondents moved the High Court to vacate the interim injunction, and it was indeed vacated.

8. An unsuccessful appeal to the Division Bench led to the current appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave.

9. In another writ petition, an interim injunction restraining the use of F.S.I. by the respondents was obtained but later vacated.

10. The present appeal before the Supreme Court is to challenge the validity of the order granting the use of F.S.I. for the entire land, including the disputed land.

11. The land in question is around 17,000 sq. meters, and the plaintiffs claim title and possession over 8006.04 sq. meters.

Issues

The Court needs to determine whether the plaintiffs have a prima facie case for an interim injunction and where the balance of convenience lies.

Judgment

The Supreme Court allows both appeals, setting aside the decisions of the Single Judge and the appellate Bench. The respondents are restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession and from using the F.S.I. for the entire land. The High Court is directed to expedite the hearing of the suit and the writ petition without ordering costs.

GAURAV JAIN VS UNION OF INDIA & ORS 1997

Brief Facts

Gaurav Jain, who was a lawyer, had filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the separate educational institutions for the children of the fallen women. The writ petition claimed that

• right to be free citizens;

• right not to be trapped again;

• Readjusted by economic empowerment, social justice and self-sustenance thereby with equality of status, dignity of person in truth and reality and social integration in the mainstream are their magna carta.

Issues

• What are the rights of the children of fallen women, the modules to segregate them from their mothers and others so as to give them protection, care and rehabilitation in the mainstream of the national life?

• And as facet of it, what should be the scheme to be evolved to eradicate prostitution, i.e., the source itself; and what succour and sustenance can be provided to the fallen victims of flesh trade?”

Judgment

The juvenile homes should be used only for a short stay to relieve the child prostitutes and neglected juveniles from the trauma they would have suffered; they need to be rehabilitated in the appropriate manner. The details are required to be worked out by meaningful procedure and programmes.

The Court from time to the Central Government, State Governments and Union Territory Administrators, would direct that adequate steps should be taken to rescue the prostitutes, child prostitutes and the neglected juveniles as indicated hereinabove ; they should take measures to provide them adequate safety, protection and rehabilitation in the juvenile homes manned by qualified trained social workers or homes run by NGOs with the aid and financial assistance given by Government of India or State Government concerned.

GAYA PRASAD VS PRADEEP SHRIVASTAVA 2001

Brief Facts

1. The case involves a landlord (respondent) seeking eviction of a tenant (appellant) from a shop building in Agra.

2. The landlord's application for eviction was filed in 1978 under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

3. The landlord cited two reasons for eviction: to provide the building for his medical graduate son to start a clinic and for himself to establish a radio repairing work after his retirement from Railway service.

4. The Prescribed Authority granted eviction on March 25, 1982, considering the claim to be bona fide and finding alternative accommodation available for the tenant's business.

5. The tenant appealed, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal on October 10, 1985.

6. The tenant then approached the High Court in 1985 through a writ petition and obtained a stay of the eviction order.

7. The tenant, despite losing at all levels, managed to delay eviction by keeping the order in abeyance.

8. The tenant learned that the landlord's son, for whom the eviction was sought, had joined the Provincial Medical Service 12 years after the eviction application was filed.

Issues

The tenant argued that subsequent developments, such as the landlord's son being posted 200 kilometers away and earning a good salary, should be considered in eviction proceedings.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court held that the crucial date for assessing the landlord's bona fide need is the date of the eviction application.

2. The court stated that subsequent events can be considered only if they entirely overshadow the landlord's original need for eviction.

3. The Supreme Court dismissed the tenant's appeal, emphasizing the need for timely resolution of cases and suggesting that High Courts set up specialized cells to address pending matters efficiently.

PART XI

GHERULAL PARAKH VS MAHADEODAS MAIYA AND OTHERS 1959 AIR 781

Brief Facts

1. The Court held that a wagering contract was void and unenforceable under Section 30 of the Contract Act. However, it was not forbidden by law, and an agreement collateral to such a contract was not unlawful under Section 23 of the Act.

2. The Court stated that a partnership with the object of carrying on wagering transactions was not illegal under Section 23.

3. The Court rejected the appellant's contentions, asserting that the doctrine of public policy was only a branch of common law and should be governed by precedents.

4. The Court emphasized that public policy principles must be applied only to clear and undeniable cases of harm to the public.

Judgment

The Court ruled that gambling or wagering contracts were not declared illegal by Indian courts, and moral prohibitions in Hindu Law against gambling were not legally enforced.

The Court held that the word "immoral" under Section 23 should be confined to principles recognized and settled by courts, and it could not be expanded to include wagering.

GHULAM SARWAR VS UNION OF INDIA 1967 AIR 1335, 1967 SCR (2) 271

Brief Facts

1. In October 1962, the President of India issued a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352(1) of the Constitution.

2. Subsequently, he issued two orders under Article 359(1), which were later amended during the emergency period.

3. The first order suspended the right of a foreigner to move any court for the enforcement of rights conferred by Articles 14, 21, and 22 of the Constitution.

4. The second order, as amended, suspended the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of rights conferred by Articles 14, 21, and 22 if the person was deprived of these rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962, or any rule or order thereunder.

5. In 1964, a Pakistani national (the petitioner) was arrested for an offense under the Indian Customs Act, 1962. He was later detained under the Foreigners Act, 1946, on grounds of being involved in a conspiracy to smuggle gold.

Judgment

1. The Court held that the High Court's order did not operate as res judicata because the petitioner's fundamental right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 could not be barred by the High Court's order.

2. The Court also considered the validity of the President's order under Article 359(1) and its compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution.

3. The Court concluded that the President's order was valid as it did not violate Article 14 and that it was within his power to make different orders applicable to different groups of persons.

4. There was a clear nexus between the classification of foreigners and citizens and the objective sought to be achieved by the President's orders.

I.C. GOLAKNATH & ORS VS STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR 1967 AIR 1643, 1967 SCR (2) 762

Brief Facts

Petitioners: Challenged the validity of the Acts mentioned above under Article 32 of the Constitution, which allows individuals to seek constitutional remedies directly from the Supreme Court for the enforcement of their fundamental rights.

1. Acts Challenged: Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (Act 10 of 1953) and Mysore Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962 as amended by Act 14 of 1965) were challenged.

2. Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964 was also challenged, as it included the aforementioned Acts in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.

3. Reference to Previous Cases: The petitioners contended that two previous cases, Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (1951) and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965), which upheld the validity of the First and Seventeenth Amendment Acts respectively, were wrongly decided.

Issues

 Whether Parliament has the power to amend fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution?

Judgment

The Court unanimously held that Fundamental Rights cannot be abridged or taken away by the amending procedure mentioned in Article 368 of the Constitution.

The Court's decision set a precedent that any future constitutional amendments affecting Fundamental Rights would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny to ensure their conformity with the basic structure of the Constitution.

GOPI AQUA FARMS & ORS ETC VS UNION OF INDIA 1997

Brief Facts

1. Writ petitions filed under Article 32 before the Court.

2. Petitions aim to overturn the judgment passed in the case of S. Jagannath v. Union of India and Others, [1997] 2 SCC 87.

3. Numerous review petitions were pending against the said judgment.

4. The case was heard over two years, and individual Aqua farms were duly notified to state governments and union territories.

5. Notices were issued in newspapers, notifying the Aqua farms about the case hearing.

Issue

Petitioners argued they were not parties to the Jagannath case and thus not bound by its decision.

Judgment

1. Court refuses to examine merits of Venugopal's contentions.

2. The Solicitor General opposed quashing the notification but supported the contention that Aqua farms were not industries.

3. The Court noted that the point about Aqua farms not being industries was not raised during the Jagannath case.

4. Writ petitions dismissed, and no order given regarding costs.

GOPINATH GHOSH VS STATE OF WEST BENGAL AIR 1984

Brief Facts

1. Appellants Gopinath Ghosh, Bharat Ghosh @ Sadhu, and Jagannath Ghosh were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nadia, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Rabi Ghosh on August 19, 1974.

2. The case was filed by Kartick Ghosh, the father of the deceased Rabi, at Nakashipara Police Station on the date of the occurrence.

3. After completing the investigation, the appellants were charged and brought to trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, who found Gopinath Ghosh responsible for the fatal injury and convicted all three appellants.

4. The appellants filed Criminal Appeal No. 160 of 1977 in the Calcutta High Court. The High Court acquitted Bharat Ghosh @ Sadhu and Jagannath Ghosh but upheld Gopinath Ghosh's conviction.

5. Gopinath Ghosh appealed to the Supreme Court through special leave.

6. During the appeal, Gopinath Ghosh claimed that he was below 18 years of age on the date of the offense, making him a 'child' under the West Bengal Children Act, 1959, and argued that the court had no jurisdiction to sentence him to imprisonment after a trial.

Issue-

The Supreme Court framed an issue to determine Gopinath Ghosh's age on the date of the offense and remitted the matter to the Sessions Judge, Nadia, for investigation.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court held that Gopinath Ghosh was a 'juvenile delinquent' under the West Bengal Children Act, 1959, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try and sentence him.

2. The Court set aside the conviction and life imprisonment of Gopinath Ghosh and ordered his release on bail.

3. The case was remitted to the Magistrate for further proceedings in accordance with the West Bengal Children Act, 1959.

4. To prevent such delays, the Court recommended that Magistrates inquire about the accused's age, especially in cases involving juvenile delinquents, and refer them to medical authorities if necessary.

GULABDAS & COMPANY & ANR VS ASSITANT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS Writ Petition (civil) 234-245 of 1956

Brief Facts

1. The case involves twelve petitions filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution.

2. All twelve petitions raise identical issues and have been argued together.

3. The main petitioner, Messrs. Kanji Shavji Parekh, is a registered partnership firm engaged in importing stationary articles.

4. The petitioners had a license to import "Artists' Materials," including crayons, issued on August 4, 1954.

5. Before obtaining the license, they had arranged to purchase 'Lyra' brand crayons from Germany.

6. The Assistant Collector of Customs provisionally classified the crayons under item 45 (a) of the Indian Customs Tariff in a letter dated July 3, 1954.

7. The petitioners imported the crayons and, upon inspection, the Assistant Collector assessed duty under item 45 (4) instead of 45 (a), resulting in higher duty.

8. The petitioners appealed to the Collector of Customs, but their claim was rejected, and they were advised to follow the appeal procedure under section 188 of the Sea Customs Act.

9. The petitioners appealed to the Central Board of Revenue, but their appeal was dismissed.

10. The petitioners then approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, challenging the orders of the Customs authorities.

Issues

1. The petitioners argued that their fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) were violated, claiming the right to hold property and carry on trade.

2. They also contended that the Customs authorities treated similarly classified goods differently, resulting in unequal treatment.

Judgment

1. The Court held that there was no violation of fundamental rights, as the impugned orders were made under the provisions of the Indian Tariff Act and the Sea Customs Act, and there was no challenge to the constitutionality of these provisions.

2. The Court stated that the Customs authorities had the jurisdiction to determine duty rates, and if aggrieved, the proper remedy was to appeal or seek revision, which the petitioners did not do.

3. The Court dismissed all twelve applications, concluding that there was no merit in the contentions raised by the petitioners, and awarded costs to the respondents.

H.C. PUTTASWAMY AND ORS VS HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF KARNATAKA HIGH COURT 1991 AIR 295, 1990 SCR

Brief Facts-

1. The appointments to the posts of Second Division Clerks in all State Departments of the Karnataka Govt. are governed by the Karnataka Civil Services (Ministerial Posts) Recruitment Rules, 1966.

2. The power to make selections for these posts vests in the State Public Service Commission.

3. The Karnataka Subordinate Courts (Ministerial and other posts) Recruitment Rules, 1977, make these rules applicable to the judicial department as well.

4. In 1978, the High Court of Karnataka issued a notification inviting applications for 40 Second Division Clerks and 25 Typists and Typists-copyists posts in the High Court establishment.

5. The notification stated that the selection would be for the existing posts and for preparing a waiting list.

6. Despite the advertised number of posts being 65, the then Chief Justice appointed 398 candidates for these positions, transferring most of them to subordinate courts.

Issues

In 1983, seven applicants challenged the validity of these appointments through writ petitions, alleging arbitrary selection without considering their merits.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court, acknowledging the importance of maintaining constitutional principles and the administration of justice, admitted the review petition and granted special leave to appeal.

2. The judiciary, as the custodian of constitutional principles, plays a crucial role in upholding the rule of law and maintaining public confidence.

3. While the Chief Justice holds administrative authority, they must adhere to the same principles and values as the court they serve.

HAR SWARUP VS THE GENERAL MANAGER, CENTRAL RAILWAY AIR 1975 SC 202, 1975 LABIC 147

Brief Facts

1. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution seeking directions for promotion, seniority, and pay grade in the Railways.

2. The petitioner was appointed as Inspector of Works in 1947 and subsequently promoted to various grades until 1949 when he was reverted to a lower grade.

3. The petitioner faced issues with promotions, and several departmental inquiries were initiated against him over the years.

Issues

1. The petitioner challenged various decisions through multiple writ petitions filed in different High Courts.

2. Some petitions were partly allowed, and the petitioner was granted promotions as per High Court orders.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's claims were stale and barred by res judicata, given previous decisions by the High Court and the Supreme Court.

2. The court emphasized that the petitioner failed to show any new point or merit to challenge the earlier judgments.

3. The court observed that the petitioner had retired by now.

HARI NARAIN VS BADRI DAS 1963 AIR 1558

Brief Facts

1. The respondent filed a suit for ejectment against the appellant, seeking the appellant's removal from the property.

2. The trial court dismissed the respondent's suit, ruling in favor of the appellant.

3. Unsatisfied with the trial court's decision, the respondent appealed the case to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge in Jaipur City.

4. The appeal at the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge was successful, and the respondent's claim for ejectment was allowed.

5. The appellant, not accepting the decision of the lower court, filed an appeal with the Rajasthan High Court.

6. The Rajasthan High Court upheld the decision of the lower court, ruling in favor of the respondent, and also refused to grant a certificate of fitness for appeal to the higher court (Supreme Court)

Judgment

1. The court asserted that it treats statements of fact and grounds of fact in such applications at face value and expects honesty from the parties.

2. Given the appellant's misrepresentation of facts, the Supreme Court decided to revoke the Special Leave granted to the appellant and dismissed the appeal.

3. The court stressed the importance of maintaining the court's trust and confidence by avoiding any inaccurate, untrue, or misleading statements while seeking Special Leave or presenting any case before the court.

HORI RAM SINGH VS KING EMPEROR (1940) 42 BOMLR 619

Brief Facts

1. The case involves an application for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Court of India, and it holds significance as it is the first such application from that Court.

2. The central question in the case pertains to the interpretation of Section 270, Sub-section (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935.

3. Section 270(1) provides protection to public servants for acts done or purported to be done in the execution of their duty as servants of the Crown in India or Burma before April 1, 1937.

4. Any proceedings, civil or criminal, against such public servants require the consent of the Governor of the relevant Province where the petitioner was employed.

5. The section is deemed exceptional, offering protection to certain public servants for their pre-1937 actions in the course of their duty.

6. The case was brought before the Federal Court prior to the application for special leave to appeal.

Issues

Despite the ingenious argument presented, their Lordships do not view this as a substantial case worthy of advising His Majesty (possibly the ruling authority) to grant leave to appeal.

Judgment

1. The case is purely limited to the construction and interpretation of Section 270(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935.

2. Overall, the application for special leave to appeal is denied, and the matter is settled, closing this specific legal challenge.

PART XII

M/S HARINAGAR SUGAR MILLS LTD VS SHYAM SUNDAR JHUNJHUNWALA AIR 1961 AIR 1669

Brief Facts

1. The case involves an appellant company with a large shareholder, B, who transferred two blocks of 100 shares each to his son and daughter-in-law.

2. The transferees applied to the company to register the transfers, but the directors, purportedly under art. 47B of the Articles of Association, refused to register them.

3. The transferees preferred appeals to the Central Government under s. III (3) of the Companies Act, 1956.

4. The Central Government, without providing any reasons, set aside the resolution of the directors and directed the company to register the transfers.

5. The appellant company obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, challenging the Central Government's decision.

Issues

The respondents raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the Central Government, when exercising powers under s. III, was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and was not subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136.

Judgment

1. The Court noted that the Central Government's decision had to be supported by reasons, and the lack of reasons hindered the Supreme Court's effective exercise of power under Art. 136.

2. As the Central Government's decision lacked reasons, the Court remanded the appeals to the Central Government for rehearing.

3. The Court further highlighted that special leave should not ordinarily be granted in such cases, as the directors were presumed to have acted properly, and appeals against decisions based on confidential allegations were rarely effective.

HARIPADA DEY VS THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL 1956 AIR 757, 1956 SCR 639

Brief Facts

1. Appellant's Conviction: The appellant was charged with the offense of dishonestly receiving or retaining stolen property (Hillman Car) under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. Trial and Conviction: The appellant was convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, and sentenced to 2 years of rigorous imprisonment for the offense.

3. Appeal to Calcutta High Court: The appellant appealed to the Calcutta High Court, where a Division Bench confirmed the conviction and sentence.

4. Petition for Leave to Appeal: The appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.

5. Certificate Granted: The petition came before a differently constituted Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, led by the Chief Justice, which granted a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

6. Supreme Court Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court exercised its jurisdiction under Article 134(1)(c) to consider appeals from judgments of the High Courts in criminal cases.

7. Grounds for Certificate: The Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court granted the certificate, believing that a full and fair trial may not have been conducted, but the case involved questions of fact.

8. Supreme Court's Disagreement: The Supreme Court found that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting a certificate based on questions of fact.

9. Supreme Court's Special Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court clarified its special jurisdiction under Article 136(1) to intervene in cases of gross miscarriage of justice or legal procedure departures that vitiate the entire trial.

10. High Court's Limitation: The High Court cannot pass questions of fact to the Supreme Court under Article 134(1)(c) but should refuse to grant certificates and direct parties to approach the Supreme Court under Article 136(1).

Issues

 The appellant's counsel argued for the Supreme Court's special leave to appeal under Article 136(1) based on documents indicating a defense that was not presented during the trial.

Judgment

• The Courts found the prosecution's case to be proved based on witness testimonies and expert evidence. The appellant's failure to present a defense cannot be blamed on the prosecution.

• The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's plea for special leave to appeal under Article 136(1) as no grounds were found to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

• Appeal Dismissed: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, cancelled the appellant's bail bond, and ordered the appellant to surrender.

IN RE: HARJAI SINGH & ANR VS IN RE: VIJAY KUMAR 1996

Brief Facts

1. "Common Cause" filed a writ petition regarding the misuse of discretionary power by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Ministry in the allotment of retail outlets for Petroleum products and L.P.G. Dealerships.

2. News articles were published in "The Sunday Tribune" and "Punjab Kesari" on March 10, 1996, alleging that the petroleum minister had allotted petrol pumps and gas agencies to relatives of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, contrary to the prescribed criteria.

3. The news items also alleged that two sons of a senior judge of the Supreme Court were favoured with petrol outlet allotments from the discretionary quota.

Judgment

1. The Court accepted the apologies of "The Sunday Tribune" Editor and Publisher, as well as "Punjab Kesari" Editor and Publisher, but warned them to be careful in the future.

2. The Court also accepted the apology of journalist Shri Dina Nath Misra but criticized his gross carelessness in publishing false information.

3. The Court directed "The Sunday Tribune" and "Punjab Kesari" to publish an apology on their front pages, explicitly mentioning the incorrectness of the news items.

4. The contempt petition was disposed of accordingly.

HARSHAD J. SHAH & ANR VS L.I.C OF INDIA AND ORS

Brief Facts

1. Jaswantrai G. Shah (the insured) took out four insurance policies for Rs. 25,000/- each with double accidental benefits through Shri Chaturbhuj H. Shah (respondent No. 3), a general agent of LIC.

2. The premium under the policies was payable half-yearly, and the insured paid the first half-yearly premium on time. However, the second premium fell due on March 6, 1987, and it was not paid within the grace period.

3. On June 4, 1987, respondent No. 3 collected a bearer cheque of Rs. 2,730/- from the insured towards the premium on all four policies and encashed it the next day.

4. The premium amount was deposited with LIC on August 10, 1987, but the insured had a fatal accident on August 9, 1987.

5. The widow of the insured (appellant No. 2) submitted a claim to LIC as the nominee under the policies, but LIC repudiated the claim, stating the policies had lapsed due to non-payment of the premium within the grace period.

6. Appellants filed a complaint before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission claiming Rs. 4,32,000/-, including the sum payable under the policies, interest, and compensation for hardship and humiliation.

7. The State Commission directed LIC to settle the claim, but LIC and respondent No. 3 appealed to the National Commission.

8. The National Commission dismissed the appellants' appeals and allowed LIC and respondent No. 3's appeals.

9. The main issue was whether the payment of premium to respondent No. 3 can be treated as payment to LIC, and if so, whether the policies can be revived.

10. LIC relied on its regulations, stating agents are not authorized to collect premiums, and respondent No. 3 was not empowered to receive premiums on LIC's behalf.

Issues

The appellants argued that the practice of agents collecting premiums was prevalent, and LIC's conduct led policyholders to believe the agents had the authority to collect premiums.

The appeals concern the question of whether payment of a life insurance policy premium to a general agent of Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) can be regarded as payment to the insurer, discharging the insured's liability.

Judgment

1. The Court held that the insured's policy lapsed due to non-payment within the grace period and the policies could not be revived as the premium was paid after the insured's death.

2. Although the appellants' claims were dismissed, the Court directed LIC to refund the entire premium amount with interest to appellant No. 2 and awarded Rs. 10,000/- as costs to the appellants due to the importance of the questions raised.

HINDUSTAN ANTIBIOTICS LTD VS THE WORKMEN & ORS 1967 AIR 948, 1967 SCR (1) 652

Brief Facts

1. The Industrial Tribunal rejected the contention of the company that different considerations and standards should apply to public sector undertakings compared to private sector undertakings when fixing the wage scale.

2. The Tribunal fixed the wage scales on a region-cum-industry basis, considering the company's financial position, productive capacity, and a comparative study of its wage structure with neighboring industries.

3. The Tribunal retained the existing dearness allowance scheme with minor alterations, linking the dearness allowance with the cost of living index for Poona.

4. It introduced a gratuity scheme for the workmen and gave the award retrospective operation.

5. The company appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution challenging the award.

Judgment

1. The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision to provide gratuity in addition to the provident fund if the industry could bear the burden.

2. The Tribunal properly considered all permissible fringe benefits in fixing the wage scales and dearness allowance.

3. The Court accepted the Tribunal's discretion in determining the effective date for the revised wage scales.

4. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's finding that a foreman was not a workman based on their managerial or administrative duties.

HINDUSTAN TIN WORKS PVT LTD VS EMPLOYEES OF HINDUSTAN TIN WORKS 1978

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the management (Appellant) of an industrial unit that retrenched 56 workers, citing nonavailability of raw material, power shedding, and mounting losses.

2. After negotiations, the retrenched workers were taken back into service, but later demanded wage scale revisions, which the management refused due to ongoing losses.

3. The management subsequently retrenched 43 workers, leading to a dispute referred to adjudication under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Issues

The Labour Court found that the real reason for retrenchment was management's annoyance at the workers' refusal to agree to settlement terms, rendering the retrenchment unjustified.

Judgment

1. The Court recognized that the financial viability of the employer can be a factor in determining the quantum of back wages.

2. The Court stressed that industry is a common venture involving both capital and labor, and if sacrifice is needed, it should be shared rather than disproportionately borne by labor.

3. In this particular case, as the industrial unit improved and started making profits, the Court awarded 75% of back wages to the reinstated workers, payable in two equal instalments.

THE MANAGEMENT OF HOTEL IMPERIAL, NEW DELHI & OTHERS VS HOTEL WORKER’S UNION 1959 AIR 1342, 1960 SCR (1) 476

Brief Facts

1. The appellants, who were the managements of three hotels, decided to dismiss some workmen found guilty of misconduct after conducting inquiries. The workmen were suspended without pay pending permission from the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

2. The workmen applied to the Industrial Tribunal for interim relief, seeking full wages and an additional sum for food during the suspension period.

3. The Industrial Tribunal granted the interim relief as prayed for by the workmen.

4. The managements appealed against the grant of interim relief, but the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed their appeal.

5. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court with special leave to appeal.

Issues

1. Whether any wages were payable to the suspended workmen pending permission being sought under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

2. Whether the Industrial Tribunal was competent to grant interim relief except by an interim award that was published?

Judgment

1. Under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, employers have the power to suspend employees without pay pending permission from the Industrial Tribunal to dismiss them.

2. The Industrial Tribunal is competent to grant interim relief, and such relief does not necessarily require an interim award published as long as it is granted as a matter incidental to the main question under reference.

3. The Supreme Court can also grant interim relief in a similar manner as the Industrial Tribunal.

4. The amount of interim relief should not exceed half of the amount adjudged by the Industrial Tribunal.

HUSSAINARA KHATOON & ORS VS HOME SECRETARY, STATE OF BIHAR 1979 AIR 1369, 1979 SCR (3) 532

Brief Facts

A writ of habeas corpus was brought before the Court under Story 32, requesting the release of 17 under-trial convicts whose identities were revealed in a newspaper article in Bihar. The state of Bihar was ordered to provide a revised chart displaying the year-by-year breakdown of the under-trial inmates, after separating them into two main categories: minor offenses and serious offenses.

Issues

• Should the right to a quick trial be included in Article 21?

• Is it possible for the law to compel the provision of free legal assistance?

Judgment

The Court ordered that these under-trial detainees, whose names and addresses were recorded in Mrs. Hingorani’s list, be released because their continued detention was considered illegal and a violation of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution because they had been in prison for a period exceeding the maximum term for which they should have been indicted.

The Court also agreed that on subsequent remand dates, when under trial detainees accused of bailable offenses are brought before the Magistrates, the State Government should appoint a lawyer at its own expense to file a bail application, in order to remand and allowing for a quick trial to begin.

The State Government and the High Court were obliged to submit information on the locations of the magistrate and session courts in Bihar, as well as the total number of cases outstanding in each court as of December 31, 1978.

BISWABANI (P) LTD VS SANTOSH KUMAR DUTTA & ORS 1980 AIR 226, 1980 SCR (1) 650

Brief Facts

1. The third respondent (Managing Director) leased the premises from Respondents 1 and 2 under a registered lease deed dated September 11, 1948, for five years at a monthly rent of Rs. 2000/- with an option for renewal.

2. The lease expired on August 31, 1953, and before its expiry, the appellant company applied for the fixation of standard rent under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950.

3. The parties later compromised, and a consent decree was passed, allowing the company to be a tenant at a reduced rent for five more years with no renewal option after that period.

4. After the expiry of the second lease term on February 29, 1960, Respondents 1 and 2 claimed possession, stating that the lease was void due to lack of registration.

5. The trial court held that the appellant was a statutory tenant, and it decreed the company's suit seeking declaration and injunction against eviction.

6. In appeal, the District Judge held that the company became a trespasser after the second lease term, allowing eviction.

Issues

(a) The status and nature of possession of a tenant under a void lease.

 (b) Whether the tenant is a licensee without any interest in the premises or a statutory tenant who can only be removed by proper legal proceedings.

 (c) Whether the tenant can defend its possession through a suit seeking declaration and mandatory injunction. (d) Whether the appeal is liable to be dismissed based on the alleged defective certificate granted by the High Court.

Judgment

The appellant company is a tenant entitled to protect its possession. The attempt to create a fresh lease was ineffective, and the appellant remains a tenant under the protection of the Rent Control Act. The appeal is not dismissed based on the defective certificate.

I.J DIVAKAR AND ORS VS GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AIR 1982 SC 1555

Brief Facts

1. In 1977, Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (APSC) invited applications for Junior Engineer posts in Andhra Pradesh Engineering Service and allied services.

2. Around 4,000 applications were received in response to the advertisement.

3. All eligible candidates were asked to appear for a viva voce test between November 1978 and March 1979.

4. After the viva voce test, APSC was finalizing the select list.

5. On September 14, 1979, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued two Government Orders (G.O. No. 646 and G.O. No. 647).

6. G.O. No. 646 withdrew certain posts, including Junior Engineer posts, from the purview of the Commission.

7. G.O. No. 647 regularized the services of temporary Government servants appointed through direct recruitment without any test, written or oral.

8. The appellants, who had applied for the Junior Engineer posts, filed a representation petition challenging the validity of G.O. No. 646 and G.O. No. 647.

Issues

The first contention was that the Government had no power to withdraw the posts from the purview of the Commission after the advertisement was issued.

Judgment

1. The Court found that the Government had the power to make temporary appointments without Commission intervention and had valid reasons for regularizing services.

2. The Court, in the interest of justice, directed the Commission to finalize the select list based on the viva voce test and appoint the appellants from the list if they fall within the zone of selection, before considering outsiders for Junior Engineer posts.

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION AND ORS VS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

Brief Facts

• An environmental organization named the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action filed a writ petition against a group of chemical manufacturers who were under the same ownership and situated in the same locality in Bicchri, a small town in the Udaipur District of Rajasthan, India.

• To the north of the aforementioned town, there existed the first major industrial undertaking – Hindustan Zinc Limited, which was a public company. The crux of the matter dates back to 1987 when Hindustan Argo Chemicals Limited commenced the production of chemicals like Single Super Phosphates and Oleum (a highly concentrated type of sulfuric acid).

• An environmental organization named the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action filed a writ petition against a group of chemical manufacturers who were under the same ownership and situated in the same locality in Bicchri, a small town in the Udaipur District of Rajasthan, India.

• To the north of the aforementioned town, there existed the first major industrial undertaking – Hindustan Zinc Limited, which was a public company. The crux of the matter dates back to 1987 when Hindustan Argo Chemicals Limited commenced the production of chemicals like Single Super Phosphates and Oleum (a highly concentrated type of sulfuric acid).

• An environmental organization named the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action filed a writ petition against a group of chemical manufacturers who were under the same ownership and situated in the same locality in Bicchri, a small town in the Udaipur District of Rajasthan, India.

• To the north of the aforementioned town, there existed the first major industrial undertaking – Hindustan Zinc Limited, which was a public company. The crux of the matter dates back to 1987 when Hindustan Argo Chemicals Limited commenced the production of chemicals like Single Super Phosphates and Oleum (a highly concentrated type of sulfuric acid).

ISSUES

Whether the industries involved in the manufacture of toxic chemicals had taken any environmental protection measures?

Whether the defendant would be legally responsible for paying the sum of money required to carry out the necessary corrective actions?

Judgment

The court implemented the concept of polluters pay, which implies, as per the court, that if an activity carried out, is of a harmful nature, then the individuals conducting these very activities will be required to compensate to make up for the damage caused to any other person irrespective of whether appropriate precautionary measures were taken or not while carrying out such an activity.

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD VS STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 1986 AIR 1780, 1986 SCR (3) 553

Brief Facts

1. Appellant filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the award of the Labour Court, granting relief to its employee-Respondent No. 3.

2. The SLP was dismissed by the Supreme Court through a non-speaking order, which means the reasons for dismissal were not provided.

3. The Appellant then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court, seeking to quash the Labour Court's award.

4. The High Court admitted the writ petition and granted an interim stay on the enforcement of the award.

5. Respondent No. 3 challenged the interim order by filing a Special Leave Petition, which was dismissed.

6. During the final hearing of the writ petition before the Division Bench of the High Court, Respondent No. 3 raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition.

Issues

1. Whether the dismissal of the SLP by the Supreme Court barred the Appellant from challenging the Labour Court's award before the High Court.

2. Whether the doctrine of election applied, preventing the Appellant from seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

3. Whether the discretionary nature of the High Court's writ jurisdiction justified refusing relief to the Appellant.

Judgment

1. The High Court's view was not correct, and it should have examined the merits of the writ petition instead of dismissing it on a preliminary ground.

2. The dismissal of the SLP by the Supreme Court through a non-speaking order did not operate as a bar against the Appellant from challenging the Labour Court's award through a writ petition under Article 226.

3. The doctrine of election did not apply to the present situation.

4. The grant of leave under Article 226 is within the High Court's discretion, but that discretion should be guided by established legal principles, and a writ petition should not be dismissed solely based on the dismissal of a non-speaking SLP.

INDIAN PETROCHEMICALS CORPORATION VS SHRAMIK SENA & ORS 1999

Brief Facts

1. The case involves two appeals, C.A. No. 1854/98 and C.A. No. 1855/98, heard and disposed of by the same judgment.

2. The appeals were filed by M/s. Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited and another (the management) and the workmen, respectively.

3. The workmen filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay seeking recognition as regular employees of the management and the same pay-scales and service conditions as other regular workmen.

4. The workmen contended that they worked in the canteen of the management's factory, which was governed by the Factories Act, and the management treated them as contract employees through a contractor named M/s. Rashmi Caterers.

5. The High Court, relying on a previous judgment (Raha's case), ruled in favor of the workmen, directing the management to absorb them as regular employees.

Issues

1. The management appealed, arguing that they are a public sector undertaking bound by a recruitment policy and reservation requirements, and absorbing the workmen would violate Article 16(4) of the Constitution and the reservation policy.

2. The workmen argued that they automatically become regular employees of the management due to the statutory nature of the canteen under the Factories Act.

Judgment

1. The Court upheld the High Court's direction to regularize the workmen's services as a measure of labor welfare and to address unfair labor practices.

2. The Court emphasized the need for guidelines or conditions while directing regularizations to maintain equity and conform to statutory requirements.

3. Both appeals were dismissed, and the workmen's services were regularized, subject to certain conditions imposed by the High Court.

4. The Supreme Court held that workmen in a statutory canteen are considered employees of the management only for the purposes of the Factories Act, not for all other employment-related matters.

INDRA SAWHNEY VS UNION OF INDIA

Brief Facts

The First Backwards Class Commission, also known as the Kaka Kalelkar Commission, was formed way back in 1953 vide Article 340 (appointment of a commission to investigate the conditions of backward classes) of the Indian Constitution, but its report (1955) was effectively rejected in 1961.

This Mandal Commission Report, inter alia, proposed a 27 percent government quota for the SEBCs on top of the pre-existing 22.5 percent reservation for the SCs and STs.

But, before this Mandal Commission Report could be put into effect, the coalition Janata Dal government fell and the Indira Gandhi led Congress government came into power. Now, the Congress government did not implement this report for a long time until they lost again to V.P. Singh led Janata Dal in 1989.

The Janata Dal fell again amidst these widespread disturbances and the P.V. Narasimha Rao led Congress government came into power in 1991 and issued another O.M. to implement the Mandal Commission Report with a couple of modifications, namely, the introduction of the economic criterion in the granting of reservations by giving preference to the poorer sections of the SEBCs within the proposed 27 percent quota and a further 10 percent reservation grant to the economically challenged sections of the people not enjoying any reservation schemes. 

Issues

1. Scope and extent of Article 16(1) and Article 16(4).

2. Definite parameters for the term “backward class of citizens”.

3. The criteria to identify the backward class of citizens.

4. Nature and extent of the reservations permissible.

Judgment

Under Article 16(4), backward classes of citizens can be identified on the basis of caste and not just on an economic basis. Economic criteria cannot be the sole identifying factor for backwardness under article 16(4). Also, in order to prevent the abuse of power, the identifying examination to determine backwardness should be an objective one and not a subjective one.

Article 16(4) is an independent clause and not an exception to Article 16(1).

Article 16(4) is exhaustive in nature regarding reservations for backward classes only.

Article 16(1) permits reasonable classification and reservation for other classes.

The socially and educationally backward classes under Article 15(4) are different from the backward classes under Article 16(4).

ISHWARI YATAYAT COOPERATIVE VS STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE AUTHORTY AND OTHERS

Brief Facts

The appellant applied for a permit from the Regional Transport Authority, which was granted to them.

The Appellate Authority, upon an appeal by a rival applicant, set aside the permit order after remand from the High Court.

The appellant filed a writ petition, seeking to overturn the Appellate Authority's decision, but the High Court upheld the Appellate Authority's order.

The appellant's application for the permit was initially not maintainable as they were not a registered cooperative society at the time of application.

The appellant registered as a cooperative society before the applications were considered by the Regional Transport Authority.

However, the law requires the applicant to be registered at the time of making the application, and the appellant failed to meet this requirement.

This rendered the appellant's initial application invalid and ineligible to file for a permit under the Motor Vehicle Act.

Filing an application on behalf of a non-existent person makes it impossible for objectors to raise valid objections, as there is no clarity on the applicant's legal status.

Though the appellant applied for registration, there was no certainty that it would be granted.

Issues

The appellant did not raise the issue of entertaining such a plea in their writ petition or in the application for special leave to appeal.

As a result, the appellant cannot raise this contention during the arguments as they did not object to its consideration earlier.

Judgment

The Court held that the appellant's contention regarding the validity of entertaining the plea at the Appellate Authority and High Court stage is not acceptable.

The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the Appellate Authority and the High Court regarding the permit issue.

DR M. ISMAIL FARUQUI VS UNION OF INDIA AIR 1995 SC 605 

Brief Facts

The Vires of Ayodhya Act was challenged in both the High Court and the Supreme Court.

The Apex Court decided to transfer the petitions that had been filed with the High Court, heard all of the issues together, and referenced Article 143 (1) of the Constitution.

The High Court proceeded to consider the Suits on their merits in light of the preceding SC judgment, with one exception: it had narrowed the scope of the dispute that was now being considered in all of these suits.

The contested area now consists solely of the space where the structure and the premises of its inner and outer courtyards once stood. Because it was legally acquired in accordance with Section 3 of the Ayodhya Act, the additional land is outside the scope of these suits.

Issues

(a) Is it possible to decide an essential practice without thoroughly examining the faith’s beliefs, tenets, and practice?

(b) Is integrality and essentiality the same criteria for determining the essential practice?

(c) Does Article 25 protect only particular faith-specific beliefs and practices, or does it cover all faith-specific practices?

d) Do Articles 15, 25, and 26 (read with Article 14) permit comparisons of religious significance?

Judgment 

The Supreme Court ruled that Muslims can offer namaz (prayer) anywhere, even in the open, and that a mosque is not necessary for the practice of Islam. Unless the Right to Worship at a particular location is itself an integral part of that right, the Right to Worship is not valid at any and all locations so long as it can be practiced effectively.

The Hon’ble High Court has held that the Option to Practice, Purport, and Engender Religion ensured under Article 25 of the Constitution doesn’t stretch out to One side of Love at pretty much every spot of love so any deterrent to revere at a specific spot in essence might encroach the strict opportunity ensured under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.

Articles 25 and 26 provide protection for religious practice, an essential component of that religion’s practice.

ITAT THROUGH PRESIDENT VS V.K AGGARWAL 1999

Brief Facts

A letter was sent by the Law Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice to the President of the Tribunal stating that he was in receipt of a written complaint that in a particular case two conflicting orders were passed by the same Bench.

It was stated therein that the Judicial Member passed the ‘first draft order’ in favour of the assesse and signed the same.

Subsequently, the Accountant Member passed an order in favour of the Revenue, which was signed by both the members.

The President was asked to send a report on the same within ten days.

The President asked the two members to give their comments on the same.

The members clarified that the first draft of the order was only signed by the Judicial Member and was not an order of the Tribunal for the purposes of the Act.

It was clarified that pursuant to passing of the draft order, the members discussed the case among themselves and decided that the view taken therein was incorrect.

Accordingly, the order deciding the issue in favour of the Department was passed by the Accountant Member and signed by both members.

Issues

The Law Secretary argued that since his responsibilities extended to supervision over the functioning of the Tribunal, he was within his rights to ask for a report from the President.

The Tribunal, on the other hand, argued that the Law Secretary’s supervision over the Tribunal was limited to matters of administrative nature and he could not be permitted to influence the judicial decisions of the members.

Judgment 

It was a deliberate attempt on his part to question the judicial functioning of the Tribunal coming as it did from a person of his rank.

It was rightly perceived by the President as well as the two concerned Members of the Tribunal as a threat to their independent functioning in the course of deciding appeals coming up before them.

His apology before the Court was not accepted and a fine of Rs. 2000 was imposed for this contempt.

MANAGEMENT OF MONGHYR FACTORY OF ITC LTD VS THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT PATNA (BIHAR) 1978

Brief Facts

The case revolves around an industrial dispute involving respondent no. 3, an employee accused of neglecting his work by packing cigarette packets with the wrong slides, causing losses for.

Respondent no. 3 was served a charge sheet and subsequently terminated after a domestic enquiry found him guilty.

The dispute was referred to the Labour Court, Patna, for adjudication by the Government of Bihar.

The Labour Court found that the dismissal was mala fide and unreasonable, ordering respondent no. 3's reinstatement with back wages.

The appellant challenged the award through a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed.

The appellant filed a petition of appeal in the Supreme Court, raising three points, 

Issues

Challenged the validity of the reference, the finding of misconduct, and the order of reinstatement.

A preliminary objection was raised by respondent no. 3, claiming that the appellant cannot raise other points due to non-compliance with Rule 5 of Order XV of the Supreme Court Rules.

The appellant argued that the reference was invalid, as the Government mechanically made it without applying its mind.

Judgment

The Court ruled that neglect of work could be a fault or misconduct based on repetition, but in this case, the Labour Court did not find habitual neglect

The Court opined that the Labour Court did not adequately consider the employee's past record before ordering reinstatement, and thus directed payment of compensation of Rs. 30,000 in addition to other benefits to respondent no. 3.

JOTI PRASAD AGARWAL AND ORS VS INCOME TAX OFFICER (B) WARD AIR 1959 ALL 456

Brief Facts

Ten petitioners filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The petitioners were members of an association called the District Khand Kothiwal Association, formed under the Collector of Etah's scheme for distributing khandsari sugar at controlled rates.

The Association operated from January 8, 1947, to January 6, 1948, and earned profits during this period.

The profits were shown as income in the individual account books of the Association members.

Out of 30 members, 23 were assessed to income-tax for their share of the Association's profits.

On March 1, 1952, the Income-tax Officer assessed the income of the Association for the assessment years 1947-48 and 1948-49.

The President of the Association appealed, and the assessments were set aside by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

On April 23, 1955, the Income-tax Officer made fresh assessments of the Association's income without notifying the ten petitioners.

The petitioners learned about the new assessment through notices of demand dated November 7, 1955.

The petitioners challenged the new assessment orders in a writ petition.

Issues

The first ground raised was that the Association was not a voluntary association formed by the petitioners, but it was formed under compulsion.

The second ground challenged the new assessment because the Association had stopped functioning from January 6, 1948.

Judgment

The Court found that once income has been charged to tax in the hands of individual members, it cannot be charged again in the hands of the Association.

The Court allowed the petition, quashed the assessment orders dated April 23, 1955, and held that the subsequent recovery proceedings were null and void. The petitioners were awarded costs for the petition.

J K COTTON SPINNING & WEAVING MILLS VS COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE 1998

Brief Facts

A dispute concerning the applicability of Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, for issuing a show cause notice related to the recovery of excise duty on yarn from a textile mill.

The Customs, Excise, and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) ruled that the assessment was not provisional, rejecting the first argument by the Revenue.

However, the majority of the CEGAT panel (2:1) held that the Delhi High Court's interim order dated 12.8.1991 acted as a stay, effectively extending the limitation period for recovering the excise duty.

The appellant challenged the CEGAT's decision in the present appeal.

The background of the case involves a textile mill with various divisions, including yarn production for fabric manufacturing. The Revenue claimed that the removal of yarn from one area of the factory made it liable for excise duty under Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules.

Issues

Whether the period of six months specified in Section 11A of the Central Excise Act for issuing show cause notices was extended, allowing the Revenue to recover excise duty beyond the limitation period.

The assessment was provisional, and the period for issuing the  notice should be counted from the final assessment. Second, an interim order of the Delhi High Court operated as a stay against issuing show cause notices, thus extending the limitation period.

Judgment

The court held that the retrospective effect of the amendments was subject to the provisions of Section 11A of the Act.

The court examined the Explanation in Section 11A and held that for the limitation period to be extended, there must be a stay of service of notice by a court order.

The court rejected the contention that the assessment was provisional and held that the Revenue cannot advance new grounds in the appeal to support their theory of provisional assessment.

PART XIII

JAGANNATH AGARWALA VS STATE OF ORISSA AIR 1957 ORI 42

Brief Facts

The appellant had two money claims against the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj State.

On January 1, 1949, the State merged with the Province of Orissa.

Clause 9 of the Administration of Mayurbhanj State Order, 1949, allowed for issuing a notification to call upon individuals with pecuniary claims against the Maharaja to notify them to an authorized officer.

The appellant submitted his two claims before the Claims Officer after the issuance of the notification.

The Claims Officer's report largely accepted the appellant's claims.

The report was then submitted to the Member (third), Board of Revenue for further consideration.

Without granting the appellant a hearing, the Board of Revenue rejected the claims, citing limitation as the reason.

The appellant sought a review of the decision and submitted supporting documents but was again denied a hearing, and the review was declined by the Board of Revenue.

Issues

The appellant argued that the Board of Revenue's decision violated the principles of natural justice, as he was not given an adequate opportunity to present his case.

The appellant argued that the act of State concluded when the claims were invited and accepted by the Claims Officer.

Judgment

The court held that the rejection of the claims was indeed an act of State and could not be challenged in municipal courts.

The State's inquiry into the claims was for the State's benefit and did not automatically confer rights on the claimants. The act of State remained open until the Government or a binding officer accepted the claims.

JAGANNATH BEHERA VS RAJA HARIHAR SINGH (1958) SCR 1067

Brief Facts

• The respondent was the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Khandapara, which merged with the State of Orissa on August 1, 1949.

• Article 3 of the Agreement of Merger guaranteed the respondent full ownership, use, and enjoyment of all his private properties.

• The Orissa Merged States' (Laws) Act, 1950, extended the Orissa Tenant's Protection Act, 1948, to the merged areas.

• In 1951, the respondent evicted certain tenants from his properties.

• The tenants applied to the Revenue Officer under the 1948 Act, seeking restoration of possession, claiming that the respondent was their landlord and had unlawfully evicted them.

• The Revenue Officer allowed the applications and directed restoration of possession to the tenants.

• The respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court, seeking to quash the orders of the Revenue Officer.

Issues

The respondent contended that (a) application of the 1948 Act violated the guarantee given under the Agreement of Merger, (b) Article 363 of the Constitution barred the Court from dealing with any dispute arising out of the Agreement, and (c) the 1948 Act did not apply to him as he was not a landlord.

Judgment

The Court held that the extension of the 1948 Act did not affect the respondent's full ownership, use, and enjoyment of his properties guaranteed under the Agreement.

The Court further held that the respondent was a landlord to whom the provisions of the 1948 Act applied.

The Court affirmed that the respondent's rights were protected, but the 1948 Act was applicable to resolve the dispute between the tenants and the respondent regarding the eviction.

JAGDEV SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB (1974) 3 SCC 412

Brief Facts

The case involves a petition filed by the Respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge a direction issued by the State for the recovery of an excess payment towards salary.

The Respondent was appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) and later promoted as Additional Civil Judge in the judicial service of the State.

By a notification, a revised pay scale was allowed to the Respondent, and he submitted an undertaking to refund any excess payment if detected later.

The Respondent was granted the revised pay scale in the selection grade.

The Respondent was suspended and eventually compulsorily retired from service.

The First National Judicial Pay Commission's recommendations were accepted, leading to the notification of revised pay rules for judicial officers in Haryana.

An exercise for adjustment of excess payments to judicial officers was undertaken, and the Respondent was served a letter for the recovery of an amount.

Issue

The Respondent challenged the recovery action in writ proceedings under Article 226, and the High Court allowed the petition, finding no fraud or misrepresentation on his part.

Judgment

The court held that the situation in the present case did not fall under the impermissible recovery criteria, as the Respondent was aware of the refund requirement when opting for the revised pay scale.

The court held that the Respondent is bound by the undertaking and Set aside the High Court's judgment.

However, the court ordered that the recovery should be made in reasonable monthly instalments spread over two year

JAGDISH LAL VS PARMANAND 2000

Brief Facts

• The appellant is a tenant of a shop under a lease executed by the respondent for a monthly rent of Rs. 600/-.

• The respondent filed an eviction petition under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973, citing grounds including arrears of rent, structural alterations, bona fide need, and change of user of the shop.

• The Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition only on the ground of change of user.

• The appellant appealed, but the appellate authority upheld the eviction order.

• The appellant filed a revision in the High Court, but it was dismissed.

• The High Court had granted the appellant time till September 1, 1998, to vacate the premises in view of an undertaking to deposit rent arrears and future rent.

• The respondent contended that the appellant breached the undertaking by filing a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court, seeking to appeal the eviction order.

• The Supreme Court overruled the respondent's contention, stating that the tenant's right to approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 was not affected by the undertaking given to the High Court.

Issues

The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant's use of the shop for a different business constituted a change of user under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, warranting eviction.

Judgment

The Supreme Court examined various precedents on similar cases and noted that a change of business could be permissible if it is allied or ancillary to the original business.

The court found that setting up a restaurant in the shop constituted a change of user under Section 13(2) (ii) (b) of the Act.

JAI MANGAL ORAON VS SMT MIRA NAYAK AND ORS 2000

Brief Facts

The case involves multiple civil appeals dealing with issues related to land disputes and the application of certain provisions of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (CNT Act).

The lands in question were initially owned by a member of the Scheduled Tribe, Nanda Oraon.

Nanda Oraon allegedly executed a registered deed of surrender in favor of the landlord in 1942 due to his inability to cultivate the land.

The landlord and his co-sharers settled the land permanently in favor of Satish Chandra Baul.

Part of the land settled with Satish Chandra Baul was later acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, and compensation was paid to him.

The remaining portion was sold by the descendants of Satish Chandra Baul to various buyers during 1971-72.

The first respondent purchased a portion of the land through a registered sale deed in 1971 and got her name mutated in official records.

Issue

The appellant, claiming to be the adopted son of Sukhi Oraon, alleged that the first respondent forcibly occupied his land and filed an application with the authorities.

The first respondent challenged the jurisdiction and legality of the proceedings through a writ petition.

Judgment

The High Court's decision was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed, considering the subsequent developments and the issues raised. The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding the lands being allotted to tribal individuals only.

 The case revolves around the application of Section 71A of the CNT Act, the authenticity of the appellant's adoption claim, and the character of the land in question. The court considered subsequent developments, including criminal complaints, to reject the appellant's claims.

JANPADA SABHA, CHHINDWARA ETC VS THE CENTRAL PROVINCES SYNDICATE LTD AND ANR 1971 AIR 57, 1970 SCR (3) 745

Brief Facts

The case involves the imposition of a cess on coal extraction in the Chhindwara area by the Independent Mining Local Board, constituted under the C.P. Local Self Government Act, 1920.

In 1935, the Board levied a cess of 3 pies per ton of coal extracted.

The cess was increased over the years, reaching 9 pies in 1947.

The legality of the enhanced levy was challenged in court.

The court held that any increase in the levy required the previous sanction of the Local Government, which was not obtained, making the higher rates illegal.

In response to the court's decision, the State Legislature passed the Madhya Pradesh Koyala Upkar (Manyatakaran) Adhinayam, 1964.

Section 2(a) of the Act defines 'Board' to include the Independent Mining Local Board and its successor, the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara.

Section 2(b) defines 'cess' as the cess imposed by the Independent Mining Local Board or its successor.

Section 3(1) of the Act provides a fiction that deems the cesses imposed, assessed, or collected by the Board as valid, despite any court judgment to the contrary.

The Schedule of the Act specifies three notifications that enhanced the rate of cess.

Issue

The key issue in the case was whether the 1964 Act validated the enhanced levy.

Judgment

The court held that the 1964 Act did not give legal effect to the imposition of the enhanced rates of cess.

The court ruled that such a limited Act could not repeal the provisions of Section 51(2) of the 1920 Act, which applied to all Boards, and without express language, the notifications issued without the State Government's sanction could not be deemed valid.

JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD, MEERUT VS LAXMICHAND 1963 AIR 677

Brief Facts

The appellant company faced direct action from its workmen, who were demanding bonus and leave, among other things.

In response, the company issued charge sheets against sixty-three workmen, accusing them of sabotage and slowdown strike.

An inquiry officer investigated the charges and found all the workmen guilty, recommending their dismissal.

However, at that time, there was a pending dispute between the company and its workmen regarding bonus payment before the Industrial Tribunal.

Due to this pending dispute, the conditions of service for the workmen could not be altered as per clause 29 of the 1954 order issued by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The workmen could not be discharged without prior permission from the Conciliation Officer, as mandated by the same clause.

The company applied for permission to dismiss the workmen, but the Conciliation Officer granted permission only for eleven workmen, considering the rest as passive participants in the go-slow campaign.

The company appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, but the appeal was dismissed as the Conciliation Officer was not considered an authority under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.

The company obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the direction of the Conciliation Officer and the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

Issues

The central issue was whether the Conciliation Officer qualified as a tribunal under the Constitution of India or an "authority" under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.

Judgment

The Court also ruled that an "authority" under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, must be a body constituted for adjudicating industrial disputes under a law made by the State.

As the Conciliation Officer lacked such power, an appeal against his order was not maintainable under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.

The case clarified the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Officer and the scope of appeal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, providing essential guidance for future similar case

JAVED AHMED ABDUL HAMID PAWALA VS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 1985 AIR 231

Brief Facts

The petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge on 6th February 1982.

The High Court confirmed the death sentence on 30th April 1982.

The petitioner's appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution was dismissed on 20th April 1983.

The review petition was also dismissed on 12th August 1983.

The President of India rejected the petitioner's petition for clemency.

The petitioner filed a writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, seeking the commutation of his death sentence to life imprisonment.

The petitioner's grounds for seeking commutation included his tender age, reformation in jail, and the long lapse of time since the passing of the death sentence.

The Superintendent of the jail reported that nothing adverse came to notice regarding the petitioner.

Judgment

Considering all circumstances, the Court finds that the petitioner is entitled to invoke the protection of Art. 21 of the Constitution.

The Court quashes the death sentence and commutes it to life imprisonment.

The case sets a precedent for considering delays in death penalty cases and highlights the importance of avoiding unnecessary human suffering through expeditious legal proceedings.

JASWANT SINGH NERWAL ETC VS STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS 1991 SCR (1) 411, 1991 SCC

Brief Facts

The Punjab Public Service Commission conducted a competitive examination to recruit 71 officers in the Punjab Civil Services (Executive Branch) and Allied Services.

Candidates specified their post preferences in their applications as per the Punjab Civil Services (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930.

V.M. Bansal initially preferred the post of Excise & Taxation Officer but later requested a change to his first preference as Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch), which was allowed before the result declaration.

Bansal's father was a member of the Commission but did not participate in Bansal's interview.

Bansal was selected for a post in the Punjab Civil Service, and Jaswant Singh Nerwal was selected for the post of Tehsildar in the Allied Services.

Some unsuccessful candidates challenged the entire selection before the Punjab and Haryana High Court through a writ petition.

Jaswant Singh Nerwal also filed a separate writ petition challenging the change of preference allowed to Bansal and claimed to be declared successful in the Punjab Civil Service in Bansal's place.

Judgmen

The Court rejected Nerwal's appeal, stating that Bansal's change of preference was allowed timely and ranked superior to Nerwal's preference based on examination results.

The Court also noted that Bansal had been working as a Punjab Civil Service Officer, and displacing him at this stage would be inequitable.

The Supreme Court allowed Bansal's appeal, upheld his selection, and dismissed Nerwal's appeal, affirming the High Court's decision to require Bansal to compete again.

M/S JETHANAND AND SONS VS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1961 AIR 794

Brief Facts

The case involves a dispute between the parties regarding the supply of stone ballast.

The parties had an agreement that any such dispute would be referred to an arbitrator appointed under the agreement.

The arbitrator made awards in the dispute, but the appellants contested the validity of these awards.

The trial court held that the dispute was properly referred to arbitration, and the awards were validly made.

The appellants appealed this decision to the High Court.

The High Court set aside the trial court's orders and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The High Court's remand order required the framing of all issues and giving the parties an opportunity to present evidence.

The High Court then granted a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.

Issues

The appellants argued that the remand order was appealable to the Supreme Court under Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Judgment

The High Court's orders did not involve any significant questions of public or private importance, and the interpretation of Para. 3 of the first schedule of the Indian Arbitration Act was left to be tried by the Civil Judge.

Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that no certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court could be granted under Article 133 of the Constitution in this ca

JHARIA S/O MANIYA VS STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER 1983 SCR (3) 475

Brief Facts

The petitioner and his two associates were convicted and sentenced under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

On appeal, the High Court upheld the petitioner's conviction but acquitted his associates due to doubt, giving them the benefit of the doubt.

The petitioner then applied to the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution, but his application was dismissed.

Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition under Article 32 seeking a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to direct the State to refrain from implementing the judgments and orders of the lower courts and the Supreme Court itself.

The petitioner claimed that his conviction was illegal and his detention in jail violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21, 14, and 19 of the Constitution.

However, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, stating that it is not appropriate to seek a declaration of the illegality of the petitioner's conviction under Article 32 when the Court had previously declined to grant special leave under Article 136.

The Court emphasized that when a special leave petition is decided by a Bench of the Supreme Court, the decision carries finality and cannot be challenged through a petition under Article 32.

It was further clarified that the Supreme Court cannot issue a writ, direction, or order to itself concerning any judicial proceedings, and the judges constituting the Bench are not subject to the writ jurisdiction of the Court.

Issues

The petitioner's argument that his detention violated his fundamental rights under Article 21, read with Articles 14 and 19, was also rejected by the Court

Judgment

Consequently, the Court concluded that the petitioner's plea for a writ of mandamus to challenge the legality of his conviction and detention was not maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Therefore, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

The decision of the Supreme Court stands, and the petitioner's conviction and sentence remain valid and enforceable as per the judgments of the lower court

JOSEPH POTHEN VS STATE OF KERELA 1965 AIR 5414

Brief Facts

The case revolves around a Notification issued by the State Government under the Travancore Ancient Monuments Preservation Regulation (Regulation 1 of 1112/M.E.-1936-37 A.D.).

The Notification declared a fort wall, located within a property purchased by the petitioner, to be a protected monument under the Regulation.

The petitioner challenged the Notification, arguing that it violated their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

The petitioner contended that Regulation 1 of 1112/M.E. was implicitly repealed by the extension of the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904 (Central Act VII of 1904) to the State in 1951, which covered the same field as the State Regulation.

Additionally, the petitioner argued that the Regulation was impliedly repealed by Central Acts LXXI of 1951 and XXIV of 1958.

The court examined whether the Central Act of 1904 made the requisite declaration regarding ancient and historical monuments of national importance.

It was determined that the Central Act of 1904 did not contain the necessary declaration, and thus the Regulation (Entry 12 of the State List) continued to hold the field despite the extension of the Central Act to the State.

The Central Acts LXXI of 1951 and XXIV of 1958 applied only to specific ancient or historical monuments listed in their schedules or expressly notified by the Central Government.

As neither of these Central Acts covered the disputed fort wall, the State Regulation remained applicable.

Therefore, the court concluded that the Notification issued under the State Regulation was valid.

Issues

The petitioner argued that the fort wall should be classified as an archaeological site or remain, falling under the Concurrent List, and thus, the Central Act of 1904 implicitly repealed the State Regulation.

Judgment

The court clarified that Parliament had the authority to make laws for ancient and historical monuments of national importance, as declared under its legislation, but the Central Act of 1904 did not embody such a declaration.

As a result, the Notification protecting the fort wall as a monument under the State Regulation was upheld, and the petitioner's challenge was dismissed

JUSTICE OF PEACE FOR CALCUTTA VS ORIENTAL GAS CO.

Brief Facts

The appellant, an industrial company, and the Oriental Gas Company, which owned an industrial undertaking for manufacturing and selling fuel gas in Calcutta.

Agreement: The appellant was appointed as the Manager of the Oriental Gas Company under an agreement with the right to receive specified remuneration.

Legislative Action: The West Bengal Legislature passed the Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960, transferring the said undertaking to the State Government for five years for management and control.

Notifications: On October 3, 1960, the State Government issued three notifications, one of which set October 7, 1960, as the date for taking over the management and control of the undertaking.

Issues

The appellant filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the constitutional validity of the Act and seeking writs to restrain the State Government from implementing it and quashing the notifications.

Judgment

Interpretation of Entries 24 and 25: Entry 24 of List II, which deals with industries in a State, and Entry 25, which specifically addresses gas and gas-works, were in apparent conflict.

Exclusive Allotment to Entry 25: The court held that Entry 25 exclusively covered gas and gas-works, while Entry 24 covered all other industries in the State.

Constitutional Intent: The Constitution intended to treat gas and gas-works as State industries and allowed Parliament to legislate on them during national emergencies.

K.G KHOSLA & COMPANY VS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAX 1966 AIR 1216

Brief Facts

The appellant entered into a contract with the Director-General of Civil Supplies, New Delhi, for the supply of axle bodies manufactured by its principals in Belgium.

The goods were inspected on behalf of the buyers in Belgium, but under the contract, they were liable to rejection after further inspection in India.

The appellant supplied axle bodies to the Southern Railway at Perambur and Mysore in pursuance of the contract.

The Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras, rejected the appellant's contention that the sales were in the course of import, instead treating them as intra-State sales.

The Tax Officer made an assessment under the Madras General Sales Tax Act for the supplies at Perambur and another assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act for the supplies at Mysore.

The appellant filed appeals against the assessments, but the Appellant Assistant Commissioner rejected them.

The Tribunal held that part of the goods was sold in the course of import.

Both parties filed two revisions each in the High Court against the Tribunal's orders.

The High Court allowed the State's petitions and rejected those filed by the appellant. It held that the sale should have preceded the import for a sale to be deemed to have occasioned the import.

The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.

Issues

The respondents raised two preliminary objections: non-compliance with O.XIII r. 2 of Supreme Court Rules and the appellant filing only two appeals instead of four as covered in the High Court's judgment.

Judgment

Section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act does not require that the sale should precede the import for a sale to be deemed to have occasioned import.

The contract's conditions made it clear that the axle-box bodies would be manufactured in Belgium, inspected there, and imported into India for the consignee. The sales took place in the course of import and were exempt from taxation under s. 5(2) of the Act.

K.K KOCHUNI VS THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS 1960 AIR 1080

Brief Facts

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955, passed by the Madras Legislature.

The Act was enacted shortly after the Privy Council declared the properties held by the Sthanam (holder of Kavalappara Sthanam) to be Sthanam properties in which the members of the tarwad (family) had no interest.

Section 2 of the Act contains the substantive provision, outlining three tests to determine whether a sthanam should be deemed as a Marumakkathayam tarwad, and its properties should be considered as belonging to the tarwad.

The petitioners, including the holder of Kavalappara Sthanam, his wife, daughters, and son, challenged the Act, arguing that it infringes their fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 31 of the Constitution.

Judgment

However, two judges in the minority held that the Act was protected by Article 31A and did not infringe the Constitution's provisions.

They disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Article 31A and argued that the Act aimed at modifying janmam rights, which was within the scope of the article.

The minority opinion rejected the argument that the Act was invalid because it had retrospective operation and reversed court decisions, citing American precedents as inapplicable.

Ultimately, the majority opinion prevailed, and the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955, was declared unconstitutional for violating the fundamental rights of the petitioners.

K.L SUBBAYYA VS STATE OF KARNATAKA 1979 AIR 711, SCR

Brief Facts

The case involves an appellant who was convicted under Section 34 of the Mysore Excise Act.

The appellant was sentenced to three months of rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) and fined Rs. 100/- for being in possession of 48 bottles of liquor.

The appellant's defense contended that the provisions of Section 54 of the Act had not been followed, and the search was conducted without jurisdiction.

Section 54 of the Mysore Excise Act requires the authorities to have reasonable belief before conducting a search for an offense under the Act.

The Court noted that the Inspector who searched the appellant's car did not record any grounds to establish a reasonable belief for the search.

The lack of any such record of reasonable belief rendered the entire search as non-compliant with the provisions of Section 54.

Judgment

By allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the conviction based on the improper search and lack of compliance with Section 54.

As a logical corollary, the Court found the entire search to be invalid, which affected the legality of the conviction.

This case highlights the significance of adhering to procedural requirements and safeguards to protect the fundamental rights of citizens and maintain the integrity of criminal proceedings.

KALIMPONG LAND & BUILDING LTD VS STATE OF WEST BENGAL 1994 SCC (6) 720, JT 1994 (6) 102

Brief Facts

The case involves an appeal filed by Hem Chand against his conviction under Sections 304-B (dowry death) and 498-A (cruelty to a married woman) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The deceased, Saroj Bala, married Hem Chand on 24th May 1982.

There were allegations of dowry demands by the accused, including a television and fridge.

Saroj Bala returned to her parents' house due to alleged dowry demands but was sent back with Rs. 6000.

The accused again demanded Rs. 25,000 for purchasing a plot, and after receiving Rs. 15,000, he took her back.

On 16th June 1987, Saroj Bala died of strangulation, and her death was reported as unnatural.

The father of the deceased filed a complaint with the police, alleging murder due to dowry demands.

The trial court found the accused guilty of dowry death and cruelty and sentenced him to life imprisonment under Section 304-B IPC.

On appeal, the High Court upheld the conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Judgment

The Court confirmed the conviction under Section 304-B IPC, which carries a minimum sentence of seven years but may extend to life imprisonment.

However, the Court found that there was no direct evidence connecting the accused to the death.

Considering the lack of direct evidence and only circumstantial evidence, the Court reduced the sentence from life imprisonment to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment (R

KAMLAKAR & OTHERS VS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS AIR 1999 SC 2300, 1999 (82)

Brief Facts

• The case involves an Interlocutory Application (IA) filed to recall an order dated 22.1.1997 in Review Petition No. 2094 of 1995 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 19257 of 1995, based on orders dated 3.3.1997 in Review Petition (Civil) No. 2096 of 1995 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 16646 of 1995.

• Two Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were filed against an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay, in O.A. No. 625 of 1990 dated 7.3.1995. SLP No. 16646 of 1995 was dismissed on 1.9.1995, but later Review Petition 2096 of 1995 was filed and allowed on 25.9.1998.

• The present SLP No. 19257 of 1995 was dismissed on 8.9.1995, and Review Petition No. 2094 of 1995 was directed to be put up after the disposal of SLP No. 18948 of 1995.

• The Review Petition 2094 of 1995 was, unfortunately, dismissed on 22.1.1997 without considering that SLP No. 18948 of 1995 (Civil Appeal No. 16741 of 1995) was allowed on 9.12.1996.

• The current Interlocutory Application No. 1 was filed to recall the order dated 22.1.1997 in Review Petition No. 2094 of 1995.

• The case involves petitioners who are part of the same cadre and filed respective SLPs against the same impugned orders of the Union Government dated 2.7.1990, claiming relief in regard to their designation and pay scale issues.

• Some petitioners in the OA 625 of 1990 got relief, while others, including the present petitioners, were denied relief by the court.

• The court, taking note of the anomalous situation, decided to allow Interlocutory Application No. 1 and set aside the orders in Review Petition No. 2094 of 1995 and restore SLP No. 19257 of 1995.

• Leave was granted to proceed with the case.

• The court observed that both sets of appellants, i.e., Kamlakar & Others and Chandra Prakash Dadwe & Others, were on the same footing and should receive the same result.

Issues

The Union of India contended that among the appellants, some were direct recruits, and some were promotees, arguing that direct recruits may be given relief but not promotees.

Judgment

The court declared that the appellants are entitled to all benefits granted to the appellants in the other appeal, i.e., Civil Appeal arising from SLP No. 16646 of 1995.

The court issued directions for compliance within three months from the date of the judgment.

The appeal was allowed, and no order as to costs was given.

PART XIII

KAMLESHWAR PRASAD VS PRADUMANJU AGRAWAL 1997

Brief Facts

The case involves an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition filed by the appellant.

The respondent landlord filed a petition for eviction of the appellant under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972, claiming bona fide requirement for carrying out his own business and having no other means of livelihood.

The prescribed authority initially ruled in favor of the tenant, stating that the landlord's requirement was not bona fide.

However, the appellate authority reversed the prescribed authority's decision, finding that the landlord's need to start a cloth business was genuine and ordered the tenant's eviction.

During the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court, the landlord passed away and was substituted by his legal heirs – his widow, two sons, and a married daughter.

Issues

The tenant argued before the High Court that due to the landlord's death, the alleged bona fide requirement for eviction no longer existed, and thus, the eviction order should be quashed.

Judgment

The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's argument and concluded that the case did not warrant interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The Court emphasized that under the Act, the appellate authority's order is final and considered a decree of the civil court, which cannot be interfered with in the High Court's superintendence powers under Article 226 and 227.

The Court also stated that the crucial date for determining the bona fide need is the day of the application for eviction, and even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition, the need could still be fulfilled by the landlord's widow or any elder son.

SMT KANCHAN DEVI VS PRAMOD KUMAR MITTAL 7 ANR 1996

Brief Facts

• The marriage between the parties took place on 18th April 1973.

• The appellant (wife) gave birth to four female children successively, which allegedly annoyed her in-laws, leading to her expulsion from the matrimonial home.

• The respondent husband neglected and refused to maintain the appellant, prompting her to file a maintenance application under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC.).

• The trial court granted the maintenance application and awarded Rs. 500/- per month to the appellant. In the appeal, the maintenance amount was reduced to Rs. 440/- per month.

• The respondent moved the High Court in revision, and the High Court remanded the matter for rehearing.

• During the proceedings, the application in the trial court was dismissed in default but later restored on the appellant's application.

• The respondent also filed a petition for divorce, obtaining an ex-parte decree of divorce, which was later set aside. Subsequently, the divorce petition filed by the respondent was finally dismissed.

• The respondent did not make any payments towards maintenance, leading the appellant to seek execution of the maintenance order.

Judgment

During the proceedings in the Supreme Court, both parties agreed that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, and they consented to a divorce on the condition that the respondent pays Rs. 60,000/- to the appellant.

Based on the settlement, the Supreme Court exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution and dissolved the marriage by a decree of divorce. All pending cases related to matrimonial and maintenance proceedings were disposed of and consigned to the respective records. The husband was directed to continue maintaining their four daughters, and the wife was given limited visitation rights, subject to prior arrangements and at the husband's residence.

KANU SANYAL VS DIST. MAGISTRATE, DARJEELING

Brief Facts

• The petitioner was initially remanded to District Jail, Darjeeling, in connection with certain offenses.

• Two charge sheets were filed against the petitioner and others for various offenses under the IPC, which were triable exclusively by a Sessions Court.

• The case was transferred to the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, who issued a warrant for the production of the petitioner in his Court.

• The officer in charge of District Jail, Darjeeling, complied with the warrant and sent the petitioner to the Court of the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam.

• Subsequently, the petitioner was remanded to Central Jail, Visakhapatnam, pending the disposal of committal proceedings.

• The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his initial detention in District Jail, Darjeeling, was illegal.

Issues

The petitioner's arguments for the illegality of detention were twofold: a) Detention in Darjeeling was violative of Article 22(1)(b) of the Constitution, as the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offenses, and thus, detention beyond 15 days was unauthorized. b) The officer in charge of District Jail, Darjeeling, should have refused to comply with the production warrant from the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, based on Section 6 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act.

Judgment

The court held that even if there were infirmities in the detention in Darjeeling, it would not affect the subsequent detention in Visakhapatnam. The legality of the Visakhapatnam detention needed to be assessed independently

The court stated that the officer in charge of a prison must comply with the order of production under Section 3(2) when it is made by a criminal court, and the detained person is fit to be removed.

KANUBHAI CHHAGANLAL BRAHMBHATT VS THE STATE OF GUJARAT 1973

Brief Facts

1. The petitioner, Kanubhai Chhaganlal Brahmbhatt, was arrested for allegedly cheating by selling brass ingots as gold to the complainant.

2. The complainant lodged a complaint with the police, resulting in the accused's arrest.

3. The police sought remand for the accused's investigation before the City Magistrate, 7th court, Ahmedabad.

4. The City Magistrate granted remand to police custody until 17th February 1972.

Issues

1. Can a Magistrate authorize detention in police custody for a bailable offense in a cognizable offense?

2. Is the accused entitled to be released on bail if he is prepared to furnish bail for a bailable offense?

Judgment

1. Sections 61 and 167 of the CrPC are subject to the provisions related to bail, as stated in Section 60.

2. Section 496 mandates the release on bail of an accused of a bailable offense if prepared to furnish bail.

3. The Court has no discretion in this matter.

4. The police can conduct investigations without detaining the accused in custody.

5. If the accused is not prepared to furnish bail, he must be produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours.

6. The Magistrate has no authority to authorize detention in police custody for an accused of a bailable offense who is willing to furnish bail.

KAPIL DEV SINGH VS THE KING 2017

Brief facts

The appellant was initially acquitted by the learned trial Court for the offence of murder.

The State of Uttar Pradesh did not file an appeal against the acquittal.

The first informant, not satisfied with the acquittal, filed a revision petition before the High Court seeking a retrial.

The High Court, in its impugned judgment, directed a retrial only for the limited purpose of rehearing arguments based on the existing evidence on record.

The High Court disagreed with the trial Court's conclusion and found the evidence of the sole eyewitness, P.W.3, credible, explaining his lack of response to help the deceased as a possible human reaction.

The High Court also reasoned that the absence of blood stains at the scene could be explained by the deceased wearing multiple layers of clothing in December.

Judgment

• The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not have interfered with the acquittal unless the trial Court's view was so improbable that it required reversal.

• The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the trial Court's order of acquittal.

• Consequently, the accused appellant was acquitted of the murder charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

KARANPURA DEVELOPMENT CO LTD VS R.K NARAIN 1956

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the interpretation and application of Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879.

2. Section 18 grants the Court of Wards the authority to sanction leases, farms, mortgages, sales, and other acts related to properties under its charge for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the ward.

3. The Court of Wards, a statutory body, is not in the same position as a guardian of a minor's property. Its powers are defined by the Act, and its decisions can only be challenged if it acted fraudulently or without proper judgment in the ward's interest.

4. In this case, the Court of Wards sanctioned a prospecting license in favor of B, the appellant's predecessor, on 26-3-1915.

5. Later, on 23-11-1917, the Court of Wards modified the terms of the license, allowing an extension up to 26-3-1951, subject to certain conditions.

Issues

1. The respondent, after becoming a major, contested the validity of the deeds, alleging that the Court of Wards did not act in the ward's benefit and that it lacked the power to enter into the 1917 transaction.

2. The respondent argued that the cess clause in the 1915 deed was less advantageous than that in another license, but the Court of Wards' decision, based on its judgment, cannot be questioned on this ground.

Judgment

1. A mere recital in the deed stating that it was sanctioned is not sufficient; it must be demonstrated that the sanction was, in fact, given.

2. The Court found that the order of the Court of Wards dated 9-10-1917 contained the essential sanction, thus complying with s. 18.

3. Importantly, s. 18 only requires the transaction to be entered into with the Court of Wards' sanction; if the transaction later turns out to be flawed, it does not invalidate the original sanction.

4. Precedents from Gulabsingh v. Seth Gokuldas and Ramkanai Singh Deb Darpashaha v. Mathewson were relied upon to support the Court's interpretation.

5. In conclusion, the Court upheld the validity of the deeds sanctioned by the Court of Wards, and the appellant's claim was deemed valid under the Act.

KESHAVANAND BHARTI VS STATE OF KERELA 1973

Brief facts

Kesavananda Bharati was the chief pontiff of the Edneer Mutt, a monastic religious institution located in Kasaragod district, Kerala. Bharati had some land in the Mutt which he owned. The Kerala state government passed the Land Reforms Amendment Act in 1969. As per this Act, the government could acquire some of the lands that belonged to the Mutt. In March 1970, Bharati moved the Supreme Court (under Section 32 of the Constitution) to enforce the rights that were guaranteed to him under:

1. Article 25: Right to practice & propagate religion

2. Article 26: Right to manage religious affairs

3. Article 14: Right to equality

4. Article 19(1)(f): Freedom to acquire property

5. Article 31: Compulsory acquisition of property

Issues

• Whether the following are constitutionally valid?

• 24th Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1971

• 25th Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1972

• The extent to which the Parliament can exercise its power to amend the Constitution.

• The question underlying the case also included: Was the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution unlimited? In other words, could Parliament alter, amend, abrogate any part of the Constitution even to the extent of taking away all fundamental rights?

Judgment

1. The landmark judgment was delivered on 24th April 1973 by a razor-thin majority of 7:6 wherein the majority held that any provision of the Indian Constitution can be amended by the Parliament in order to fulfil its socio-economic obligations that were guaranteed to the citizens as given in the Preamble, provided that such amendment did not change the Constitution’s basic structure. The minority, however, in their dissenting opinion, were wary of giving the Parliament unlimited amending power.

2. The court held that the 24th Constitutional Amendment was entirely valid. But it found the first part of the 25th Constitutional Amendment to be intra vires and the second part of the same ultra vires.

THE KESHAV MILLS CO. LTD VS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY NORTH 1965 AIR 1636

Brief Facts

1. The appellant was a company registered in the erstwhile Baroda State.

2. The dispute was related to the assessment year 1942-43, where the Income-tax Officer in Ahmedabad held that certain sale proceeds were taxable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

3. The specific item in dispute was the sale-proceeds collected through cheques on British India Shroffs and Merchants.

4. Both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal ruled against the appellant.

5. The case was referred to the High Court for a decision.

6. The High Court requested the Tribunal to collect additional material and submit a supplementary Statement of Case on two occasions.

7. Ultimately, the High Court decided against the appellant but granted a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. The appellant contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Tribunal to collect additional material under section 66(4) of the Income-tax Act.

2. The Revenue argued that the two previous cases, Petlad Co. and New Jahangir Mills, required reconsideration.

3. The Supreme Court had to decide whether to review and revise its earlier view in the two cases.

Judgment

1. The Court held that the High Court's power to ask the Tribunal to investigate further facts was reasonably possible, but the opposite view taken in the two earlier cases was also reasonable.

2. The Court declined to review or revise its decisions in the Petlad Co. and New Jahangir Mills cases as they had been consistently followed in subsequent cases and had regulated the procedure in reference proceedings in the High Courts.

KHACHERU SINGH AND ORS VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AIR 1956 SC 546

Brief Facts

1. Appellants were convicted under Sections 323 and 326 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.

2. The Magistrate framed charges under Sections 148, 323, and 326 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, convicting appellants and seven others.

3. In appeal, the Second Additional Sessions Judge acquitted all except the appellants, maintaining their conviction but reducing the sentence.

4. Appellants moved the High Court in revisional jurisdiction.

5. High Court acquitted appellants under Section 148 and Sections 323 and 326 read with Section 149, stating the absence of unlawful assembly elements.

6. High Court convicted appellants under Sections 323 and 326 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.

7. Appellants obtained special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court against this decision.

8. Prosecution version accepted, which revealed appellants assaulted complainant Randhir Singh after an altercation about grazing bullocks in the 'Chari' field.

9. Another incident occurred where some people came to help the complainant and were also assaulted.

10. Prosecution's version of the occurrence accepted, while the defense version was rejected.

Issues

Appellants argued there were two separate incidents and no evidence of a prepared plan for assault.

Judgment

1. Supreme Court stated it usually does not interfere with findings of fact in special leave appeals.

2. The court found that the provisions of Section 34, Penal Code applied based on accepted prosecution version.

3. The appeal was dismissed, and appellants' participation in the assault was held to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

KHARAK SINGH VS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS 1963 AIR 1295

Brief Facts

1. The petitioner was challenged in a dacoity case but was released due to lack of evidence against him.

2. The police opened a history sheet against him and put him under surveillance as per Regulation 236 of U.P. Police Regulations.

3. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32, challenging the constitutional validity of Chapter XX of U.P. Police Regulations, including Regulation 236.

4. The respondent's defense was that the regulations did not infringe any freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and were reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order and efficiency of police duties.

Issues

The respondent argued that any action causing trespass to property could lead to a claim in tort for damages, but the court rejected this argument as irrelevant to the infringement of fundamental rights.

Judgment

1. The court stated that both Article 19(1) and Article 21 deal with distinct and independent fundamental rights.

2. The whole of Regulation 236 was held to be unconstitutional, not just clause (b).

3. Acts of surveillance under Regulation 236 were considered to infringe the petitioner's fundamental rights under both Article 21 and Article 19(1)(d) (freedom of movement).

4. The court reasoned that surveillance restricted the petitioner's freedom of movement and expression, turning the whole country into a jail for him.

KHODAY DISTILLERIES LTD & ANR VS THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 1996 SCC

Brief Facts

1. The civil appeals were listed before the Constitution Bench for directions and were not heard on merits before the decision was made.

2. The judgment in the civil appeals reported in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others, 1995 (1) SCC 574, is invalid due to a violation of principles of natural justice.

3. Reliance is placed on the decision in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr., 1988 (Suppl.1) SCR 1, in support of these submissions.

Judgment

The court emphasizes that frequent resort to the decision in Antulay in similar situations is misconceived.

The court clarifies that the decision in Antulay is limited to its peculiar circumstances and does not permit reconsideration of a final decision on merits.

The court's decision is based on the facts and circumstances of        the current case, where the civil appeals were heard, and supplementary written submissions were considered before the review petitions were rejected.

The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.

KHYERBARI TEA CO. LTD & ANR VS THE STATE OF ASSAM 1964

Brief Facts

1. The petition challenges the constitutional validity of the Assam Taxation (on Goods carried by Road or on Inland Waterways) Act, 1961.

2. The previous Act of 1954 had been declared constitutionally invalid in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [1961] 1 S.C.R. 809.

3. The Assam Legislature passed the impugned Act with retrospective effect from the date of the Act of 1954, with the President's sanction under Art. 304(b) of the Constitution.

4. Petitioner No. 2, the Manager of a tea company, challenged the Act under Art. 32 of the Constitution, as the company's petition was deemed incompetent.

Issues

1. The main contention was that ss. 3 and 34 of the Act constituted unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade guaranteed by Art. 301 and infringed Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

2. The Court decided to examine whether the restrictions imposed by the Act were reasonable and in the public interest under Art. 304(b) of the Constitution.

Judgment

1. Section 34 of the Act, selecting only tea and jute for taxation, was not discriminatory under Art. 19(1)(g) and within the Legislature's freedom to determine taxed articles.

2. The power to levy tax under Entry 56 of List II was not controlled by other Acts, and the Act's application was not extra-territorial.

3. The Court held that the Act was not colorable legislation and did not violate Art. 14 or 19 of the Constitution. The validity of the Act was upheld.

KIRAN VS SHARAD DUTT 1999

Brief Facts

1. The case is an appeal in a divorce matter between the appellant (wife) and the respondent (husband).

2. During the proceedings at the Special Leave Petition (SLP) stage, both parties agreed to seek a divorce by mutual consent, leading to an adjournment of the case.

3. Consent terms were filed, duly signed by the wife, husband, and their respective Advocates-on-record.

4. The terms suggested in the I.A. No.3 of 1999, jointly moved by both parties, were found to be fair by the court.

5. Both parties have been living separately for several years and are unable to reconcile or live together. They do not have any children.

6. The original Hindu Marriage Petition No.584 of 1988, which sought divorce on grounds of alleged desertion and cruelty by the wife, as well as a decree for nullity under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, is no longer relevant due to the mutual consent for divorce.

Judgment

1. The agreement regarding the payment of permanent alimony and monthly maintenance, as specified in paragraphs 2(a) to (d), will be part of the divorce decree.

2. The judgments and decrees of both the High Court and trial court are set aside.

3. The Hindu Marriage Petition will stand allowed in terms of the prayer for divorce by mutual consent.

4. The case concludes with the successful granting of divorce by mutual consent between the parties.

KISHINCHAND CHELLARAM VS THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX BOMBAY

Brief Facts

1. The appellant firm, M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram, was assessed to tax for the assessment year 1947-48, relevant accounting year being the year ending 6th April 1947.

2. The Income Tax Officer received information that a sum of Rs. 1,07,350 was sent by the appellant firm through a telegraphic transfer to one Nathirmal in Bombay, via Punjab National Bank, Madras, on 16th October 1946.

3. The Income Tax Officer initiated inquiries by sending letters to the appellant firm to explain the remittance. The firm denied making any such remittance in their replies.

4. The Income Tax Officer brought the amount of Rs. 1,07,350 to tax as concealed income of the appellant firm, based on the belief that the remittance was made by them.

5. The appellant firm appealed to the Assistant Appellate Commissioner, claiming that the transaction did not relate to their firm.

Judgment

1. The Court criticized the Income Tax Officer for not disclosing certain important documents to the appellant firm, including letters from the bank manager, and for not giving the firm an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.

2. The Court held that the documents in question did not provide a reasonable basis to conclude that the remittance was made by the appellant firm.

3. Ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling in favor of the appellant firm, as there was insufficient evidence to prove that the amount in question belonged to them and was remitted from Madras to Bombay.

KRISHAN YADAV VS STATE OF HARYANA 1994 AIR 2166

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the validity of the selection process of Taxation Inspectors by the Subordinate Selection Board.

2. The Board issued an advertisement in 1986 inviting applications for 96 posts of Taxation Inspectors in the Excise and Taxation Department.

3. The selection was based on a written test and viva voce interview, with minimum qualifying marks set for each subject and aggregate.

4. Due to certain reasons, the written test could not be conducted as per the first advertisement.

5. Later, the Board issued a fresh advertisement in 1988 for the same 96 posts, allowing candidates from the previous advertisement to be considered.

6. The written test and interviews were conducted, and the selection list was finalized, but serious allegations of nepotism and fraud arose.

Judgment

1. The Court found the selection process to be arbitrary and set aside the entire selection of Taxation Inspectors.

2. A fresh selection process was ordered, with a new advertisement and revised evaluation criteria for written test and viva voce.

3. The Court directed the State to ensure fair conduct of the examination, and necessary prosecutions were to be initiated against those involved in the irregularities.

4. The Court imposed a cost of Rs. 10,000 on each of the Respondents as a symbolic gesture of disapproval for the arbitrary selection.

KRISHNA BUS SERVICE LTD VS SMT. MANGLI & ORS

Brief Facts

1. The appellant's bus, DLB 5749, driven by "HS," while en route to Hissar, overturned in village Kheri Sadh, resulting in the death of "LWS" and injuries to many passengers.

2. The bus was overloaded with passengers and goods, and "HS" was driving at an excessive speed despite protests from the passengers while negotiating a turn.

3. The legal heirs of deceased "LWS" filed a suit for damages against the driver and the appellant, holding the appellant liable for employing a rash and negligent driver.

4. The appellant claimed "vis major" as a defense, citing rain on the fateful day and the breaking of the tie-rod of the vehicle, causing the bus to go out of control.

5. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the Punjab and Haryana High Court decreed the suit, finding the accident was due to negligence attributable to the driver or both the driver and the appellant.

6. The High Court based its decision on the testimony of witnesses and evidence, including overloading, slippery road conditions due to drizzling, bad brake conditions, and the fast speed at which the bus was driven.

7. The High Court also invoked the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" to infer negligence against the appellant and the driver due to the overturning of the bus.

8. The High Court awarded damages of Rs. 21,600/- with proportionate costs against the appellant and the driver, limiting the liability of the insurance company to Rs. 2,000/-.

Issues

1. The appellant appealed the decision, contending that "res ipsa loquitur" was wrongly applied and that the onus of proving non-negligence should not have been shifted to them.

2. The appellant argued that the breaking of the tie-rod was a result of "vis major," and there was no specific evidence supporting this fact.

Judgment

1. The court found that the driver's actions, like overloading, excessive speed, and failure to drive cautiously on a slippery road near a village, contributed to the accident.

2. The court held that the breaking of the tie-rod, assuming it occurred, was at best a neutral circumstance, as the driver could have avoided it with ordinary care.

3. As the driver was an employee of the appellant, acting in the course of employment, and the vehicle was under the appellant's management, the appellant was held fully liable for the negligent act of their employee and the resulting injuries. The appeal was dismissed.

L. CHANDRA KUMAR VS UNION OF INDIA 1997

Brief Facts

• It empowered the Centre to establish a Central Administrative Tribunal, State Administrative Tribunals, and a Joint Administrative Tribunal to provide swift, effective, and just justice to public authorities who had been wronged. The issue of tribunal hierarchy is not addressed in this article.

• Article 323-B: Industrial and labour disputes, taxation, land reforms, foreign exchange, election to Parliament and State Legislature, import and export, rent and tenancy rights, the ceiling on urban property, and foodstuffs were all covered by Article 323-B, which allowed both the Parliament and the State Legislature to create tribunals.

• The State Legislature and Parliament may establish a hierarchy of tribunals under this article.

• In this judgment, the Administrative Tribunal Act of 1985 and the Tribunals established under Part XIV-A of the Indian Constitution were grouped together as effective and efficient substitutes for the courts in discharging the power of judicial review.

• With the implementation of Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution, the Central Administrative Tribunal was founded on November 1, 1985, with five separate Benches. However, some challenges challenging the constitutional validity of the articles in question were filed before the creation of these benches in the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Is it possible to say that the Tribunals established and operating under the Act are effective substitutes for the High Courts in exercising the power of judicial review? If not, what changes must be made to bring the tribunals into compliance with their basic goals?

• Is it true that the Tribunals have the authority to examine the constitutional legality of statutory rules enacted under Article 323-A or 323-B of the Indian Constitution?

• Whether the power conferred on State Legislatures or Parliament by Article 323-B 3(d) or by Article 323-A 2(d) excludes the jurisdiction of all courts (except the Supreme Court under Article 136) in respect of complaints and disputes referred to in clause 1 of Article 323-A, and runs counter to the power of judicial review conferred on High Courts and Supreme Courts, respectively, by Article 226/227 and Article 32.

Judgment

• The central topic of the entire decision was that the Tribunals cannot and will not serve as a substitute for the High Courts' judicial review power granted by the Constitution. While the High Court performs its job, the Tribunals will serve as auxiliary institutions to support it. Furthermore, the Tribunals will be supervised by the High Courts and cannot be regarded as independent organizations.

• Articles 32 and 226 confer judicial review power on the Supreme Court and the High Courts, respectively, as part of the Constitution's basic framework.

• The fact that these Tribunals are supervised by the Supreme Court and the High Court is also part of the Constitution's core framework.

LAJWANTI SIAL AND OTHERS VS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 1956

Brief Facts

The reference is made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, under section 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as per the direction of the Court in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 10 of 1953.

The assessee, R.S.P.S. Sial, had a credit amount of Rs. 14,600 in his personal account on 31st March 1948, which the Income-tax Officer treated as his business income. The officer observed that no explanation was offered by the assessee and assumed that the true source was concealed to avoid taxation.

Issues

The reference involves three questions of law:

Whether there was any material on record to find that the cash credit of Rs. 14,600 was the assessee's income from an undisclosed source? 

Whether the Tribunal was legally justified in holding the money in question as income from an undisclosed source in the absence of any material on record indicating otherwise? 

Whether the amount of Rs. 14,600 is otherwise taxable?

Judgment

1. The Court answers all three questions in the negative, stating that there was no material to show that the credit amount was from an undisclosed source, and the assessee's explanation was reasonable and should not have been rejected.

2. The Court orders the Department to bear the costs of the proceedings, and the hearing fee is fixed at Rs. 100.

LAXMI SHANKER YADAV VS KUAWAR SHRIPAL SINGH AND OTHERS AIR 1960

Brief Facts

1. The petitioner and the first opposite party were candidates for election to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from Shahganj Constituency No. 200, where one seat was reserved for a candidate of the scheduled caste.

2. The first opposite party won the election and was declared elected from the general constituency.

3. The petitioner filed an election petition challenging the first opposite party's election, alleging corrupt practices and illegalities, and sought his own declaration as duly elected.

4. The Election Commission referred the petition to the District Judge, Jaunpur, as the Election Tribunal.

5. The Tribunal dismissed the election petition, and the petitioner appealed to the High Court, which also dismissed the appeal.

Issues

• A preliminary objection was raised concerning the maintainability of the petition under Article 133 of the Constitution.

• The objection was based on Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, which provides for appeals against Election Tribunals' orders.

• It was contended that the High Court acted as "persona designata" and its judgments in such appeals were not judgments of a High Court within Article 133.

Judgment

The court found that the grounds raised a question of substantial and general importance of a recurring nature, warranting consideration by the Supreme Court, and granted the certificate of fitness for appeal under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitutio

LAKSHMI SHANKAR SHRIVASTAVA VS STATE ( DELHI ADMINISTRATION)

Brief Facts

1. The appellant worked as an investigator in the office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports.

2. He was charged, found guilty, and convicted for offences under Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

3. The appellant was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months on each count and fined Rs. 200/-, with further rigorous imprisonment in default of payment.

4. He appealed his conviction and sentence to the High Court, but the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence were upheld.

5. The appellant sought special leave from the Supreme Court limited to the question of the validity of the sanction accorded under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

6. Before the Supreme Court could hear the appeal, the appellant died, and his near relatives were granted permission to continue the appeal as per the provisions of Section 394(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Issues

1. The State raised a preliminary objection about the abatement of the appeal due to the appellant's death. However, the objection was rejected since the near relatives were allowed to continue the appeal.

2. The main issue before the Supreme Court was the validity of the sanction accorded for prosecuting the appellant under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

Judgment

1. The order issued by the President under S.R.O. 631 was saved under Rule 34 of the 1965 Rules, making the sanction valid.

2. The fact that the administrative department for the office of Chief Controller of Imports and Exports was the Ministry of Foreign Trade & Supply did not impact the validity of the sanction.

3. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, upholding the appellant's conviction and sentence.
   
   

LALIT MOHAN DAS VS ADVOCATE GENERAL 1957 AIR 250

Brief Facts

1. The case involves an appellant pleader who had a strained relationship with a Munsif (a judicial officer).

2. The pleader made objectionable remarks in open court, suggesting partiality and unfairness on the part of the Munsif.

3. The Munsif initiated a proceeding against the pleader under sections 13 and 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, and submitted a report to the High Court through the District judge.

4. The pleader filed an application to the Additional District judge, seeking time to move the High Court for a different judicial officer to hear the matter.

5. The Additional District judge granted one month's time and sent the record back to the Munsif for unknown reasons.

6. The Additional District judge tried to settle the issue by arranging an apology from the pleader and a resolution from the local Bar Association.

7. The pleader apologized in writing and expressed regret, and the Munsif dropped the proceeding.

8. However, it later emerged that the resolution passed by the Bar Association did not adhere to the terms suggested by the Additional District judge, and the agreed settlement was not fully executed.

9. Consequently, the proceeding was re-opened, and the report was re-submitted to the District judge, who forwarded it to the High Court along with his opinion.

10. The High Court, upon reviewing the matter, suspended the pleader from practice for five years.

Issues

The appellant argued that there was no valid reason to revive the proceeding after an apology and expression of regret were made.

Judgment

1. The court emphasized that a member of the Bar is an officer of the court and has a duty to uphold the dignity and decorum of the court while also representing the client.

2. The Supreme Court would be reluctant to interfere with disciplinary actions against a member of the Bar by the High Court, except in cases with clear mitigating circumsta

LAXMI KANT PANDEY VS UNION OF INDIA 1987

Brief Facts

1. The case deals with the adoption of Indian children by foreign parents.

2. The Supreme Court formulated normative and procedural safeguards for such adoptions.

3. Petitioners moved for clarification/further directions due to difficulties in implementing the safeguards.

4. The court mandated that a reasonable amount (Rs. 450 to Rs. 500) be paid to the scrutinizing agency for its services when appointing a foreign parent as a guardian for adoption.

5. Indian parents applying for guardianship or adoption were also required to pay a smaller amount (not exceeding Rs. 150).

6. Nursing homes and hospitals finding abandoned children must inform the Social Welfare Department or the Collector and recognized placement agencies.

7. Prospective Indian parents registered with placement agencies are entitled to information about available children.

Judgment

1. Placement agencies can transfer abandoned children to their branches in other states or associate social/child welfare agencies after completing the inquiry.

2. The Government of India is directed to publish lists of recognized placement agencies and their associates, and agencies can recover expenses (up to Rs. 6000) from the foreign parents.

LILY THOMAS VS UNION OF INDIA

Brief Facts

A Marriage was constituted between Mrs. Sushmita Ghosh & Mr. Gyan Chand Ghosh on 10th May 1985, following all Hindu rituals and traditions.

 A month later, on April 22nd her husband conveyed to her he was no longer willing to live with her, and thus, she should agree for getting a divorce with mutual consent.

 The husband told her he has converted to Islam and would marry Vinita Gupta. Later on, the husband of the petitioner pronounced that he was converting his religion to Islam for which he got a certificate on 17th June 1992, and thus would marry again with a lady named Vinita Gupta.

 Therefore, the petitioner i.e. Mrs. Sushmita Ghosh prays her husband should be abstained from marrying Vinita Gupta

Issues

1. Can a Hindu male be allowed to enter another marriage after converting to Islam?

2. Would a Hindu male be held liable for the offence of Bigamy as per section 494 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860?

Judgment

If a Hindu spouse converts their religion in order to convene a second marriage with no intention of truly professing such religion but only to achieve an ulterior motive, the second marriage is null and void. Article 21 of the Constitution is violated. The first is not dissolved simply because either party converts. Especially if the first marriage is still in force, such an action would constitute bigamy under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It shall invite the provisions of IPC Sections 494 and 495. Marriage is performed in India in accordance with the provisions of personal laws applicable to the parties.  The Court ruled that a mere conversion does not dissolve a marriage until a divorce decree is obtained from the competent Court and that until the decree is obtained, the marriage remains valid and continues to exist.

LIOYDS BANK LTD, NEW DELHI VS PANNA LAL GUPTA AND ANR AIR 1967 SC 428

Brief Facts

1. The case involves an industrial dispute between Lloyds Bank Ltd. (the appellant) and the Union of its workmen (the respondent) concerning three employees: Panna Lal Gupta, Phusa Ram Goyal, and Paras Ram Garg.

2. The respondent claims that the three employees are entitled to a special allowance of Rs. 50 per month as prescribed in paragraph 164 of the Award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) modified by the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Act, 1955.

3. The dispute was referred to the Central Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, by the Central Government for adjudication.

Issues

The main issues framed by the Tribunal are the validity of the reference and whether the three workmen are entitled to the special allowance.

The appellant argues that the clerks' duties primarily involve checking and accounting and lack true supervisory characteristics

Judgment

1. The Court agrees with the appellant's arguments and concludes that the three employees do not qualify as supervisors under the Award's category 9.

2. Therefore, the Court allows the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's order, and there will be no order as to costs.

3. The case highlights the importance of considering the actual nature of the duties performed by employees in determining their supervisory status for entitlement to special allowances.

M.C MEHTA VS UNION OF INDIA 1986

Brief Facts

On 4th December 1985, an incident of a major leakage of oleum gas happened from one of the units of Shriram. The leakage physically affected many common public – both the workmen as well as common people outside. 

Moreover, an advocate practising in the Tis Hazari Court died after inhaling oleum gas. The incident was confirmed by both the petitioner and the Delhi Bar Association. After two days, another minor leakage of oleum gas took place from the joints of a pipe on 6th December.

Due to the subsequent two incidents of oleum gas leakage, the Delhi administration immediately responded by issuing an order under Section 133(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which directed Shriram to take the following steps:

• To stop using harmful chemicals and gases in the unit within two days;

• Remove the said chemicals to a safer place within seven days and not keep or store the chemicals in the same place where the disaster happened again;

• Or, to appear in the Court of District Magistrate, Delhi to show cause for the non-enforceability of the mentioned order on 17th December 1985.

Issues

• Whether the jurisdiction and authority of the Supreme Court under Article 32 can be extended;

• Whether applications for compensations to victims are maintainable under the said Article;

• Whether Shriram falls under “other authorities” as mentioned in Article 12;

• Whether the right to life under Article 21 is available against a private corporation like Shriram;

• If a letter addressed to any individual judge is maintainable as public interest litigation;

Judgment

The final decision by the Supreme Court was to give Shriram permission to reopen the mentioned plant. Though the earlier two orders passed by the Inspector and Assistant Commissioner of factories dated 7th and 24th December, 1985 were not vacated, both the orders were suspended. The Court gave temporary permission to run the plant and set ten conditions to strictly follow, along with fines. The Court also mentioned that failure to maintain the conditions would result in the cancellation of the permission granted by the Court. 

LAXMI & CO VS DR ANANT R. DESHPANDEY & ANR 1973 AIR 171

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the interpretation of Section 42A of the Presidency Small Cause Courts (Maharashtra Amendment) Act of 1963.

2. Section 42A provides a special procedure for cases where an occupant claims tenancy within the meaning of the Bombay Rents, Hotel, and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act 1947.

3. The occupant is required to claim tenancy of the applicant within the scope of the 1947 Act.

4. If the applicant (landlord) does not admit the occupant's tenancy claim, the Small Cause Court must decide the issue as a preliminary matter.

5. The critical phrase in Section 42A is "then notwithstanding anything contained in that Act," indicating the significance of specific conditions that must be met.

6. The conditions are: the occupant must appear at the appointed time, claim tenancy within the meaning of the 1947 Act, and assert entitlement to the Act's protection.

7. If the applicant denies the occupant's claim, the Small Cause Court is tasked with deciding whether the occupant is entitled to protection under the 1947 Act.

8. The key point of contention in the appeal is the interpretation of the term "appears" as used in Section 42A.

Issues

The first question before the court is whether "appears" means the physical presence of the party in person or representation through someone at the date of the hearing.

The second question is whether the Small Cause Court must frame an issue regarding the occupant's tenancy status, regardless of whether the contesting party appears at the hearing or not.

Judgment

1. The court rules that the trial court is not obliged to frame a preliminary issue on the appointed day, irrespective of the occupant's appearance.

2. In this specific case, the respondent (occupant) did not appear at the hearing to claim protection under the 1947 Act.

3. As the respondent failed to appear and assert his entitlement to the Act's protection, he is entitled to retain possession of the tenancy.

4. Therefore, the court allows the appeal, affirming that "appears" in Section 42A means appearing at the date of the hearing, and no preliminary issue is required if the occupant fails to appear and make the necessary claims.

M. RAMJAYARM VS G.M SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY (1996)

Brief Facts

1. The case concerns the selection of Law Assistants, where the appellant challenges the awarding of 15 marks to contesting respondents based on seniority, as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

2. The appellant secured more than 60% in the written examination and performed well in the viva-voce, but couldn't get selected due to the additional 15 marks awarded to the contesting respondents for their seniority.

3. The court issued a notice to consider the procedure for selection based on overall merit, as per Rule 219(g) of the Railway Establishment Code.

4. Rule 219(g) outlines the factors for selection and their relative weightage, including professional ability (50 marks), personality and academic qualifications (20 marks), record of service (15 marks), and seniority (15 marks).

Issues

The appellant's contention is that the contesting respondents were from different units, and Rule 320, which pertains to inter-seniority for employees in different seniority units, should not apply in this case.

Judgment

1. The appellant's performance in the written examination and viva-voce was better, but the seniority-based marks tilted the selection in favor of the contesting respondents.

2. The court emphasizes the importance of selecting candidates primarily on overall merit, as per the guidelines in Rule 219(g).

3. The case highlights the significance of adhering to fair and non-discriminatory selection procedures in the recruitment process.

M.S AHALWAT VS STATE OF HARYANA

Brief Facts

1. The petitioner, M.S. Ahlawat, had earlier been convicted and sentenced by the Supreme Court in a judgment delivered on January 17, 1996. He was found guilty of deliberately fabricating false records before the court.

2. The charges against him included punishment under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for giving or fabricating false evidence in a judicial proceeding, and also for contempt of the court under Article 129 of the Constitution of India.

3. The court had received a report on November 5, 1993, stating that the petitioner's signature on an affidavit filed before the court had been forged. This led to an inquiry into the alleged forgery.

4. The District Judge, Faridabad, conducted an inquiry and submitted a report on January 29, 1994, stating that the petitioner was not responsible for the alleged forgery.

5. The court, not being satisfied with the report, ordered a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiry into the matter.

6. The CBI inquiry led to notices being issued to certain individuals, including Head Constable Krishan Kumar, SI Ishwar Singh, and ASI Randhir Singh, for their alleged involvement in the forgery and filing of false affidavits.

Issues

1. The petitioner filed a review petition against the conviction, which was dismissed summarily on March 29, 1996.

2. In the present writ petition, the petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 193 IPC, but does not question the conviction under Article 129 of the Constitution for contempt of court.

Judgment

1. The court observes that its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be used to ignore substantive provisions of a statute. It acknowledges that it should not have assumed jurisdiction to convict the petitioner under Section 193 IPC without following the procedure prescribed under Sections 195 and 340 Cr.P.C.

2. The court, therefore, sets aside the conviction of the petitioner under Section 193 IPC but upholds the conviction and sentence imposed under Article 129 of the Constitution for contempt of court. The court also clarifies that the petitioner cannot claim compensation or initiate any proceedings in any court arising out of his conviction under Section 193 IPC, except to use it in any departmental proceedings related to his services.

M.S PATIL, ASSTT. CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS, SOLARPUR VS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 1996

Brief Facts

1. The case arises from the common order of the Administrative Tribunal, Bombay, in Application No. 83/96, etc., dismissing the above judgment.

2. The controversy had already been decided by this Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Sanjay Thakre & Ors. [1995 Supp. (2) SCC 407], in which one of the Justices, K. Ramaswamy, was a member.

Issues

• The combined seniority as per the rules should be maintained from the date of regular appointment or promotion.

• The petitioner's appointment preceded the appointment of direct recruits, and his entire service as an Assistant Conservator of Forests should be considered to maintain seniority.

• The direct recruits' unfilled quota cannot be carried forward, relying on the judgment in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India [1992 Supp. (3) 217].

• The petitioner was not made a party to the earlier proceedings, violating the principles of natural justice.

• The third respondent (in this case) is a direct recruit who concealed material facts leading to an erroneous judgment by this Court.

Judgment

The Court noted that some of the persons were not parties to the earlier petition, but the general principle of law laid down by this Court in the earlier judgment stands applicable to every person, irrespective of their involvement in the earlier order.

The Court found no error of law in its earlier judgment and declined to reconsider the case. The judgment in the earlier matter remained valid, and the law laid down by the Court stood firm.

MADHURI MEHTA VS MEET VERMA 1997

Brief Facts

1. The parties, who are highly educated doctors, filed a joint application under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent.

2. The application also includes provisions for their only child, granting the child the right to visit the father whenever he likes.

3. However, the application does not grant the father a corresponding right to visit the child, leading to a potential violation of the rights of both the child and the father.

4. The parties have been estranged and living apart since January 1996.

5. Prior to their current marriage, both parties had their previous marriages broken or disrupted due to unfortunate circumstances – the husband's previous wife passed away in a vehicular accident, and the wife divorced her earlier husband.

6. The court acknowledges the complexities of their situation considering their past experiences and differences.

7. In light of the circumstances, the court entertains the application and decides to grant them a divorce by mutual consent.

8. The court exercises its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to grant the divorce, citing ample authority from previous decisions of the same court.

Judgment

1. The court emphasizes the significance of mutual consent in the divorce process under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act.

2. The court considers the joint application and mutual consent as valid grounds for granting the divorce.

3. The court concludes that the divorce by mutual consent is appropriate in this case, considering the parties' irreconcilable differences and long separation.

4. The transfer petition and divorce petition are both disposed of accordingly, and the parties are granted divorce by mutual consent under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the court's powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

MAHARAHSTRA GENERAL KAMGAR UNION VS GLASS CONTAINERS 1982

Brief Facts

1. Petitioners: A registered trade union

2. Impugned Decision: Decision of the Industrial Court in Complaint ULP 301 of 1978

3. Impugned Decision Outcome: Dismissed the Complaint filed by the Union and vacated the ad-interim injunction against the Employer.

4. 1st Respondent: The employer who was the opponent in Complaint ULP 301 of 1978.

5. 2nd Respondent: The Tribunal whose order is challenged in the writ petition.

6. Background: Strained relations between employees and the employer since mid-1977. Employer filed Complaint ULP No. 288 of 1977. Lock-out declared on 13th October 1977. Union made a reference to the Labor Court for declaring the lock-out illegal.

7. Previous Closure Attempts: Employer sought permission for closure under S. 25(O) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Government of Maharashtra refused permission on August 16, 1977, and again on November 9, 1977.

8. Supreme Court Ruling: In September 1978, the Supreme Court struck down certain provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act related to closure, including S. 25(o) and part of S. 25R.

Issues

1. October 9, 1978: Employer issued a notice of closure, stating that the manufacturing unit would be closed down after one month from the date of the notice.

2. Union's Complaint: On October 30, 1978, the Union filed a complaint before the Industrial Court alleging unfair labor practices under M.R.T.U. Act, 1971.

Judgment

The writ petition is discharged, upholding the Industrial Court's decision on unfair labor practice points but disagreeing with its view on the legality of the closure due to non-compliance with S. 25-FFA and S. 25-FFF. The Judge directs the Prothonotary to send a copy of the judgment to the Government of Maharashtra for necessary action against the employer.

MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY VS M/S WAMAN YASHWANT

Brief Facts

1. Appeal against District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum's order dated 12.01.2010 in Consumer Complaint No.89/2009.

2. Parties: The Original Complainants (Respondents) are owners of a petrol pump. The Appellant Company is the electricity supplier.

3. Dispute: The dispute arose when the Appellant Company treated the electricity consumption at the petrol pump as commercial instead of industrial, resulting in a higher tariff.

4. Forum's Decision: The District Consumer Forum ruled in favor of the Complainants, declaring the bill dated 12.10.2009 issued by the Appellant as illegal. It awarded Rs. 3,000/- as compensation and costs and directed the return of Rs. 25,050.50 credited to the Appellant's account.

5. Grounds of Appeal: The Appellant challenged the Forum's decision, contending that the dispute pertains to tariff pricing, which is beyond the jurisdiction of consumer forums.

6. Applicable Regulations: The Appellant cited the Electricity Act, 2003 and the Electricity Supply Code and other conditions of Supply Regulations, 2005, which grant the power to change tariffs to the Appellant Company.

7. Basis of the Appellant's Action: The Appellant explained that the Chief Engineer directed the electricity supply to the Petrol Pump to be treated as commercial purpose, leading to the difference in tariff and the billing amount.

8. Precedent Cited: The Appellant referred to the authority of the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in the case of Anand Cane Crusher v/s. U.P. State Electricity Board and Anr., upholding that disputes related to tariff pricing are beyond the jurisdiction of consumer forums.

9. Original Complainant's Payment Record: The Original Complainant was paying the electricity bills regularly, as stated by the Appellant.

Issues

The Appellant asserted that the dispute is about the consideration payable for power supply and falls under the realm of tariff pricing, not incorrect or inflated billing.

Judgment

1. The Appellant Company's decision to treat the electricity consumption as commercial for the petrol pump was upheld, and the Complainants' claim for compensation and refund was denied.

2.  The Appeal was allowed, the Forum's order was set aside, and Complaint No. 89/2009 was rejected. The parties were informed of the decision.

MAHESH CHANDER VS DELHI ADMINISTRATION AIR 1991

Brief Facts

1. The appellants were accused Nos. 1 and 2 in a murder case before the 8th Additional Sessions Judge in Delhi.

2. The charge against them was that they committed murder in furtherance of their common intention on 28th May 1975 in Pitam Pura, Delhi.

3. The deceased was Hanumant Singh, son of Harkishan Singh (PW-6), who had been demanding the return of gold ornaments given to his wife PW-4 at the time of their marriage.

4. The deceased's wife, PW-4, had gone to her parents' house but did not return the ornaments, leading to a strained relationship.

5. On 25th May 1975, the deceased rebuked PW-4 and asked her to retrieve the ornaments from her parents' house.

6. On 27th May 1975, appellant Mohinder Singh and his friend, appellant Mahesh Chander, visited the deceased's house, where they all slept in the front courtyard.

7. In the early hours of 28th May 1975, PW-11, the daughter of the deceased's brother, witnessed the appellants attacking the deceased with a wooden pestle while Mahesh Chander held him down.

8. The deceased cried for help, and PW-11 tried to intervene but was threatened by the appellants to keep quiet.

9. PW-11 managed to escape and inform her father PW-5 about the incident, who then went to the scene with PWs 1, 3, and 6.

10. The appellants were seen running away from the scene by PWs 1, 3, 5, and 6.

Issues

The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the correctness and legality of the High Court's judgment.

The main issues raised were related to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of evidence to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Judgment

The Court noted various discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses, which cast doubt on their veracity.

The Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the convictions and sentences passed by the lower courts and acquitted